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Tamara Y. Demko: The Politics of Public Health in Florida: Insights from Debates Over Medical 
Cannabis and Needle/Syringe Exchange Legislation 
(Under the direction of Pam Silberman) 
This study examined the question of why some health-related legislative bills in the state 
of Florida pass into law while others do not. Using a retrospective, sequential, mixed methods 
case study design that included in-depth, key informant interviews, I explored how 
sociopolitical factors and stakeholder actions influenced policymakers and the outcomes of two 
Florida bills on medical cannabis and needle/syringe exchange. 
 Both bills were considered during the 2014 election year by a Republican majority 
legislature. The medical cannabis bill passed, and the needle exchange bill died in return 
messages at the end of the legislative session. Several sociopolitical and policy themes 
influenced the outcome of the bills: window of opportunity; persuasive health and/or economic 
arguments; effective grassroots mobilization with active, in-person citizen/constituent 
advocacy; influential legislative relationships (predominantly member-to-member and family 
members); and constituents and legislators acting as policy entrepreneurs and issue champions. 
However, certain expected themes were less influential: professional lobbying, state health 
agency influence, and pre-passage support by the governor’s office. The medical cannabis bill 
had unique favorable factors that helped it pass compared to the needle/syringe exchange bill: 
the threat of a constitutional amendment that might increase Democratic voter turnout and 
further influence a gubernatorial election; a CNN documentary on medical cannabis; strong 
iv 
majority party sponsorship; and a sympathetic focus on sick children, viewed as blameless 
relative to injectable drug users. 
 This work provides insights into Florida legislative processes and can be used as a 
roadmap for success for future public health legislation. An advocacy checklist for public health 
and health-related professionals and organizations provides recommendations on how to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
The topic of this dissertation is state public health legislation and how it is formally 
developed. Every year, important pieces of public health-related legislation are passed into law. 
What sets these items apart from those that do not? What factors granted them favored status 
above all other health-related ideas? Was there a moment, action, actor, or event that changed 
their fate? Are there factors that helped them be successful? If so, can a working guide or 
roadmap of suggested actions be created for use by a public health advocate to improve chances 
of having the idea made into law or policy?  
Overview of Dissertation 
Health sector policy advocates often encounter significant problems in promoting 
desirable health legislation. Their efforts often fail or are passed over for other priorities. As 
such, critical population health needs may not be met. While no study can fully capture the 
totality of interpersonal and political transactional elements that shape the outcomes of particular 
bills, this dissertation seeks to add insight to the larger picture. Using two specific examples, one 
successful, one not, I hope to assist public health professionals, related professionals, and policy 
advocates in expediting the enactment of beneficial, but potentially controversial, health policy 
legislation. I also hope to add to the discussion of factors impacting health-related legislation. 
The passage of state health-related legislation has been explored periodically in academic 
and general literature. These studies identified potential factors that influence passage of 
legislation and were grounded in established, but often limited and generalized political and 
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policymaking theories. Few studies, however, examine the breadth of potential influencing 
factors specifically impacting the health policy sector that confront state legislative processes. 
This dissertation used a retrospective, sequential, mixed methods case study design to 
explore the factors influencing the outcome of health-related legislation in the state of Florida. It 
focused on two controversial health bills in the 2014 Florida legislative session, one that passed 
(use of Charlotte’s Web/Low-Level Cannabis, SB 1030), and one that ultimately failed 
(Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program, SB 408). The study used a Qualtrics-based online 
survey that combined categorical Likert-scale questions of factors that influenced specific 
legislation with open-ended survey fields for participants to write in additional factors. The 
Qualtrics survey was sent to legislators and stakeholders of record. The survey results were used 
to inform key informant interviews of 20 selected stakeholders (“influencers”). These influencers 
included legislators, including primary bill sponsors, executive branch employees involved with 
the bills, lobbyists, and citizen stakeholders who both supported and opposed the legislation. 
Data were coded, analyzed, and then triangulated by examining the legislative history and media 
reports of actions occurring during the legislative process. 
The study explored more than 22 sociopolitical and interpersonal factors that have been 
posited to influence policy formation. They were derived from the literature review, Qualtrics 
survey write-ins, and my personal knowledge of Florida’s political mechanisms. These factors 
were thematically grouped for coding purposes into “General Factors” (e.g., window of 
opportunity), “Argument & Persuasion” (e.g., health benefit), “Constituencies” (e.g., legislative 
testimony), “Legislature” (e.g., sponsoring legislator’s power), “Lobbyists” (e.g., professional 
lobbyist work), and “Executive Branch” (e.g., governor’s office support).  
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To increase internal validity and reliability, a second coder was used to classify the 
responses. Given the specific legislative leadership and climate during 2014, potential researcher 
bias in factor and interviewee selection, and limitation to Florida, the results need to be viewed 
with caution. However, I believe that the results will be useful to the public health community 
through the sharing of study insights with public health associations and schools. Research-based 
suggestions for the effective deployment of monetary and manpower efforts will help to improve 
chances of legislative success. 
Discussion: Loss of Health Ideas When Health-Related Legislation Fails to Pass 
Important ideas that would advance the public’s health are often lost when higher priority 
topics supersede them, when reports gather dust on shelves, when administrations change, or 
when public health champions lose energy on the long, tedious paths to legislation and 
policymaking. A practical paradigm for any health professional or interest group to change 
health-related ideas into accepted health policies/laws in the fastest, most effective way possible 
could enable those groups to move issues “up the agenda” and maximize their impact on public 
health.  
For example, prevention, early detection, and early treatment for cancer, obesity, and 
diabetes are challenging political “sells” that can have high costs attached. Yet prevention and 
evidence-based interventions can, over time, increase the chances for improved quality of life 
and health, reduced long-term health care expenditures, and a stronger workforce. As another 
example, the concept of newborn screening has gained support in state legislation to varying 
degrees over the years. While the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
recommends screening for 35 core disorders and 26 secondary conditions, state newborn 
screening programs vary in which conditions are screened.1 Enacting state legislation that covers 
 
4 
screening for more conditions can improve long-term prognoses or functionality in many cases  
and allow families to make informed decisions for health care earlier, saving money for families 
and the state. 
In the limited number of studies of factors influencing state health legislation, analysis 
has primarily focused on specific aspects of influence, rather than on integrating factors into a 
larger picture or schema. In large part, either quantitative or qualitative investigations describe 
certain behaviors, attributes, or actions, without providing an understanding of the meaning 
behind such actions or an observation of the degree to which the factors weighed or interacted to 
provide the desired legislative success. While quantitative results can indicate that a factor of 
influence was or was not present, or even provide a scale of how influential a factor was 
subjectively thought to be, by themselves they fail to provide a complete picture that could lead 
to greater effectiveness in future legislative efforts. However, reviewing quantitative results with 
the additional qualitative narrative provided by key informant interviews can add situational 
context and better guide future legislative efforts. For example, interviews can provide behind-
the-scenes political context about why there was sponsorship by the majority party, not merely 
that there was or wasn’t support as indicated through a survey instrument. For this reason, I used 
a retrospective, sequential, mixed methods case study design to illuminate case studies of state 
health legislation. Because of its large population and political influence, and because of my 
experience in health policy in the state, I chose to study Florida. 
Main Research Question & Contextual Scope of State Health Legislation 
This study sought to address the question: What factors most influence the passage or 
defeat of health-related legislation at the state level in Florida? As discussed in the literature 
review (see Chapter 2), while a study of health policymaking can encompass policy 
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implementation inclusive of rulemaking and subsequent programming, this research study was 
exclusively focused on a policy formulation step involving the passage of health legislation. This 
is an important preliminary step in broader policy adoption and change—but also a culmination 
of policy work. Specifically, the research issues had already reached a level of salience to be 
introduced as legislative bills, and this study explored what factors influenced whether these bills 
successfully passed legislative scrutiny.  
State Selection: The Fate of Health-Related Policy Ideas in Florida 
I selected Florida for ease of access to research and participants. It is my state of 
residence, which reduces transportation costs and improves the accessibility in scheduling 
interviews as part of the qualitative component of this mixed methods study. In addition, my 
knowledge of Florida’s legislative and governmental processes provides additional context for 
data interpretation. Further, public health legislation has historically met resistance in Florida, 
with public health professionals and advocates rarely achieving desired legislative ends despite 
some knowledge of the legislative process. 
About Florida 
Florida was ranked fourth largest in population with 18.8 million reported in the 2010 
U.S. Census2 but eclipsed New York in December 2014 to become the third most populous state 
in the nation.3 Florida ranks near the bottom of all states for the number of people without health 
insurance, and about two-thirds of all states have better overall health than Florida.4 With an 
increase in population (especially in persons 65 or older) and impending physician and nursing 
shortages,5 the health of Florida’s residents needs greater attention.  
Florida’s demographics are described in Table 1. The demography of a state jurisdiction 
is often closely aligned with its politics.6 The higher percentage of Hispanic, Black, and older 
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adults (65 or older) in Florida than in the United States may increase the influence of certain 
stakeholders or change the “window of opportunity” for particular health topics to reach the 
legislative policy agenda. Florida is older and more Hispanic than the rest of the United States. 
 















































































Florida 19,893,297 48.9% 51.1% 17.4% 7.0% 24.1% 3.3% 5.4% 20.4% 19.1% 
United 
States 
318,857,056 49.2% 50.8% 13.9% 75.9% 17.3% 6.2% 6.2% 23.1% 14.5% 
 
 
About Florida Health Legislative Processes8 
Health care programs comprise approximately one-third of Florida’s state budget, making 
health care an important topic du jour. At times, Florida has been at the vanguard of health 
policy issues, and the state has been known previously as a health policy “innovator.”9 However, 
in 2014, when the medical marijuana and needle/syringe exchange program bills reviewed in this 
dissertation were introduced, Florida ranked 35th among the states in public health funding, 
allocating $58 per person.10 In contrast, as the top-ranking states in public health funding in 
2014, Alaska allocated $219 per person, Hawaii allocated $213 per person, and New York 
allocated $149 per person.11 Florida ranked 31st in health determinants and 36th in health 
outcomes among the states in 2014.12 
Politically, Florida was at the time of this study, led by a Republican governor. The 
bicameral legislature consists of the Florida House of Representatives (120 representatives) and 
the Florida Senate (40 senators). Republicans held the majority in both the chambers. Each 
chamber has at least one substantive health committee and one appropriations subcommittee 
 
7 
focused on health issues. In 2014, despite having both a Republican legislature and governor, 
Florida ranked 32nd in the nation in percentage of adults identifying as Republican or 
Republican leaning at 37%. Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia were among the 31 
states with greater Republican-leaning tendencies. Florida ranked 15th highest nationally for 
adults identifying as being neutral (19% showed no lean) and 22nd nationally for Democrat or 
Democrat-leaning at 44%.13  The explanation for the apparent mismatch between the population 
and the politics of Florida is hard to explain easily, and this analysis partly speaks to the paradox. 
In the executive branch, several separate agencies comprise the “health” grouping: 
Department of Health, Agency for Health Care Administration, Agency for Persons with 
Disabilities, Department of Elder Affairs, Department of Children and Families, and Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs. The agency heads report to a deputy chief of staff in the Executive Office 
of the Governor. 
The Florida Legislature meets in session every year for 60 consecutive days. A regular 
session of the legislature shall convene on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of 
each odd-numbered year, and on the second Tuesday after the first Monday in January of each 
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In simplified form, a typical progression of a Florida bill involves referral to committees 
following its introduction by a member of one of the houses (first reading is accomplished by 
publication). If the bill is voted favorably out of all committees, it is placed on the chamber 
calendar for second reading (consideration of questions and amendments) and then for third 
reading (consideration of questions and amendments only by two-thirds vote, debate on the bill, 
and the sponsor’s closing statement) before being voted on the chamber floor. If passed by a 
chamber, the bill will be sent in “messages” for approval to the other chamber. If both legislative 
chambers pass the bill, it is ordered enrolled and sent to the governor’s desk for approval or veto. 
Several situations can occur in the progression of a bill. For example, a bill can be voted 
favorably off the floor in one chamber and then referred to the other chamber’s committees. A 
bill can be voted favorably by each chamber but amended so heavily that there is no final 
agreement. At any of these points, a bill may die. In other instances, a bill may die in one 
chamber, but its similar companion bill14 in the other chamber may pass, in original or highly 
amended forms. Successful bill language in one chamber is sent to the other chamber for review 
(the bill is said to be “in messages”), at which point the second chamber may refer it to 
additional committees of references in that chamber.15 This study focused on the legislative 
progression to the point of legislative passage and, therefore, did not explore factors in the 
governor’s approval process.  
A five-year average of Florida legislative bill data surrounding the time of the bill, 2012-
2016, indicated that, of the bills that died, 87% of bills died in committee, 8% died on a chamber 
calendar waiting to be voted on the floor, and 4% died in messages.16 In the 2014 Florida 
legislative session, 1,540 general bills were filed by the House and Senate, with 332 passing one 
chamber, and 229 passing both chambers.17 Of the 2,014 bills that died, 74 bills died on calendar, 
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and 53 bills died in messages.18 This study examined two bills, both of which survived all 
committees of reference and were voted favorably off both chamber floors. However, one of the 
bills was ordered enrolled into law, while the other bill died in return messages before final 
legislative passage.   
Florida is known for having an unusually large pool of lobbyists and lobbying interests.19 
In 2007, Florida had 411 interest groups registered to lobby on health issues, more than any other 
state. By comparison, New York had the second highest number of health lobby groups 
registered at 368.20 In addition, Florida had more interest groups registered to lobby (across all 
sectors) than any other state, at an average of 2,305 interest groups from 1980 to 2007.21 In 2014, 
Florida remained one of the top states for lobbying with more than 3,500 registered lobbyists.22 
In comparison, New York had more than 5,800, and California had more than 2,100 registered 
lobbyists that year.23  
Health-Related Legislation—Topic & Bill Selection 
To limit the scope of the study, this research retrospectively analyzed two instances of 
controversial, health-related legislation in Florida’s 2014 regular legislative session, each with a 
different legislative outcome. A single legislative session was selected to remove confounders 
attendant to changes in political actors and political climates. The 2014 legislative session saw 
both a Republican House and Senate majority, and a Republican governor, Rick Scott. It was an 
election year and, therefore, both House and Senate leadership were well-established—and were, 
perhaps, more sensitive to the public’s perception of the intent of legislation. 
Bills were selected by reviewing House and Senate bills presented during the recent 2013 
through 2016 legislative sessions. To be considered, any bill submitted by any member had to be 
referred to the highest substantive health committee in its chamber of origination to ensure that 
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legislative leaders believed the bill topic to be substantive to health: Health and Human Services 
Committee in the House, and Health Policy in the Senate. From 2013-2016, 447 bills were 
referred to the House Health and Human Services Committee,24 and 379 bills were referred to 
the Senate Health Policy Committee.25 These bills were reviewed for passage or defeat and, if 
defeated, for how far the bills had progressed when they died. In addition, to reduce source 
confusion and narrow the basis for passage or defeat, omnibus or “train” bills (bills that start as 
single issue or single topic, but by the end of the legislative session have additional issues tacked 
on in the hope of resurrecting dead issues on still-viable bills), and bills that originated with 
appropriations language were not included. Substantive, single-issue bills were selected.  
The year 2014 bills specifically selected for this study were SB 1030 on the use of 
medical cannabis, and SB 408 on an Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program. Each selected 
bill, described briefly below and detailed in Chapter 4, addressed a relevant, present-day, health-
related concern that raised some degree of ethical or social controversy: the compassionate use of 
cannabis for certain medical conditions, and an infectious disease pilot program for clean needle 
and syringe exchange. Although the cannabis bill was referred to appropriations, bill selection 
was focused on substantive policy significance, and bill referrals to appropriations committees 
were not used in selection criteria. Therefore, any attached funding or appropriation related to the 
selected bills was not specifically examined as part of this study.  
In addition, these health topics were based on a combination of considerations, such as 
the support of public health groups (e.g., the American Public Health Association has supported 
medical cannabis since 1995), continued public and media attention, potential long-term impact 
on improving the public’s health and well-being, and investigator-known state/stakeholder 
interest. The topics selected were intentionally controversial in some respects to provide deeper 
 
12 
insights into how public health issues are managed as well as the strategies used by those who 
seek to implement substantive public health policy.  
SB 1030 (2014)—Cannabis (Low-THC Cannabis/Charlotte’s Web)26 
Health Significance 
The use of medical marijuana or medical cannabis in the treatment of a variety of health 
conditions has been a topic of much attention and controversy for decades, with extensive 
anecdotal experience and some research supporting beneficial claims.27 With varying degrees of 
evidentiary support, medical cannabis use has been explored in the treatment of cancer,28 
epilepsy,29 amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS or Lou Gehrig’s disease),30 chronic pain,31 and 
other health conditions.32 Florida was expected to have more than 114,000 new cancer cases and 
43,000 cancer deaths in 2015, higher than any state except California.33 At the time of the bill, 
more than 1,500 individuals in Florida had ALS,34 and an estimated 375,000 individuals 
(125,000 children) in Florida had epilepsy.35 
Bill Purpose 
CS/CS/SB 1030,36 also known as the “Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014,” 
permitted certain physicians to order low-THC cannabis for patients with medical conditions 
such as cancer and epilepsy. The legislation required the Florida Department of Health to create 
a compassionate use registry and establish an Office of Compassionate Use. The bill also 
authorized certain medical centers to conduct research on cannabidiol and low-THC cannabis, 
provided for physician education, and created criteria for authorized dispensing organizations. 
Low-THC cannabis was often referred to as “Charlotte’s Web” throughout the legislative debate, 
in honor of a five-year-old girl with epilepsy who benefited from the cannabis.   
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Recent Prior Legislative Attempts37 
Medical cannabis legislation was previously introduced in both the 2012 and 2013 
Florida legislative sessions. In 2012, Senator Dwight Bullard (D-Parts of Miami-Dade and other 
counties) and Representative Jeff Clemens (D-Palm Beach) introduced joint resolutions (HJR 
353 and SJR 1028) that would create Section 28 of Article X and Section 32 of Article XII of the 
State Constitution to allow the medical use of cannabis. The resolutions died unheard in their 
respective first committees of reference. In 2013, Representative Katie Edwards (D-Broward) 
and Senator Jeff Clemens (D-Palm Beach) introduced more extensive bills (HB 1139 and SB 
1250) authorizing medical cannabis with corresponding rulemaking authority. Despite additional 
legislator cosponsors, both bills died before being heard in their respective first committees of 
reference. 
Brief 2014 Bill History 
CS/CS/SB 1030 developed from a series of committee substitutes in language put 
forward by the Senate Appropriations and Health Policy Committees, and the original sponsors 
Senators Rob Bradley (R-Baker County and Parts of 11 others), Aaron Bean (R- Nassau County 
and part of Duval County), and Jeff Brandes (R-Pinellas County). When the Senate bill went 
forward, six senators (which included Senate leadership) had appended their names to the 
sponsorship list as cosponsors. Groups supporting the bill included the Florida Democratic Party, 
and specialty health nonprofits (e.g., American Cancer Society, Florida chapter). Groups 
originally opposing the bill included the Florida Medical Association and pharmaceutical 
companies. The Florida Republican Party and Governor Rick Scott supported a non/low-
euphoria-inducing version of medical cannabis for use in certain conditions, in part, to improve 
the quality of life for Florida’s children with debilitating illnesses.38 This bill was voted 
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favorably out of the Senate Health Policy, Criminal Justice, and Appropriations committees of 
reference with minor objection and several changes to bill language via committee substitutes. At 
least nine legislators offered amendments at various points close to the end of the voting period. 
Over the course of the bill’s progression, 17 amendments were offered. It was voted favorably by 
the full Senate (36-3), favorably by the full House with amendment (111-7), sent via return 
messages back to the Senate and then favorably by the Senate with amendment (30-9). The bill 
underwent final passage and was ordered engrossed then enrolled on May 2, 2014, the last day of 
the legislative session.39 
SB 1030’s substantively similar companion bill in the House CS/CS/HB 843, was 
sponsored by Representatives Matt Gaetz (R-Okaloosa), who is now a US representative, and 
Katie Edwards (D-Broward), the Judiciary Committee, and the Criminal Justice Subcommittee, 
and later cosponsored by 35 additional state representatives. Originally filed by Gaetz, HB 843 
was referred to the Criminal Justice Subcommittee, where it passed favorably with committee 
substitute (12-1). HB 843 was then voted favorably out of the Appropriations Committee (24-0). 
In the Judiciary Committee, the bill’s last committee of reference, HB 843 was voted favorably 
with committee substitute (15-3). It was laid on the table and underwent first reading on April 
22, 2014, but no additional action was taken, and it died pending review of the committee 
substitute.  
SB 408 (2014)—Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program 
The Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program (SB 408) provided for a clean needle 
and syringe exchange pilot program in Miami-Dade. It also originated in the Senate, passed 
successfully out of all committees of reference, was voted successfully out of both chambers 
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once, but died in returning messages from the House when final consensus could not be reached 
following last-minute amendments.  
Health Significance 
As of 2011, Florida ranked third nationally for the number of newly diagnosed HIV 
infections and second nationally for the number of pediatric AIDS cases.40 As of January 31, 
2014, more than 104,000 people were living with HIV/AIDS in Florida,41 with Miami-Dade 
ranking first in the state, and Broward County ranking second in the state for the number of new 
cases.42 By 2014, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Miami-Dade County had 
increased by 23% since 2004.43 The availability of clean, unused needles and syringes may help 
to prevent or reduce the transmission of blood-borne diseases such as HIV, hepatitis, and AIDS 
among IV drug users and their intimate partners and offspring.44 
Bill Purpose 
SB 408 and similar companion bill HB 491 created the “Miami-Dade Infectious Disease 
Elimination Act (IDEA).” The bill required the Florida Department of Health (DOH) to establish 
and administer a five-year pilot program in Miami-Dade County for sterile needle and syringe 
exchange toward the prevention of HIV/AIDS and blood-borne infectious diseases. Funding 
would be outside of state dollars through private donations and grants. In 2014, Florida law 
prohibited the supplying of syringes to known drug users, and therefore the IDEA ensured that 
the distribution of needles and syringes under the pilot program did not violate the Florida 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act or other laws. It further required the 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) to report on the 
pilot program and to recommend whether it should be continued.  
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Recent Prior Legislative Attempts45 
Legislation to create a Needle and Syringe Exchange Pilot Program for Miami-Dade 
County was previously attempted in the 2013 Florida legislative session. Representative Mark 
Pafford (D-Palm Beach) introduced a “similar” bill in the House (HB 735), which was 
subsequently voted favorably, adopted, and additionally sponsored by the House Health Quality 
Committee, its first committee of reference. However, the bill died waiting to be heard in its 
second committee of reference. In the Senate, Senator Gwen Margolis (D-Miami-Dade), who 
previously served as that body’s first woman president, introduced the bill (SB 808), which was 
subsequently voted favorably, adopted, and additionally sponsored by the Senate Health Policy 
Committee, its first committee of reference. SB 808 also passed its second and final committee 
of reference but died on calendar for a third reading.  
Brief 2014 Bill History 
CS/SB 408 was sponsored by Senator Oscar Braynon (D-Parts of Broward and Miami-
Dade Counties) and the Health Policy Committee, and co-introduced by Senators Eleanor Sobel, 
Dwight Bullard, Audrey Gibson, Anitere Flores, and Rene Garcia. Originally, SB 408 was filed 
by Senator Braynon and referred to the Senate Health Policy Committee, the Criminal Justice 
Committee, the Appropriations Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, and the 
Appropriations Committee. It was voted favorably with committee substitute out of Health 
Policy (9-0) and redirected to the Criminal Justice and Rules Committees as the bill had no 
appropriations at the time. It was voted favorably out of the Criminal Justice Committee (6-0) 
and introduced and read on the Senate floor. It then passed favorably out of the Rules Committee 
(9-1) and was placed on the calendar for second reading. At that time, an amendment was 
adopted, and the bill was ordered engrossed and placed on third reading. Over the course of the 
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bill’s progression, four amendments were offered. Upon third reading, it was passed by the full 
Senate as amended (30-10). CS/SB 408 was then sent to the House in messages. On May 2, 
2014, the last day of the 2014 legislative session, it was read a second time and a strike-all 
amendment (sponsored by Representative Mark Pafford, see below) was adopted. (A strike-all 
bill is when the bill title and enacting clause are kept but all substantive portions are deleted and 
replaced.) The House-amended version was read a third time and passed the House with the vote 
of 109-8. It was then sent back to the Senate in returning messages, where it died.  
SB 408’s substantially similar companion bill in the House was HB 491. CS/HB 491 was 
sponsored by the Health Quality Subcommittee and Representatives Mark Pafford and Julio 
Gonzalez (R-Part of Sarasota). Ten additional cosponsors were listed in the final stage. The bill 
was voted favorably with committee substitute out of the Health Quality Subcommittee (13-0) 
and then voted favorably (10-0) out of the Government Operations Subcommittee. The bill then 
was voted favorably out of the Judiciary Committee (14-0) and also passed favorably (17-0) out 
of the Health & Human Services Committee, its fourth and final committee of reference. It was 
added to the House second reading calendar on April 10, where it remained and died without 
being put to a vote on the floor, and without an additional proposed amendment being adopted.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
I performed a literature review to investigate the question, “What determining factors 
most influence the outcome of state health legislation?” and focused on the period since 1990. I 
focused on studies of factors that determine legislative success. The results of the literature 
review contributed to the selection of factors of influence used in the disseration study design. 
Time Period Selection 
The literature review examined scholarly work that investigated state health legislation 
published from 1990 through 2016. The earlier date was chosen to include recent, relevant 
research on state health policymaking processes and was extended through 2016 to include 
recent studies.  
Sources Used 
I obtained contextual background through a review of classic political science and policy 
books and research of additional references through the university library system. I 
systematically searched for publications on state health legislation determinants primarily using 
PubMed, which accesses MEDLINE, and the Google Scholar database. Medical subject headings 
(MeSH) terms (see Table 3) were utilized in PubMed to home in on the research topic. To fill 
any gaps in the list generated using the selected key words, I reviewed a handful of known, 
industry-standard, legal, public policy and health policy journals, and recommended articles 
(PRISMA review, see Figure 1). Initial review of relevant books and instructive literature 
covered the 26-year period (1990-2016) with the intention of gauging and describing the 
historical context of an advocacy/legislation framework and providing a solid foundation for 
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subsequent identification of relevant sources by first examining well-referenced sources. A 
snowball technique found additional references identified by these “core” sources. Only articles 
and reports for which a full-text version could be obtained were included in the review. For 
additional context and direction, I explored organizational websites, such as the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors Association (NGA), the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), the National Academy for State Health Policy 
(NASHP), and the American Public Health Association (APHA).  
Selection Criteria: Inclusion and Exclusion  
Two basic inclusion criteria focused on determining which factors of health-related 
policy and legislation are widely considered influential: 1) The article or report must be 
published in English and refer to humans; 2) The health care legislation or policy discussed by 
the article must have passed between January 20, 1985, and July 1, 2016.  
Articles and reports that addressed health policy implementation in general rather than 
the passage of health-related legislation were excluded. In addition, descriptive studies that 
broadly discussed successful legislation without consideration or analysis of influential factors 
and those that, while meeting basic inclusion criteria, had no direct relevance to the study 
objectives (judged on a case-by-case basis) were excluded.  
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Keywords and Search Strategy 
 
Table 3. PubMed search strategy 
 
ALL Searches were limited to  
Publication date of 1990–2016: 
Concept Key Words, Search Terms 
Legislation (“legislation”) as topic OR (“health/legislation and jurisprudence”) OR 
(“health policy/legislation and jurisprudence”) OR (“health 
planning/legislation and jurisprudence”) OR (“public policy/legislation 
and jurisprudence”) OR (“politics/legislation and jurisprudence”)  
AND 
Health “health”  
AND 
State “federal” OR “state” 
Other search terms may include 
Concept Key Words, Search Terms 
Factor “factor” OR “determinant” 
Influence “influence”  
 
Search Process  
I used PubMed initially with the search strategy detailed in Table 3. All searches were 
limited to a publication date of 1990 through 2016. A search of “Legislation” concept terms in 
Table 3 yielded 113,260 articles, which was narrowed to 83,796 articles when the term “health” 
was added. From that point, the search explored both “state” and “federal” term paths, with 
15,248 articles and 5,896 articles returned, respectively. To further refine state path results, I 
added the terms “factor” (186 articles), “determinant” (27 articles), and “influence” (423 
articles). I then refined federal path results in the same manner, adding the terms “factor” (69 
articles), “determinant” (seven articles), and “influence” (140 articles). The refined state and 
federal paths yielded a combined total of 852 articles. I then used article titles to determine that 
96 of those articles were potentially relevant and confirmed by scanning abstracts. PubMed 
search results based on Table 3 search terms are depicted in Figure 1. From full-text review of 
each of the 90 unique articles, I identified 34 for inclusion in this dissertation, reduced to 27 after 
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the elimination of duplicates. Twelve additional articles were found using a snowball method of 
cross-referencing works cited in the articles selected and included. Furthermore, health policy 
scholars recommended a handful of articles for inclusion, leading to more than 39 articles 
ultimately included for reference. I read these articles until themes and results began to repeat 
and saturation was presumed. 
The systematic search and initial review of content resulted in the inclusion of 27 primary 
relevant articles detailing researched factors that influenced the outcome of health care 
legislation and policy across a variety of health-related topics. These articles were reviewed 
individually and in conjunction with political science and public policy theory source materials.   
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Figure 1. PubMed Search Results Based on Table 1 Search Terms46 
After full-text review, 34 articles remained instructive and 27 were ultimately included after 




Emergent Themes & Focus in the Literature 
Policy themes in the literature were reviewed and resulted in a question of whether they 
were applicable to health policy. The literature suggested that health policymaking and politics 
were similar but distinct from general policymaking (as described in more detail below). While 
Additional studies identified 
through other sources 
(n = 12) 
Records screened 
(n = 852) 
Records excluded by title 
(n = 756) 
Full-text articles assessed for eligibility 
(n = 96) 
Full-text articles excluded 
by abstract 
(n = 62) 
Studies included in qualitative synthesis 
(n = 34) 
Studies included in quantitative synthesis 
(meta-analysis) 
(n = 27) 
Records identified through database searching 
(n = 113,260) 
Records excluded through 
narrowing by search terms  
(n = 112,408) 
Duplicates removed 
(n = 7) 
Studies included in quantitative synthesis 
(meta-analysis) 
(n = 39) 
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policymaking includes a spectrum of activities from problem identification through policy 
implementation, I focused on those policies rising to the level of legislation, and research 
discussing other previous and post-enactment activities were culled out. In addition to the 
articles, I reviewed policymaking themes to provide context and to ensure that larger political 
and policy theories were not overlooked in the creation of research scope and methodology.  
General Policy Themes 
Across various resources and instructive policymaking academic books, several agenda-
setting and policy paradigms emerged. Some of these models are not exclusive to health policy 
but, rather, encompass scholarly theories well-cited over time as applicable to health policy 
development.  
Widely acclaimed and referenced, John Kingdon’s “three-streams” model of agenda-
setting, 47 originally developed as a description of the policymaking in the federal government, 
posits “largely independent” major process streams.48 This involves actors’ recognition of 
problems, or the “problem stream”; development of proposals to alter public policy, or the 
“policy stream”; and political action to influence change, or the “political stream.” Kingdon 
keeps these process streams mostly separate, with stream “coupling” and convergence at times 
when change is most feasible. These critical times present opportunities for action within one or 
multiple streams known as “policy windows,” “open windows,” or “windows of opportunity.” 
Within this model, Kingdon recognizes multiple actors can work across streams and identifies 
particular “specialists” in the streams.49 For example, specialists in the policy stream may 
include researchers, academics, and bureaucrats. “Policy entrepreneurs” can exist throughout the 
system at any point, as can “specialists” who generate solutions but remain “relatively hidden.” 
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These actors may include researchers, bureaucrats, and consultants. In addition, Kingdon’s 
research found special interest groups such as the media to be important in policymaking.  
The streams model went beyond other previously considered models such as Lindblom’s 
(1952) incrementalism,50 Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) “garbage can” mix of the conditions 
in a given time leading to outcomes;51 or even a potentially unrealistic concept of 
comprehensive, “rational decision making.”52  
Deborah Stone’s body of work53 argues that policymaking does not exist in a clean, 
logical vacuum devoid of politics. As such, it does not fit neatly into the concept of “rational 
decision making” and is necessarily messy as points of view will contradict, seem illogical, or 
appear to be in paradox. The larger political community, or “Polis,” has underlying paradoxical 
needs, thoughts, and ethics. A tension exists across goals, problems, and solutions. “Reasoned 
analysis is necessarily political … [p]olicy analysis is political argument, and vice versa.”54 
Other scholars analyze public policy by asking who, what, when, where, why, and how of 
policy issues to “tell a story.”55 In considering “who,” subsets include elites who run things, 
professionals, bureaucrats, scientists/academics, media, the public or “The People,” policy 
entrepreneurs, and “great people” who may act as role models.56 Institutional actors such as 
legislators and governors may also play large roles.57 The role of lobbyists or government 
relations specialists, interest groups, and the impact of health science research58 (and therefore 
researchers59) have been studied for their impact on policymaking. Effective advocacy across 
these special interests is critical to policymaking success,60 along with the ability to use resources 
so as to influence others.61 For the question of “when,” subsets includes windows of opportunity, 
election and funding cycles, agendas and schedules, and history. The question of “how” looks at 
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subsets of lawmaking, intergovernmental processes, the policy “market,” politics, and making 
deals. Questions of “why” might include justice, for example.  
Health Policy Distinction Themes 
Although these paradigms are widely applied across political and policy topics, some 
political scientists consider health politics and health policymaking to be distinct from general 
policymaking. Carpenter (2012) finds that health politics is set apart from other policy areas 
along various lines such as organizational identity (e.g., groups nontraditionally aligned but 
unified under a disease banner), deference to professionals/experts in areas such as science and 
medicine, and governmental treatment of health access and inequities different from other social 
inequalities and injustices.62 In addition, the more involved role of the state and its regulatory 
agencies also differentiates health policy. For these and other reasons, health politics may not 
easily conform to more generalized political science and policymaking theories of analysis. 
Some scholars note a seemingly inherent conflict between population health and politics, with 
the “public health community seldom acknowledge[ing] that its work is pervasively political,” 
and find that few studies are devoted to the politics of public health within health 
policymaking.63 Furthermore, the complex politics of health care, the varied effectiveness of 
“organized interests” across issues,64 and the intricate dance of various private actors65 set a 
distinct political health stage. 
The Legislative Stage in the Policymaking Spectrum 
The policymaking process is frequently portrayed as multiphase or multistage, with a 
minimum of three phases to include agenda setting, policy formulation, and program 
implementation.66 “The politics of agenda setting, policy formulation, and implementation are 
complex and, in many respects, uncertain in both their causes and consequences.”67 Within 
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policy formulation, certain policy agendas rise to legislative review and are passed into law.68 
Because the research is aimed at determinants that predict the legislative voting outcome of state 
health legislation, the literature review excluded later-stage implementation and preliminary-
stage agenda setting. Issues introduced as bills are assumed to have been deemed sufficiently 
salient to invest legislator effort. How the issue was introduced, however, may have implications 
for later passage and is noted whenever applicable. 
Importance of Health Policy Focus at the State Level 
Federalism and history suggest that state and federal health policymaking may involve 
both different health issues and different processes. While the federal government holds certain 
enumerated, implied, and plenary powers, those powers that are not delegated to the federal 
government nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Traditionally, federalism has allowed concurrent governing of public health at the 
federal and state levels, with states often holding the role of innovator, public health regulator, 
and executor of core public health functions. This status remains unless or until a multistate or 
national health issue creates a need for congressional preemption or triggering of the Supremacy 
Clause.69 “Delivering public health services requires local knowledge, civic engagement, and 
direct political accountability. States and localities are also often the preferable unit of 
government … a ‘laboratory of the states’ enables local officials to seek innovative solutions.”70 
In the case of natural disasters and epidemics, federal action is frequently seen; however, states 
are fertile ground for novel public health policies. 
State health policy decisions have ripple effects for policy diffusion across levels of 
stakeholders. While federal health policy can impact state health policy in a vertical, top-down 
manner,71 state health policy can also help to shape federal health policy to varying degrees,72 as 
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has been seen historically and in more recent health reform efforts.73, 74 In addition, the adoption 
of health policy in one state can have a horizontal impact on the adoption of similar health policy 
in a neighboring state.75 States have also worked together through collaborative associations such 
as the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors Association 
(NGA), and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), to put checks and balances on 
federal decision-making,76 and provide analyses that impact state legislatures and federal 
initiatives.77 
Discussion of the Literature 
Convergence of Political Policymaking Paradigms with Public Health Theories 
Among renowned policy scholars, several policymaking and agenda-setting paradigms 
are widely consulted for political and policy analysis.78 While health policymaking can certainly 
be analyzed using these time-tested models, the models are not exclusively tailored to public 
health and health-related issues. Political scientists believe that the politics of health is different 
from other politics.79 Discussions by health policy experts appear to find classical paradigms 
instructive but requiring of additional health context.80  
Emergent Overarching Themes in Health Legislation 
The primary relevant articles appear to revolve around the following five overarching 
themes that are in keeping with, or expand upon, the political science literature on policymaking: 
1) general factors long-discussed as impacting legislative outcomes, or that are unattributable to 
traditional actors, are discussed herein as the “Influence of General Factors,” such as having a 
“window of opportunity”; 2) the influence of legislators and legislative staff are discussed herein 
as the “Influence of the Legislature”; 3) tactics used directly by constituents and special interest 
groups to impact legislation are discussed herein as the “Influence of Constituences”; 4) the 
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ability of paid professional lobbyists to influence votes is discussed herein as the “Influence of 
Professional Lobbyists”; and 5) the influence of government officials in the legislative and 
executive branches at the highest position levels is discussed herein as the “Influence of Highest 
Government Leadership.” 
Influence of General Factors  
Various factors that do not clearly correspond to a traditional actor (e.g., legislator, 
lobbyist) or are not easily categorized can influence the outcome of health-related legislation. For 
example, such “General Factors” may include celebrity attention, research, strength of argument, 
or bill timing, as in a “window of opportunity” opening.  
“Time-tested general factors” were explored in a seven-state, health care reform 
legislation study by Paul-Shaheen (1998).81 She categorized her research results into three 
lessons that reinforced a current understanding of state health reform (crisis as a catalyst for 
action, the role of new special interests in game-changing opportunities, and expanded 
bureaucratic influence in health care reform) and six additional lessons that extended an 
understanding of state health reform (timing, the continuum of many smaller steps leading up to 
a larger product, policy entrepreneurship, media and public opinion, Democratic introduction of 
the bill, and single-payer option). While factors such as “single-payer option” may be limited in 
applicability, Paul-Shaheen’s study supports the general influence of both non-categorical factors 
such as persistent action and “window of opportunity,” and actor-attributable influence, as in the 
case of policy entrepreneurship.  
In addition to Paul-Shaheen’s work, other studies have explored persistence, or the 
impact of prior attempts at similar legislation, with or without incremental success as an 
influential factor in current legislative outcome.82, 83 Media attention is another general factor 
that may influence legislation.84, 85, 86 
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Furthermore, studies have reviewed the influence of evidence-based reports or research 
on legislative outcomes,87, 88, 89, 90 with some legislatures forming partnerships with universities 
for research purposes.91 Persuasive arguments on the health benefits92, 93, 94, 95, 96 and economic 
benefits97, 98, 99 of health-related legislation also influence legislative outcomes. Whether a bill is 
viewed as being fiscally legitimate and consistent with state need and resources also plays a 
role.100 
In recent political times, celebrity advocacy and endorsement have had a growing impact 
on policy focus and legislation.101, 102 Notably for this dissertation, famous personalities have 
visited Florida legislators to discuss current legislative bills.103  
Finally, the strategic exchange of political support and/or opposition across bills and 
positions may occur across a variety of actors such as interest groups, lobbyists, and legislators. 
“It is difficult to conceive of a legislature without internal horse-trading, and recent work 
suggests that logrolling [prior agreement between legislators to vote for each other’s bills] is 
widespread among legislators and more frequent than commonly thought.”104 This practice of 
“horse-trading” may affect legislative decisions.105, 106 
The Influence of the Legislature 
“General Factors” do not touch upon the complex powers and factors within the 
legislature and legislative process. The willingness of a particular legislator to champion a bill 
and the political power or capital of a bill-sponsoring legislator can play significant roles in 
legislative outcomes, 107, 108, 109 as can committee sponsorship.110 Whether a legislator believes a 
bill has significant constituent backing,111, 112 covers an important topic,113 or will be of great 
benefit to the state, 114, 115, 116, 117 also impacts a bill’s fate.  
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In studying the influence of think tanks, media, and foundations on Minnesota legislators, 
Gray and Lowery (2000) noted that legislators determine how important a particular source of 
information is for legislative voting purposes.118  
Some studies distinguish supportive legislators based on topic and timing. From Carol 
Weissert’s (1991) study of the North Carolina Legislature,119 policy entrepreneur legislators who 
have subject-matter knowledge and persistence are great influencers of successful legislation and 
are perceived to be highly effective (e.g., legislators known for health expertise become more 
effective when health issues are salient). Second to policy entrepreneurs, policy opportunist 
legislators, who identify and become associated with a topic during a window of opportunity, 
also become influential in the passage of bills. Opportunists did not necessarily have committee 
ties and generally lacked the substantive knowledge of entrepreneurs. Both policy opportunists 
and policy entrepreneurs varied from year to year. Legislative turnover could not explain a 
finding that legislative policy entrepreneurship was highly transient in nature. Thirty legislative 
entrepreneurs were identified over three legislative sessions, but only one legislator was named 
twice, and he was successful on a similar issue in a subsequent legislative session. Weissert 
concluded that any legislator could seize a window of opportunity and increase substantive 
knowledge to gain effectiveness.  
Other studies explored how the personal attributes of legislators may be significant 
factors in whether legislation passed. In Ellickson’s 1992 study of the Missouri House of 
Representatives,120 personal (e.g., occupation, age, race, gender, education), environmental (e.g., 
urban/rural dimension district competition), and institutional (e.g., seniority, political party) 
attributes were identified.121 Institutional and personal characteristics impacted legislative 
success more than environmental factors. Seniority and political party (institutional attributes) 
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were noted as particularly important as they impacted the level of influence the legislator had in 
formal office. In addition, Ainsworth (1997) found that legislators influence lawmaking by 
“selective associations” with professional lobbyists, interest groups, and other legislators, often 
in “lobbying enterprises” that vary distinctly across policy areas.122  
General attitudes and norms appear to be important in predicting the voting intentions of 
legislators. A three-state, tobacco control legislation study by Flynn et al. (1998)123 found that 
the perception of the 444 legislators interviewed regarding whether the bill would have a 
beneficial outcome to stakeholders was a strong, influential factor. Also, legislators’ perceptions 
of constituent pressure, perceptions of potential bill impact on various economic and social 
sectors, political party affiliation, and location (state) played roles in influencing voting 
intentions.  
Legislative staff members such as legislative aides, committee staff, and staff directors 
may also play an important role in whether legislation passes.124, 125 Health policy staff functions 
involve intelligence, information gathering, agenda setting, and proposal shaping. Weissert and 
Weissert (2000)126 found a significant correlation between trust of staff and influence in studying 
health policy legislative staff across five states, including Florida. They reviewed public 
documents and interviewed “forty-six legislative staff, former staff, governor’s advisors, agency 
liaison, lobbyists, and legislators.” Fiscal staff had a higher correlation for influence than trust. 
The role of legislative staff is paramount to state health policy in that staff members serve as the 
institutional memory of what is typically a highly transient state legislature.  
The Influence of Constituencies 
The ability to influence the successful passage of legislation may also be found at the 
grassroots or organizational level.127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133 This may include a variety of tactics 
such as using patient case studies,134 coalition building, 135 and unifying health care elites.136 
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Constituencies may also present testimony or have direct discussions with legislators and 
relevant government agencies.137. 138, 139, 140 For example, nurse practitioners have become active 
advocates in recent years for scope of practice expansion, directly engaging with legislators.141 
In 2001, Zakocs, Earp, and Runyan142 explored 35 advocacy tactics regarding gun control 
policies to prevent related injury and found that legislative lobbying, media, and education were 
commonly used while litigation and electioneering (actions to influence voting during campaign 
and election seasons) were least used. Tactics also included administrative lobbying. Tactics to 
mobilize public support included public education, working with mass media, and protest events. 
Surprisingly, no association was found between an organization’s financial resources and the use 
of various advocacy tactics. The most effective group employed a wide range of tactics at 
various stages of the policymaking process.  
The Influence of Professional Lobbyists 
Increasing expenditures in legislative lobbying efforts in all states demonstrate the 
important role of lobbying as a factor in legislative success. In-house government relations 
personnel representing a single constituent may not have the same bargaining power as higher-
paid professional lobbyists representing multiple interests, who have better ability to trade off 
client interest to obtain desired results (e.g., the “unprincipled agent hypothesis” posed by 
Lowery, 2013143).  
Ahrens, Jones, Pfister, and Remington (2001)144 studied legislative lobbying of tobacco 
control legislation in Wisconsin and found that the numbers of hours spent lobbying (time 
invested) correlated more strongly to successful bill outcomes than did the amount of money 
paid for lobbying. Despite pro-tobacco groups spending three to seven times more than anti-
tobacco groups, anti-tobacco groups invested 117% to more than 150% more lobbying hours and 
could achieve substantial portions of their agenda. Even so, Landers and Sehgal (2004) found 
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that federal health care-lobbying expenditures in 2000 were larger than the lobbying 
expenditures of any other sector, with 1,192 organizations involved in health care lobbying.145 
“There are sizeable disparities in the health care-lobbying expenditures of various groups. Health 
advocacy groups may need to consider the relative distribution of these expenditures as they 
formulate legislative strategies.”146 
When studying the Georgia General Assembly, Bullock and Padgett (2007)147 observed 
that lobbyists had to change strategies at the time as the state legislature moved from a single- 
party to a two-party political system. Old lobbying methods of offering perks to legislators (e.g., 
golf outings) and single-legislator connections have become less effective than newer methods of 
lobbying committee members individually and reaching “across the aisle” to gain support for 
positions. Lobbyists must work harder to stay on top of their bills through the entire legislative 
process, to expand their contacts to be successful, and to become subject-matter experts to 
educate legislators and influence outcomes. In addition, negative lobbying strategies (lobbying 
against an issue) may be even more effective than positive lobbying strategies.148 
Lobbying efforts may be hidden/“behind the scenes” (informal) or visible (formal), with 
a combination of both styles potentially yielding the greatest policy changes.149 Lobbyists further 
influence the outcome of legislation through financial contributions to legislators either directly, 
or indirectly through donations to political parties or political action committees in their name or 
their clients’ names.150, 151, 152 Campaign contributions have been correlated with influential 
changes in state legislative policymaking behavior, such as in the case of tobacco control.153  
The Influence of Highest Government Leadership 
Support of legislation by officials at the highest level of government leadership plays a 
significant role in the outcome of legislation. The support of the leading state agency with 
subject-matter expertise can influence outcomes,154, 155, 156, 157, 158 as can the active support of the 
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governor’s office.159, 160, 161, 162, 163 Florida governors who use a verbal style that conveys realism, 
action, and passion are more successful in achieving legislative objectives than those who do 
not.164 Legislative leadership support is critically important to legislative bill outcomes.165, 166, 167, 
168 In studying state health care reforms, Oliver and Paul-Shaheen (1997) found that “[b]y 
attracting the support of highly placed elected officials, advocates of reform … were able to 
bring public opinion into greater prominence, secure the support and resources of many interest 
groups …” and fight off opposition.169  
Additional Key Themes in the Case Studies 
Although not included in the original literature review, two critical themes arose in these 
drug-related health policy case studies that necessitated additional selective literature review and 
discussion: “framing” and “deservingness.” 
The “prudent choice of frames, and the ability to effectively contest the opposition’s 
frames, lie at the heart of successful policy advocacy.”170 “Frames” are based on internalized 
concepts or values that create meaning for people. They function as “existing constructs that 
allow us to interpret developing events” that can be impacted by “various elements, such as 
language choices and different messengers or images.”171 According to Ostrom (2007), 
frameworks “organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry” and “provide a metatheoretical 
language that can be used to compare theories.”172 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) described policy participants as holding three levels of beliefs 
that impact advocacy: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs.173 Competing 
internalized frames can be influenced by selective communication that “resonates with people’s 
deeply held values and worldview” and “appeal[s] to higher-level values.”174 By appealing to 
“big ideas” such as justice and responsibility, rather than general or specific issues such as the 
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environment or tropical rainforests, advocates can frame an issue to drive community and 
policymaker action.175  
Negating a frame both activates and strengthens it; therefore, successful argument 
introduces different frames while avoiding an opponent’s frames.176 Metaphors play a key role in 
framing issues, are used by people to reason and frame, and can be used to redirect reasoning.177 
According to Lakoff (2014), reframing is “social change” and “new language is required for new 
frames.”178 “Sustained public discussion” may prepare an issue for effective reframing, or “the 
changing of millions of brains to be prepared to recognize a reality.”179  
Framing influences all steps in the policymaking process, including policy formulation 
and adoption, the subject of this case study.180 Framing may be particularly salient in the context 
of drug-related policy, because in telling the political story, “the narrative is more powerful than 
the numbers, the meaning more memorable than the mean.”181 For example, needle exchange 
may seem a logical policy choice toward HIV prevention. However, policy options become 
limited when the issue is framed using the image of “illegal drug use” rather than using the “big 
picture” concept of preventing HIV and helping children and families. Framing the issue in a 
way that conflicts with the values of major groups in the country (e.g., the religious right) 
restricts alternatives.182  
The perceived disparities in drug policy may be better understood through the lens used 
by Ryan (1976), who contends that people are likely to use the ideological framing of “blaming 
the victim,” which unintentionally distorts reality.183 In this framework, perspectives of social 
problems range from “exceptionalism,” focused on correcting what is “unusual,” “different,” or 
“internal” about an individual, to “universalism,” which recognizes “similarity” across people 
and a need for a “collective” or “external” focus on the larger society for change.184 The 
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universalistic perspective frames social problems as issues of society and system that are 
“predictable and … preventable through public action,”185 while exceptionalism leads to 
classifications and change efforts focused on an individual’s differences such as culture, race, 
and socioeconomic class, and further sub-labeling of “the worthy poor” (the deserving) versus 
“the unworthy poor” (the undeserving).186 
According to Morone (1997), “drug policy remains enmeshed in racial politics and 
biases.”187 While “crude racialist rhetoric is far less prevalent,”188 Netherland and Hansen (2016) 
observed that, historically, the “U.S. ‘War on Drugs’ has had a profound role in reinforcing 
racial hierarchies.”189 For example, history has shown legal action to coincide with “widespread” 
public fears of violence and deviance related to the use of opium (associated with Chinese 
immigrants), of cocaine (associated with African Americans), of recreational marijuana 
(associated with Mexicans) and, more recently, of crack cocaine (associated with African 
Americans).190 Use of powdered cocaine and opioids (associated with Caucasians) carried 
reduced criminal penalties in comparison and were framed more from a perspective of treatable 
illness (deserving) rather than deviant (undeserving).191  
Recent research suggests that medical marijuana use is more common in high-income 
whites (similar to opioids) because of reduced drug enforcement.192 In addition, “minorities have 
been largely absent from the push for medical cannabis across the South,” and advocates have 
needed to specifically push for medical cannabis laws to cover conditions disparately impacting 
African Americans, such as sickle cell disease.193 The racial underpinnings and politics of drug 
policies may cause universal harm as Hansen and Netherland assert that “racially disparate drug 
policies and health care practices ultimately hurt White patients.”194  
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Gaps in Research and Knowledge/Bridging the Gaps 
The articles reviewed were often specific to one health topic and may not be applicable 
across other health topics. Studies appear to favor the controversial topics of state health care 
reform and tobacco legislation, big-ticket items that may not be viewed in the state legislative 
process the same way as chronic disease prevention, for example.  
Most of the articles in this literature review acknowledge that the determinants studied 
are not the only factors influencing legislation. Factors that influence the success or failure of 
legislation may not always be observable. For example, Lowery (2013) observed “many null 
findings in influence research” and synthesized divergent research into 12 null hypotheses on 
types of influence, while noting that “the dark matter of influence that is vitally important to the 
distribution of power in a society … [may be] … influence that cannot be readily observed.”195  
A study based on factors gathered in this literature review, augmented with investigator-
preferred factors from anecdotal experience, will improve understanding of how state health-
related legislation is passed. Using mixed methods in qualitative and quantitative research design 
may allow for a more thorough exploration and understanding of the determinants identified.  
Search Strategy Limitations and Weaknesses 
Search strategies used for this literature review have limitations. The search terms were 
specific to health and state legislation, but a significant number of articles initially retrieved were 
not limited to state legislation and did not address state legislation specifically. Narrowing the 
search to include the terms “factors” and “influence” resulted in a few key articles but may have 
unintentionally excluded important articles. However, given the time gaps in relevant articles 
reviewed, it appears that much of the cross-referenced literature, even by newer articles, predates 
the expanded exclusionary date criterion of 1990 to present. Furthermore, each of the articles 
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identified as relevant and reviewed explores different potential factors of successful legislation 
rather than merely supports prior theories. Expanding the date criterion further may have 
included significant primary articles that could have led to other newer articles through a 
snowball method.  
Informing a Dissertation & Conclusion 
This literature review served as the cornerstone to this dissertation to explore the 
development of a comprehensive assessment of the key determinants of successful health 
legislation. Specifically, the literature review identified factors that are associated with the 
successful passage of health policies at the state legislative level. The convergence of general 
policymaking theories with research supporting specific determinants of state health legislation 
formed a basis from which to develop a survey instrument to test the extent to which each of the 
selected determinant impacted specific legislation. Further, the literature review supported a 
research design involving a triangulation of resources to include legislation, public records, key 
informant interviews, and surveys. Certain studies provided ideas for selection of interviewees, 
questions, and scope. The literature review also highlighted differences across articles showing 
variations in validity, reliability, and quality. Additionally, the literature review aided in 
narrowing what turned out to be a very broad topic into a more manageable endeavor. To help 
fill in gaps of knowledge in the literature and address concerns found in the literature, key 
informant interviews captured additional factors not reflected in previous research studies. In 
addition, the dissertation will add to the discussion of influential factors that, while not 
conclusive or definitive, may provide valuable suggestions to health-related professionals 
seeking a path to successful health legislation and may offer new factors for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Study Design196 
This dissertation presented a retrospective, sequential, mixed methods case study design 
that seeks to gather information on what factors influence the passage or failure of health-related 
legislation in Florida. The research aimed to create a roadmap for stakeholders to follow for 
potentially increased efficacy in the pursuit of health-related legislative and policy changes. 
However, prospective policy analysis inherently brings many challenges.197 The mixed methods 
design allowed the testing of legislative factors, compiled using the literature review and 
researcher-selected factors, through an online survey and key informant interviews.  
The online survey contained quantitative elements that were descriptive in nature. The 
structured key informant interview questions contained qualitative elements derived from 
previous case studies found in the literature review and from the results of the online survey. 
Both open-ended and closed-ended questions were included. The blended mixed methods 
approach identified factors and their levels of influence on the outcome (successful legislation). 











Data Collection Procedures [See Appendix C for Key Terms Defined.] 
Data for this study were derived from two sources: an online survey of key stakeholders 
(quantitative) and 20 key informant interviews (qualitative).  
Multiple information sources were examined and cross-referenced to: 1. identify bill 
proponents and opponents, including lobbyists and constituencies, 2. to add specific context to 
tested factors, 3. to better understand bill language changes that impacted bill support, 4. to 
observe the interactions of relevant parties, and 5. to inform additional guiding prompts for key 
informant interviews. These background data sources included relevant documents for each of 
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records that are accessible as public records online or through special order via the Florida 
Legislature and The Florida Channel.  
Online Qualtrics Survey (Quantitative Focus) [See Appendix A for Online Survey and 
Consent Forms.] 
 
An online, self-administered survey entitled “Why Did That Bill Pass?”199 comprised the 
main quantitative survey research component. The survey was distributed via email through 
Qualtrics. Using a Likert scale, stakeholders were asked to weigh the level of influence of 
different factors on the success or failure of the specific piece of legislation. Prior to distribution, 
the survey was tested on three individuals who each had been involved in Florida government for 
at least 10 years at the time of testing. 
These individuals were asked for general feedback on items such as wording, the 
sensibility of the survey questions, and the amount of time needed for survey completion.  
The survey consisted of five sections. The first section listed 22 factors derived primarily 
from the literature review and then augmented by factors from my knowledge of Florida politics. 
The survey taker was asked to respond to each factor’s level of influence in passing a particular 
bill on a scale of one (1) through five (5), with “1” being “Less Influential,” and “5” being “More 
Influential.” “I don’t know” was also an option. The respondent was able “hover” over each 
factor for additional description of the factor. (See Appendix D for more information on the 
Qualtrics Survey Question Coding and Hover Function Descriptions.) The survey allowed 
respondents the ability to type up to three unlisted subjective factors and provided respondents 
the opportunity to type additional thoughts into an open field.  
The second part asked respondents to rank the influence of 14 stakeholder groups (with 
the possible addition of up to three write-ins) from “1” (less influential) to “5” (more influential). 
The Qualtrics hover function was employed to provide the respondent with additional description 
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of each stakeholder group. The third part asked the respondent to generally identify their 
occupational position/role at the time of the bill passage by clicking on one of 12 categories, 
such as “Professional Lobbyist.” The Qualtrics hover function was also employed in this section 
and provided detailed descriptions for the occupations listed. The fourth part asked the 
participant to select their political affiliation as listed on their 2014 voter registration card. The 
fifth part, which was optional, asked the survey taker to type into an open field any additional 
comments or thoughts on what they felt was influential but not previously listed. 
For each of the two selected bills, all legislative members on committees of reference, all 
registered health-related lobbyists of record for the bills (lobbyists representing organizations 
with interests in the bills derived from state lobbyist registrations in combination with legislative 
committee records and videos), executive branch agents, and testifying stakeholders, were 
invited to participate if contact information was available. Contact information was derived from 
the legislative lobbyist directory, government webpages, and public records. This totaled 215 
unique individuals. 
Surveys were sent electronically with an email introduction to 187 cannabis bill 
stakeholders and 188 needle exchange stakeholders, which included an overlap of 160 legislators 
(120 House member and 40 Senate members). Eighteen messages to cannabis stakeholders and 
24 messages to needle exchange stakeholders were returned as undeliverable, for a net total of 
169 cannabis stakeholders and 164 needle exchange stakeholders presumably reached. Up to five 
reminder emails were sent to potential respondents over a three-month period. Participants 
received an email directly from Qualtrics requesting participation and issuing a unique link to the 
survey instrument. The link brought the participant to an informed consent and confidentiality 
form. A Qualtrics “rule” was set up to prevent multiple submissions by the same participant 
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while ensuring protection of the participant’s identity. I was not privy to the identity of survey 
participants. Participants were able to stop or pause the survey and resume it at a later time. 
The results of the quantitative online survey were not statistically useful for 
generalization because of a very low participation rate (see Chapter 4, Results, for additional 
details). However, survey results helped to inform the qualitative key informant interview guide. 
See Appendix E, Select Results from Qualtrics Survey, and Appendix G, Key Informant 
Interview Coding Guide. 
Key Informant Interviews (Qualitative Focus) [See Appendix B for Key Informant Interview 
Question Guide and Consent Forms.] 
 
Key informant interviews comprised the main qualitative research component. A draft of 
the semi-structured interview question guide was developed for all interviewees regardless of 
type of stakeholder (see Appendix B) and was slightly modified based on the results of the 
quantitative online survey and relevant legislative history. [For a list of sources and factors that 
influenced the development of the key informant interview script, see Appendix F.] The 
interview guide contained 15 questions in multiple parts consisting of both closed and open-
ended questions.200 The respondents were asked primarily open-ended questions designed to 
elicit general information about the legislative process and capture information on any external 
factors not previously contemplated. Respondent answers to open-ended questions often led to 
free-flow commentary and additional follow-up questions. 
Legislative records and media sources were used to identify interviewees who could 
provide diverse viewpoints. The four types of informants were categorized as legislative branch 
representatives, executive branch representatives, lobbyists, or constituencies. With time 
considerations and conservative expectations following a low number of survey responses, the 
following breakdowns were goal respondents for each bill: 
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• three from the legislative branch with preference for at least one sponsoring 
legislator, and representation of both majority and minority parties; 
• three lobbyists (multi-client or in-house) with preference toward lobbyists 
publicly known or known to be active on the particular bill; 
• two from the executive branch; and  
• two from constituencies. 
 
Table 4. Initial key informant interview goals 
 
Stakeholder Category Examples of Stakeholder Titles # of 
Interviews 
Per Bill 
 # bills Totals 
Legislative Branch • Chairman, Florida Senate Health Policy 
Committee 
• Ranking member, Florida House Health 
& Human Services Committee  
 
Include two representatives and one senator, 
with at least one legislator from the minority 
party 







• Testifying lobbyist representing payers 
• Lobbyist of record representing 
providers 
3 2 6 
Executive Branch • Deputy chief of staff, Executive Office 
of the Governor 
• Bureau chief, Florida Department of 
Health 
• Legislative director, Florida Department 
of Children and Families 




• John A. Smith, Medicaid recipient from 
Miami, testifying before committee 
• Sally Q. Jones, health policy director for 
state economic watchdog organization 
2 2 4 
Totals    20 
 
 
Out of 40 purposively selected contacts, 20 key informants agreed to participate. Some 
respondents were able to comment on both bills: Seven of the twelve individuals originally 
interviewed for the medical cannabis bill were able to provide additional feedback on the needle 
exchange bill. Four of the eight individuals originally interviewed for the needle exchange bill 
 
45 
provided additional feedback on the medical cannabis bill. This resulted in 16 key informants (12 
original plus four crossovers) providing information on the medical cannabis bill and 15 key 
informants (eight original plus seven crossovers) providing information on the needle exchange 
bill.  
Because of privacy concerns and the possible identification of key informants through 
their titles, I am unable to present respondents’ actual titles as in the examples listed in column 2 
of Table 4. With this consideration in mind, I present generalized key informant data in Table 5 
below. 
 
Table 5. Description of the categories of key informants interviewed for each bill 
 






Constituencies 6 (5/1) 4 (2/2) 
Executive Branch 2 (1/1) 3 (2/1) 
Legislators 5 (3/2) 6 (3/3) 
Lobbyists 3 (3/0) 2 (1/1) 
 




Republican 8 (5/3) 9 (5/4) 
Democrat 7 (6/1) 6 (3/3) 




As this study involved human subjects, approval was sought from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Approval was granted in September 
2017, IRB # 17-2311.  
Consent & Confidentiality 
All participants in both the quantitative and qualitative research components gave consent 
before participation. The quantitative survey included a Click-to-Consent form before accessing 
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the survey. Identifying information was not collected or kept as data in any form. Otherwise, 
only a general self-identification into one of thirteen (13) stakeholder categories (e.g., state 
representative, executive branch employee, professional lobbyist, constituent) was asked of the 
participant. The broad groupings and large participant pool prevented the identification of 
individuals. Responses were captured in the aggregate through Qualtrics and printed for coding 
and analysis purposes without identifiers. Information was physically stored in a locked cabinet 
and electronically stored in password-protected files on a password-protected computer in my 
office. All materials will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study to further protect 
participants. 
Qualitative interviews were conducted in person whenever possible, and otherwise via 
telephone. The consent forms for the interviews varied based on interview location: Those 
interviewed in person completed a paper consent form, all others gave consent orally. 
Respondents were required to give permission for the interview to proceed and be recorded. I 
used a digital voice recorder with built-in USB drive to record the interview in a manner 
consistent with the IRB-approved informed consent and protocol. To maintain confidentiality of 
data in the interview component, each subject was given a numeric identifier so their specific 
comments could not be linked to the data. Immediately after each interview, the digitally 
recorded audio file was uploaded and saved on a password-protected computer in my office. The 
interview files were run through Dragon NaturallySpeaking Premium for transcription. 
However, because the audio quality was low, I employed a professional transcription service that 
included a confidentiality agreement. I checked the accuracy of the transcriptions and adjusted 
errors by comparing them to the recordings. My handwritten notes, which did not include any 
identifying information, augmented the transcriptions. 
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Upon the completion of the study, all recordings, transcripts, and handwritten notes were 
destroyed to ensure information cannot be linked to any participants. Results were published in 
the aggregate. The only descriptors of key stakeholders included a general stakeholder category 
(e.g., state representative, executive branch employee, lobbyist, or constituent). No names were 
kept or included to maintain confidentiality.  
Interview Recording Procedures 
Interviews were conducted from the spring of 2018 to the spring of 2019. They were 
conducted at a time and location of the interviewee’s preference. Checks for accuracy and 
completeness were conducted following each interview. Handwritten notes were scanned to 
Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format for electronic archiving and subsequently printed for a backup 
paper copy. In addition, the handwritten notes were integrated into and corroborated with the 
transcription for later use in MAXQDA data analysis.  
Data Analysis Strategy 
Quantitative Analysis 
The online survey provided quantitative data. After tallying counts for each section, I 
reviewed the data and ranked the more influential and less influential factors for Part 1, and the 
more influential and less influential stakeholders for Part 2. The data were insufficient to 
categorically group or analyze data by influential stakeholder group, type of survey participant, 
or political affiliation. 
Coding Guide 
After checking and review of the interview transcript was completed, a content analysis 
to identify themes was used to create a themed coding guide. The Coding Guide was developed 
using literature review findings, survey results, and researcher preferences to improve 
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consistency in text unit coding. Appendix D and Appendix F formed the initial basis for such 
Coding Guide. 
Key Informant Interviews 
Following professional transcription and review for errors, transcripts were processed in 
MAXQDA201 and coded by paragraph according to the predetermined coding scheme in the 
Coding Book (see Appendix G). The Code Book included 39 codes. All interviews were 
systematically coded and analyzed, with the interviewer’s handwritten notes referenced to cull 
out additional data. The open-ended questions in the online survey and interview phases were 
coded using identical codes. This allowed me to compare language phrasing and themes. Fill-in 
responses from the online survey and the key informant interview transcriptions were entered 
into MAXQDA software. I reviewed each interview and coded sections of text using the Coding 
Guide.  
To increase study reliability, a second coder was engaged to independently code key 
informant interview results, to assist in refining the codebook, and to confirm investigator coding 
until an acceptable level of interrater reliability was reached. The second coder coded five key 
informant interviews in MAXQDA, or 25% of the 20 total unique interviews. MAXQDA 
software was used to run statistical comparisons of researcher coding against the second coder’s 
coding. An interrater reliability kappa score of 0.75 was reached by the second coded document 
and a kappa score of 0.91 was reached by the fifth document. These kappa scores demonstrate a 
level of “substantial,” “very good,” or “excellent” interrater agreement.202, 203  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Summary of Qualtrics Survey Results  
The Qualtrics surveys on factors influencing Florida legislation yielded low response 
rates that did not provide enough information for quantitative analysis. The medical cannabis bill 
survey was sent to 169 individuals (with active email addresses) associated with the bill, started 
by 14 of those individuals, and completed by 12 individuals (7.1% response rate). Among those 
who completed the survey, there was a question completion response rate of 79%. The needle 
exchange bill survey was sent to 164 individuals (with active email addresses) associated with 
the bill, started by 13 individuals, and completed by 12 individuals (7.3% response rate). Among 
those who completed the survey, there was a question completion response rate of 46%. Despite 
the lack of responses, information gathered from the survey was useful in informing questions 
for the key informant interviews. See Appendix E for survey result highlights. 
Medical Cannabis  
For the medical cannabis bill, survey-takers ranked the following items as more 
influential (“4” and “5” ratings combined) in the bill’s outcome: 1. persuasive health benefit 
arguments, 2. the amount of media attention, 3. sponsorship by the majority party, 4. a special 
interest group’s legislative testimony or direct discussions with legislators, 5. the amount of 
constituent support, and 6. the support of legislative leadership. They further ranked the 
following types of stakeholder groups as more influential (“4” and “5” ratings combined) in the 
bill’s outcome: 1. general public/individual stakeholder, 2. legislative leadership, 3. bill sponsor 
(Senate), and 4. bill sponsor (state representative). Survey participants noted that legislative 
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relationships (member-to-member and family) and legislator influence were important in bill 
outcome. Several participants mentioned public testimony with children present and “heart-
wrenching” pleas from parents that left legislators “soul searching” and voting it “to the next 
committee just to get it over with” were highly influential. A CNN story, a proposed 
constitutional amendment with the possibility that passage of the legislation would “reduce the 
interest of voters in the ballot measure,” and a “very conservative regulatory framework” for the 
bill were cited as other influential factors. One participant recommended that “the best way to get 
to someone” is to research “if the legislator has been personally affected or knows someone who 
has been personally affected.” 
Needle Exchange  
Participants in the needle exchange bill survey ranked the following items as more 
influential (“4” and “5” ratings combined) in the bill’s outcome: public education or grassroots 
mobilization campaign, the political power of a sponsoring legislator, the support of legislative 
leadership, professional lobbyist work, state agency support, governor’s office support, and 
persuasive health benefit arguments. They further ranked the following types of stakeholder 
groups as more influential (“4” and “5” ratings combined) in the bill’s outcome: state 
representative—committee chair, state agency, general public/individual stakeholder, governor’s 
office, bill sponsor (Senate), state senator—committee chair, bill sponsor (state representative), 
and legislative leadership. One participant noted that there was a “perception that government 
was condoning illegal drug abuse.” 
Summary of Key Informant Interview Results 
For the following section on key informant interview results, these descriptors have the 
following meanings: “few” means three to four persons, “some” means four to six persons, 
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“several” means seven to eight persons, “many” or “most” means nine or more persons, and 
“nearly all” means all but one or two persons. 
Medical Cannabis 
The key informant interviews outlined several factors in the passage of the 
Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014 (SB 1030), which sought to permit prescriptions 
of low-THC cannabis for patients with certain medical conditions such as intractable epilepsy 
and cancer. It would also amend Florida’s Controlled Substances Act to remove such 
prescription and usage from criminal penalty. It further required physician education, created a 
compassionate use registry and Office of Compassionate Use, and funded research on 
cannabidiol (CBD) and low-THC cannabis. The bill passed out of committees in both the House 
and Senate and passed both chambers after a last-minute amendment on the House floor. It was 
signed into law by Governor Rick Scott on June 16, 2014. (See Chapter 1 for additional 
information.)  
In the medical cannabis case study, I first discuss what factors and unique confluence of 
events led to the opening of a window of opportunity for the bill. Then, I explore which 
persuasive arguments were used, and how grassroots and constituency advocacy efforts impacted 
the bill. Next, I move to a review of lobbyist involvement in the advocacy efforts. The impact of 
legislative perceptions and relationships is explored as well, followed by the influence of the 
executive branch. Finally, I recount what happened in the final hours of the legislative session 
through the perspective of the respondents.  
Window of Opportunity: An Unlikely Perfect Storm 
According to one respondent, “Lawmakers were looking at a perfect storm …” for 
consideration of a medical cannabis bill that included a unique confluence of events: a heated 
gubernatorial election, a simultaneous push to pass a constitutional amendment that was largely a 
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citizen-driven initiative, similar bills passed in other states, an influential CNN documentary, and 
emotionally moving family advocates.  
The Sanjay Gupta Factor 
Most respondents referenced a national news documentary as the unlikely genesis of SB 
1030. In August 2013, Dr. Sanjay Gupta and CNN reported on medical cannabis in a nationally 
broadcast documentary that focused on sick children rather than adult patients.204 It was cited as 
greatly influencing a shift in public opinion in Florida and across the nation. “The Sanjay Gupta 
story brought it mainstream … we had sort of a tipping point in the nation.” Dr. Gupta’s 
changing view on medical cannabis “gave credibility to the discussion.” The CNN report shared 
the story of Charlotte Figi who benefited from a form of medical cannabis that had high-
cannabidiol (CBD) and low tetrahydrocannabinol (low-THC) content. The Stanley Brothers, in 
Colorado, developed Charlotte’s Web, a form of medical cannabis to help Charlotte Figi, and 
this was featured on the CNN report. This “American success story for kids” was helpful to 
politicians in an election year who worried they would be branded a “pot supporter” and passed 
over by more conservative Republicans in their districts. One respondent explained, “All of a 
sudden, kids were the best message for medical marijuana. I think that was a big deal influencing 
public opinion in Florida, across the country.” 
According to respondents, people from Florida independently reached out to the Stanley 
Brothers after coincidentally watching the same CNN story. Among these people were then-
Representative Matt Gaetz and a family, the Moseleys, in/near his district who had a child with 
intractable epilepsy. “The genesis of the bill really came from the constituents of Gaetz in the 
panhandle … Moseley … [their] daughter had severe epileptic seizures—dozens a day … [they] 
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had been to Colorado to find a THC chemist for [their] daughter and thought that Florida should 
have a bill.” 
Joel Stanley of the Stanley Brothers put Representative Matt Gaetz in contact with the 
Moseleys. Gaetz invited the Moseleys to work with him on his medical cannabis House bill, 
which evolved into the language passed in Senate Bill 1030. Many families shared their stories 
during a workshop in December 2013. Inspired by the momentum, some families hired lobbyists 
or even media consultants, while others formed or joined nonprofit organizations to help 
organize support. They traveled to Tallahassee before and during the session to meet with 
legislators. 
The parent advocates were “very careful to explain the difference between CBD and 
THC” and remind legislators that the bill was exclusively a CBD bill. Families were invited to 
speak at committee meetings. They “weren’t asking for recreational cannabis” or THC but “just 
asking for access to high-CBD oil.” The bill language contained a restriction to keeping THC 
below 0.8% and more than 10% CBD, which respondents agreed was “an easy starting point for 
people to consider, instead of just jumping right into a bigger bill.” Respondents commented that 
“they found a sweet spot in the language of the bill … [medical cannabis] for a limited use, and 
for a very select group of people, and very low dosage form … a lot of smart political 
positioning.” With that step, “you’ve now broken the stigma … the camel will get his head under 
the tent … [soon] you’re going to have the whole camel inside the tent,” one respondent 
commented. 
Momentum 
Medical marijuana was the subject of widespread national and state lobbying efforts, 
which caused Florida legislators to consider keeping up with other states. Several respondents 
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stated that “it was time in Florida to pass the Cannabis Bill.” Another respondent noted, “They 
wanted to be proactive and to make sure that the state of Florida was ready.” 
Despite this, respondents noted that it was important that Florida’s consideration arose 
“from local concerns, not San Francisco … any reference to Colorado was seen as very 
negative—California, Colorado … bad places. We don’t want to be like … those wild-eyed 
hippies out there.” Also, some problems were noted in Colorado, making Florida legislators 
think they “should take this in small steps and not jump into it.”  Florida legislators “did not want 
to have a pot shop on every corner.” As to reasons why SB 1030 passed, one respondent stated, 
“The first obvious [reason] is just compassion … then they saw other states doing this … then 
there was the potential for growth in Florida.” Another respondent believed the bill’s momentum 
was: 
a combination of political pressure from people that had seen the positive effect … 
People were moving to Colorado to seek treatment … also, since it was being widely 
accepted in many other states, I think because it was generating new revenues, it was 
lowering healthcare costs—pharmaceutical costs.  
Persistence in a Conservative Government Environment 
As discussed in Chapter 1, cannabis legislation had been attempted unsuccessfully in 
prior legislative sessions. According to several respondents, “the year before, nobody would 
have touched [cannabis] with a ten-foot pole. Then, all of a sudden, it went through the entire 
legislative process on its first try.” As one respondent stated, “For some people it’s going to be 
super controversial. It’s not going to be anybody’s priority. It will most likely die, but if they 
keep coming back for two, three, or four sessions, it will most likely pass.” One respondent 
commented that conservatives thought, “The crazy lefties have been talking about this for ten 
years now … maybe there’s actually something here we can latch on to.” 
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Political Timing of an Amendment in an Election Year  
Political timing was “a huge factor” in the 2014 passage of medical cannabis. A 
referendum to legalize medical marijuana by constitutional amendment was placed on the 
Florida General Election ballot in February 2014, just before the March start of the legislative 
session. Then-Democratic “super” attorney John Morgan and others pushed the referendum. 
Morgan is a politically active attorney in Florida who founded the Morgan & Morgan law firm. 
In 2014, former Governor Charlie Crist, a Republican-turned-Democrat, was employed by 
Morgan & Morgan, a substantial contributor to his gubernatorial campaign against incumbent 
Republican Governor Rick Scott that year. Most respondents believed that Morgan was 
bankrolling both Crist’s campaign and the constitutional amendment to increase Democratic 
voter turnout and regain Democratic control of Florida government. All respondents believed 
that the ballot initiative played a significant role in the passage of SB 1030. Several of these 
respondents suggested that the referendum was the key factor or the “number one factor” in the 
bill’s successful passage. One respondent stated, “It was the pressure of the constitutional 
amendment hanging out there … most likely the legislature probably wouldn’t have done 
anything if they didn’t think that there was a ballot amendment coming.” 
Preemptive Strike 
Many respondents viewed SB 1030 as a “preemptive strike” and a “strategic decision by 
the majority party to blunt the importance of the constitutional amendment,” which was “wide 
open” with language that permitted cannabis use for “10 different medical conditions, [with] no 
limits on THC.” A few respondents believed that SB 1030 was an attempt to confuse voters into 
thinking the medical marijuana issue had been addressed, and they did not have to vote on it 
again during the general election through the referendum. The Republican majority “saw the 
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writing on the wall that it was becoming a much more popular concept and so they acted on it.” 
Many respondents surmised that Republican (majority) legislators “wanted to be ahead of the 
game, ahead of the curve, ahead of the amendment.” Many respondents explained that affected 
families were in favor of the bill. They also wanted “something going simultaneously with the 
amendment” because they were not willing to “put all [their] eggs in the basket of the voters at 
the time.”  
The Crist Factor 
According to a few respondents, the ballot initiative was about much more than medical 
cannabis. One respondent commented that the re-election was “inseparable” from the referendum 
as an issue. Governor Rick Scott, Republican incumbent, was running against former Governor 
Charlie Crist who, while Republican during his governorship, was now running as a Democrat. 
A few respondents commented that Republicans in 2014 were “absolutely terrified of having 
medical marijuana on the ballot” because it would motivate Democrats and unlikely voters to 
vote. “This was Rick Scott’s re-election. They were … terrified of the prospect of Charlie Crist 
being Governor.” As one respondent commented: 
[Charlie Crist] was working for John Morgan, runs for Governor, runs as a Democrat. If 
you put a ballot initiative on for cannabis, you are going to increase the number of 
Democrat voters by a few percentages … it could be the thing that tips you over the scale 
in the gubernatorial race, which … was won by 50,000 votes. 
There was also concern that “younger folks are going to turn out” and they would not be 
conservative. The “national mood had shifted in favor of medical cannabis … so you were 
starting to see the younger generation getting more politically engaged in the conversation. You 
had seen the legalization of it around the country.” According to a few respondents, Republicans 
believed there would be less interest and decreased turnout by Democratic voters if a medical 
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cannabis bill had already passed at the time of the election, because the issue would have been 
“addressed.” 
The Polling Factor 
As one respondent explained, “Public opinion was growing in strength for legislation, 
whether it was statutory or constitutional.” Through a ballot initiative, California was the first 
state to legalize medical cannabis in 1996, and Colorado and Washington were the first states to 
legalize the use of recreational cannabis in 2012.205 Hawaii was the first state to legalize medical 
cannabis through the state legislature in 2000 and, by January 2014, 20 states and the District of 
Columbia had approved the use of medical cannabis. 206 
Public opinion and polling research in the election year played a role, and polls prior to 
the 2014 legislative session showed that most Floridians polled supported medical marijuana.207 
None of the polls showed support below 60%, the threshold for referendum passage in Florida. 
“Public opinion was strong. Different polls put it in the 80s, some in the 60s.” One respondent 
explained that legislators had a “[S]ense of … this thing … polling so high. If I’m on the wrong 
side of this, I’m on the wrong side of history.” A few respondents believed that “the Republican 
party had to get out in front of this issue and show some progress on it, otherwise it wasn’t going 
to end well for them.” 
Legislators had “noticed through many town hall meetings and especially with 
constituents that they wanted medical marijuana to be an option.” One respondent noted, “The 
hardworking taxpayers that I represented wanted access … [and] they saw cannabis as a product 
… as a medical solution to address a variety of different issues and it was time for Florida to 
have a policy on that.” 
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Persuasive Arguments: Health Considerations, Economic Considerations, and Research 
Arguments against medical cannabis included addiction issues and use of marijuana as a 
gateway drug. Some respondents explained that there was also legislative concern regarding the 
use of painkillers. Some legislators had a “hard stand on unlawful drugs including marijuana as a 
gateway drug … [it] caught some opposition, particularly among Republicans.” 
Most respondents said that educating legislators on the bill topic was essential because 
there was “90 years-worth of misinformation.” For example, respondents claimed that at the start 
of the legislative session, there was widespread misunderstanding among legislators regarding 
the difference between medical marijuana and marijuana that people use to get high. 
Strategy turned toward educating legislators that medical cannabis was less harmful than 
alternative therapies and could lead to reduced use of prescription medications. A couple of 
respondents commented that legislators began supporting the bill when they learned that medical 
cannabis “is a benign therapy with minimal side effects … if there are side effects, they are 
positive … increased appetite or things like that.” 
However, it was the specific highlighting of ill children that was cited by all respondents 
as a key reason the 2014 medical cannabis bill was viewed differently than prior legislative 
attempts. One respondent stated, “It wouldn’t have started without the families. It wouldn’t have 
gotten the traction early on without … the recognition … that it really helps really sick kids.” 
Parent advocates and organizations enlisted the assistance of a medical consultant to 
explain that a child with intractable epilepsy may need a strong medication like clonazepam 
(Klonopin) daily, which has “a huge warning label that lists side effects and that the long-term 
effects are unknown.” In addition, parents reported stories of physicians suggesting that the 
parents “cut [the child’s] brain in half” and “say [their] goodbyes” to their children. In contrast, 
“all parents want to do is just try a CBD oil that would not get [the child] high.” This was a 
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persuasive argument for many legislators. Having “access to something that’s way less harmful” 
in Florida seemed a reasonable option.  
The medical cannabis in the bill would not be smoked, which was “really important to so 
many of our lawmakers … [who] would have been doing anti-smoking campaigns for … many 
decades.” As it was low-THC, it was low euphoria, which was “definitely a selling point” for 
lawmakers.  
Although the 2014 bill “started out by focusing on kids with intractable epilepsy” as the 
main purpose, the constituency for medical cannabis expanded. A few respondents noted that 
patients with cancer were also helpful in engaging and garnering support from legislators who 
would not normally support any medical cannabis use. 
Additionally, as one respondent noted: 
[P]eople realized that it might be good economically, not necessarily to raise more taxes, 
but to lower the cost of the pharmaceuticals—the Medicaid issues—because Medicaid is 
a large portion of the budget. And a lot of that is the drug costs. 
Several respondents commented on the lack of evidence-based studies and medical 
research at the time. “Because there is so little medical research and mobilized evidence, the only 
thing that really is compelling are the anecdotal stories from people for whom it makes a huge 
difference.” The bill attempted to address the paucity of research with a $1 million allocation to 
Florida-based research on the use of CBD oil for patients with epilepsy. The “educational 
component was a big selling point with Republicans” who liked the idea of studying the efficacy 
of medical cannabis. One respondent commented that “sensible policy” would: 
Start with a small subset of patients, spend some money on some research. We’re talking 
about public policy, right? What’s good public policy? Do a small, limited program; do it 
for a subset of patients; watch it carefully; invest some money and follow the research; 
expand the program as you see viability and positive results—and, ideally, in the clinical 
setting, if not in third-party, double-blinds, placebo. If you can’t get that, at least you can 
get clinical results. 
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Grassroots Work & Constituents as Powerful Advocates  
When ranking influential factors in the bill passage, on respondent stated, “a lot of people 
say the Constitutional amendment was the top thing that motivated them, but ... I think it was 
three years of grass-roots advocacy—an idea has to take time to percolate,” referencing the years 
leading up to the introduction of SB 1030. “We had used a lot of grassroots tactics to push public 
opinion—including professional advocacy campaigns,” which included the use of a program that 
allows advocates to send pre-written letters to lawmakers. Parents were traveling to Tallahassee 
with their children and staying for the legislative session, “maybe 10 or 12, the core group” who 
essentially “put everything on hold to become lobbyists.” One respondent described the 
environment: 
Moms and dads [were] coming up every day, walking the halls. Moms from Pensacola, 
moms from Jacksonville, moms from Tampa, moms from Gainesville, moms from South 
Florida—and moms and dads, and aunts and uncles. And the patient groups had seen that 
on Sanjay Gupta, and they were talking. And we had … Facebook …  
Mothers of children with medical conditions who could benefit from medical cannabis 
worked together as a driving force in advocacy. Many respondents spoke of the passion and 
persistence of the “mama bears” with testimony “pulling on heart strings.” The mother advocates 
“got more organized as they progressed,” forming a still-active group called the “canna-moms.” 
Several respondents noted that parent advocates made it a point to “bring lots of families” to 
committee meetings so legislators would understand “these were kids in the state of Florida who 
could really benefit from this.”  
Bringing people from multiple districts to meet with their representatives, in combination 
with emails and phone calls, was an effective strategy. All respondents commented that personal 
stories shared by families—particularly stories regarding suffering children—ranked among the 
top three factors influencing the passage of SB1030. “Politics and sick kids were one and two,” 
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one respondent stated. Several respondents shared the view. Legislators had “families sitting in 
their offices in tears, desperate for their kids or themselves to be able to access medical 
marijuana … that played an enormous part in it.” Most respondents claimed that the most 
persuasive argument was bringing in actual people with serious illness, “not just numbers,” and 
allowing legislators to see their suffering.  
All respondents characterized the testimonies of parents as “heartbreaking,” “heart-
wrenching,” or “hard to ignore.” Mothers testified in legislative committee hearings about how 
they had exhausted all prescription medication options to help treat their children. A few 
respondents recalled in detail the testimony of a mother that “the suffering of her child had 
gotten so bad, every night she prayed to God for God to take her child.” One respondent recalled 
a father with a special needs child testifying, “almost in tears, [he would] chastise and challenge 
these legislators” saying that he had “broken the law to save [his] son. Put me in jail if you want. 
But that’s what I had to do.”  
A few respondents recalled stories of families who considered moving from Florida to 
Colorado to gain access to Charlotte’s Web. They recalled commentary that families “shouldn’t 
have to move” out of state to access medical cannabis. That Florida families would leave without 
in-state access was a significant concern for lawmakers. 
Parent advocates were permitted to distribute photos of children during the committee 
meetings with the intent of wanting legislators to “feel like it was their [child] so they would be 
fighting … just as hard” as the parents. As one respondent described, “it was the human element 
thing, first and foremost … there were very compelling videos of almost instantaneous responses 
for seizure activity. If that’s not compelling, I don’t know what is.” 
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These stories “resonated” with legislators, who could “absolutely identify” with the 
public testimony across various medical issues, according to several respondents. “Republican 
senators and representatives and their communities … could identify with … rural, suburban, 
well-educated families with kids who were having seizures.” The testimonies evoked “personal 
emotional issues,” and as one respondent noted, “All of us have somebody in our family who has 
died of cancer … Politics is all about the framing of it.” Another respondent stated, “We all have 
our stories. If you have a family, you’re going to have somebody you love that has a condition or 
a situation if you’re around long enough” that could benefit from medical cannabis. 
Professional Lobbyists and Varying Cannabis Interests 
Most respondents did not recall the influence of professional lobbyists for or against the 
bill. Several respondents (inclusive of lobbyists) thought that the bill likely would have passed 
without professional lobbying. This was, in part, because few professional lobbyists were being 
paid to lobby on the issue at the beginning of the session. Many respondents noted that one 
known health lobbyist “ended up getting up and speaking at every meeting” but may have been 
acting “in a personal capacity” because he had recently lost a child to cancer. A few respondents 
commented that “none of the other [well-known] lobbyists were really terribly involved with this 
first [2014] bill.” A couple of respondents stated that a few known lobbyists quietly worked pro 
bono behind the scenes because of personal connections with the topic. One respondent noted 
that two influential lobbyists were “given money to keep an eye on the program” and “were 
certainly working in the background.”  
Generally, only toward the end of the legislative session or after passage of SB 1030 did 
professional lobbyists get involved to shape related public safety and business polices. One 
respondent believed lobbyists were “probably 35% to 40% responsible” for getting SB 1030 to 
the finish line, incentivized by the “amount of money that they might be paid in the future by the 
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applicants who were successful in getting licenses” in Florida, the “third largest populace [sic] 
state.” Lobbyists and businesses watched legislation closely, and out-of-state parties contacted 
Florida lobbyists. (See Final Hours of Legislative Session within this Section for more 
information.) 
“Most of the time … lobbyists can wield [influence] if they care enough to … if not to 
get it passed, to get it nuanced.” One respondent described the professional lobbyists covering 
medical cannabis as generally falling into one of three categories: those wanting access to 
medical cannabis only for their clients to financially profit; those that just wanted access; and a 
“third group of lobbyists that wanted smokables and expanded disease states.” 
Professional lobbyists wanted access to medical cannabis, but they wanted it for just their 
clients to sell … for the ones that had clients that wanted to get into the business and be 
licensees. Their goal was to limit the amount [sic] of licenses available in the state … so 
that the capital required to get into the business would be astronomical, and so that most 
people would stay out of it.” One respondent commented, “There was probably a lot 
more going on behind the scenes … that thing evolved from an affirmative defense to 
possess cannabis … [to] this convoluted, politically integrated system where … they have 
a monopoly. 
Among those just wanting access, patients were “hiring people to advocate for patient 
needs and patient care.” A few respondents noted that “the Epilepsy Foundation, pediatric 
physicians, psychologists … [and] others were very supportive.” There were also “political 
characters like John Morgan, who just wanted more access … in general.” However, some 
wanted to address additional health conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, in the bill. 
Parent advocates were approached by those who wanted full legalization of cannabis, but 
strategically did not expand the scope of their advocacy because the limited bill “was already a 
big ask” in “such a conservative state.” One respondent stated that “decriminalization … was 
discussed, but it wasn’t part of this. This was a medical healthcare issue.” 
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A few respondents commented that factions developed, which made it “difficult to 
compromise” among “hardline, anti-drug groups” that thought a bill would go too far, and pro-
marijuana groups that wanted “something more extensive than Charlotte’s web, so they were not 
particularly excited about it” as the bill did not go far enough in their opinions. 
A few respondents noted that a handful of groups, such as Drug-Free America, vocally 
opposed the bill. They argued that cannabis was “a gateway drug.” Other groups appeared to 
initially oppose the bill, then support the bill by the end of the session. For example, while the 
Florida Medical Association (FMA) initially opposed the bill, it ended up supporting it after bill 
language was added to include eight hours of continuing education for physicians. Respondents 
were mixed on whether the law enforcement groups were initially supporters or opponents. 
However, everyone agreed that they were on board or neutral at the end. Florida Cannabis 
Action Network, Moffitt Cancer Center, University of Florida, the Medical Marijuana Growers 
Association, and the Stanley Brothers were mentioned as other supportive stakeholders.  
Legislative Motivation and Perception 
Respondents had varying opinions on what personally motivated legislators to pass the 
2014 medical cannabis bill. One respondent stated: 
Honestly, different factors for different issues affect different lawmakers in different 
ways. So, there were some who were truly, I believe, concerned, with the well-being and 
the possibility of medical marijuana helping, for instance—patients with epilepsy and 
ALS and other things. And then there were legislators who looked at it as though it could 
potentially be a new source of revenue. I mean, different legislators, I think, had different 
takes on it. And then of course, there were those who were adamantly opposed. 
Another respondent commented that, with legislators: 
 
The first question is, is this going to make me look good? Second question is, is this 
going to help the people who are financially supporting me? Third, is it good public 
policy? … They are not looking to hurt people … but improving the lives of the state of 




Legislative Relationships and Power 
Relationships drive the process. I’m sure there were relationships specifically 
to people that helped facilitate the conversations, and that ultimately helped 
the outcome. No doubt about that.  
 
A few respondents noted that several legislators shared stories of family members who had 
suffered without access to medical cannabis. There were many “powerful stories” and “a lot of 
anecdotal comments made by legislators both in private … in committee, and on the floor.” 
Other respondents noted, “Legislators had loved ones that would benefit from this.” One 
respondent noted, “Once it hit the papers and the news and all over the state, people would say, 
‘There was no reason to tell you before, but now, yes, this is important because my cousin Fred 
has PTSD.’” One respondent remarked that: 
People who are advocating certainly look for decision-makers who might have family 
affected. I’ve done that my whole career. And sometimes they want to ignore it to make it 
look as though they’re there not for parochial reasons, but for reasons of helping an entire 
constituency on everything. And I understand that. 
A couple of respondents recounted surprise that Representative Charles Van Zant (R-
Keystone Heights), a Christian conservative known for praying during his in-office meetings, 
had ended up supporting the bill. Other respondents explained that Van Zant had recently 
watched a loved one suffer and “didn’t want that” for the parents and children he met, coming 
the conclusion that using such a product was “in the Bible” and that “there’s plants God has put 
here for us to cure us” after doing his own research. 
Personal passions for medical cannabis extended beyond family members. One 
respondent recalled a story of Senate President Don Gaetz: 
Don Gaetz was quoted in the Orlando Sentinel—in the midst of that legislative session … 
Don Gaetz admits to a reporter that when he was working for the hospice, that he 
procured cannabis illegally for a priest that he knew who was dying of cancer—and that 
he gave it to him.  
 
66 
Most respondents noted that the medical cannabis bill involved a unique overlap of 
family relationship and member-to-member relationships in that Senate bills sponsors Rob 
Bradley and Aaron Bean were brothers-in-law, and House bill sponsor Matt Gaetz was the son of 
Senate President Don Gaetz. 
The Senate sponsors, Aaron Bean, Rob Bradley, and Jeff Brandes, were collectively 
referenced by several respondents as “The Three Bs” who made “a pretty powerful team.” A 
couple of respondents believed that Bean was lending additional support to his brother-in-law, 
Bradley, by signing on to sponsorship. A couple of respondents commented that Bradley and 
Bean supported each other’s legislative efforts as brothers-in-law and stated, “they’re close. and 
they work together on several issues … they look after each other. They’re family.”  
Some respondents said that having Matt Gaetz on board “allowed him to reach across the 
chamber and get his dad on board,” and that the Senate president’s support seemed to be “a 
personal favor.” One person thought it was possible that the bill may not have passed if Don 
Gaetz had not been Senate president at the time. A couple of respondents mentioned that Matt 
Gaetz may have had additional compassion for persons with chronic illnesses and disabilities 
because his “mom is in a wheelchair.”  
However, some respondents believe that it was Don Gaetz’s wife, Vicky Gaetz, rather 
than son Matt Gaetz, who secured Senate President Don Gaetz’s support. A couple of 
respondents stated that “the way to get to the Senate President is through Mrs. Gaetz,” and a few 
respondents recalled that parent advocates had met with Vicky Gaetz. One respondent recalled 
that Mrs. Gaetz then reached out to other Senate spouses to rally support and “keep their 
husbands accountable.”  
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In addition, many respondents noted that they heard “that a couple of the licensees had 
ties to legislators, either in the family or close relationships, maybe business relationships.”  
Legislative Leadership Support 
According to respondents, the support of legislative leadership is critical for the passage 
of Florida legislation. One respondent noted that it was “probably more of a function of 
leadership’s decision to decide what final product came to the floor.” “In a legislative session, 
particularly in a legislative session in an election year, if you’re not somebody in leadership’s 
number one priority, you ain’t going anywhere,” explained one respondent.  
One respondent believed there was a “last minute deal” in which Senate President Don 
Gaetz “made it one of his last big negotiating chips … in negotiations between the House and the 
Senate over their priorities. It was pushed through as a result of both political will and the 
exercise of political will power.” Another respondent noted that medical cannabis was prioritized 
as a “top 10 issue for the Senate” in general, and for the Democratic caucus, in particular.  
Legislative Staff Support 
Many respondents did not recall staff as “having too much influence over the final 
product” except, perhaps, in drafting the bill or legislative analysis. “There’s a varying spectrum 
of influence from the staff on legislation … on this particular issue … more on the not influential 
side.” Another respondent noted, “I’ll say that we passed it despite staff.” This may have been 
because use of medical cannabis was still illegal. “In all fairness to [legislative staff] position[s], 
it’s still federally illegal,” which makes the choice of selectively ignoring a rule of law “a 
slippery slope.” Staff in the House, the more conservative body, tended to be more skeptical. 
They were suspicious of the medical value as there were “no double-blind studies and nothing 
was proven.” While, in general, legislative staff members were not directly involved, some 
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respondents praised Senator Bradley’s staff as doing a lot of work on the bill and working well 
with the parent advocates. A couple of respondents explained that legislative aides for the 
sponsors were “actively involved, but the staff directors for the respective health care committees 
varied.” 
Sponsoring Legislator’s Power, Influence, and Conservatism 
According to several respondents, the medical cannabis bill was “a bipartisan effort on 
the House side by both Matt Gaetz and Katie Edwards.” One respondent commented, “You had 
such a weird marriage between bill sponsors. Matt Gaetz was hard-core Republican, yet Katie 
Edwards was Democrat.” The bill garnered “more broad support from both sides because of 
that.” 
A few respondents viewed Matt Gaetz as a visionary medical cannabis reformer who 
prominently promoted the issue. One respondent remarked, “Gaetz saw this coming … it was 
something that he knew … although I believe he’s very sincere in his efforts, he’s also smart. 
This is something he could latch on to.” Respondents commented, “Nobody could have run the 
House bill better than Matt did.” Another respondent stated: 
Timing-wise, I think we just had the right voice. I think Matt Gaetz was one of the people 
who not only was in the right party at the right time, but also had influence in the other 
branch—being as his father was the Senate President … It was a combination of all of 
those things … plus we had bipartisan support with Katie Edwards.” 
Success factors noted by respondents included that most bill sponsors were “very credible 
and conservative” and there were “other … red states doing this.” “To their credit, and to Gaetz 
probably more so, they decided to forge ahead with it and wholly under … a seriously 
conservative framework.” Respondents explained that “physicians had to go through an eight-
hour course” and patient registration concerns were addressed so it “wasn’t going to be sold on 
the street corner and wasn’t going to be a gateway drug.” 
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In addition, Gaetz was also able to show that there were already legal products with THC 
available in the markets. At a first committee meeting, a couple of respondents recalled, Gaetz 
had the Florida Sheriffs Association test products that his staffers had procured at a “Whole 
Foods type” store. They brought items such as “hemp lotion, hemp milk, and some other type of 
hemp product” for testing. 
Two of the three came back positive for THC. [Gaetz] says ‘there are products in the 
store that have already tested positive for THC. We’re already offering this without 
knowing it. Why can’t we do this for kids who need it? Why can’t we get the oil here for 
kids who need it?’ 
A few respondents thought family testimonies provided conservative legislators with 
“political cover … how can [they] say no to a kid who has these kids of seizures.” According to 
one respondent, conservatives “edged into this slowly and looked around to make sure that 
everyone was holding hands moving forward so they couldn’t be singled out necessarily.”  
“It was an extremely popular piece of legislation because it had really opened up the door 
for a dialogue on the topic, which had never happened before.” Interested parties, such as 
“Florida Cannabis Action Network [that] had been advocating for years in the desert” suddenly 
found that others were “all for it.” The bill was viewed as a “tipping point” to allow for 
discussion of both the “medical benefits as well as community standards.” 
“In the Florida legislature, it is difficult for a Democrat to sponsor a bill and have it go 
anywhere.” Edwards was said to “sign on” to this bill after unsuccessful prior attempts to get a 
larger cannabis bill passed. A couple of respondents noted that Edwards took the time to “put 
together a huge binder … of the research articles … and passed it out to every single staff 
member, every single representative and senator.” 
Other non-sponsoring legislators also played memorable roles according to respondents. 
For example, Van Zant, known for being religious and conservative, changed his opinion and 
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supported medical cannabis. One respondent recalled Van Zant’s statement, repeating from 
recollection: 
Well, when I was a young man, I went to seminary, and my first parish was up in the hills 
of Kentucky. And there in the hills and the hollers traveling along the riverbed, there was 
hemp. And back in World War II they used that hemp oil to oil their guns. And that hemp 
oil saved lives in World War II. And, well, it looks to me like that hemp oil’s going to 
save lives again. 
Opponents were generally concerned that this bill would turn into a broader exemption 
for recreational marijuana use, would be a “slippery slope,” and that it would lead to greater drug 
use. However, the bill was narrowly drawn, and the focus on sick children made it difficult for 
opponents to defeat the bill.  
Executive Branch Opposition 
Interestingly, the executive branch was not seen as a supporter of this legislation. Almost 
all respondents noted that the state surgeon general was not in favor of the medical cannabis bill, 
presumably because of the use of recreational cannabis as a gateway drug. “Dr. [John] 
Armstrong was no fan of any medical marijuana options regardless of what they were.” A few 
respondents recalled that the state surgeon general “actually came out and testified against the 
cannabis bill [in legislative committee meetings].” 
Most respondents stated that Governor Scott was “not supportive” and “not a big fan of 
this [cannabis bill].” One respondent remarked that, “The Governor probably could have made it 
a little easier. He had a couple of opportunities to jump in and support and opted not to.” Another 
respondent stated that “[the legislature] made it veto-proof, and he had no choice but to be 
supportive.”  
Final Hours: Last-Minute Push and Surprise Influence  
Nearly all of the respondents did not believe the SB 1030 would pass in the 2014 
legislative session. One interviewee explained, “ … it was a zero-hour passage. There were many 
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points where it was dead, or passage was far from assured. It was a pretty big surprise … when it 
finally did pass.” As one respondent described: 
This was an atypical kind of bill getting to the finish line. It didn’t have the campaign 
donations tied to it that other bills might occasionally have … didn’t really have two 
sides fighting over an issue. You had history against you, and then you had sympathy 
with sick children. 
Toward the end of the session, “it became more of an industry battle.” When proponents 
realized the bill would pass, it was “time to make sure that this farmer gets something or that 
farmer gets something,” and lobbyists helped “steer the way that the licensing went for the 
growers.” One respondent noted that “money certainly helped them over the finish line, when 
people knew there was a big windfall coming.” Big business had a strong incentive as “state 
economists estimated it would be worth $5 billion” with approximately 444,000 probable 
medical cannabis users. Some businesses, according to a couple of respondents, operated under 
the premise that medical cannabis (and even recreational cannabis) use would eventually gain 
approval and, therefore, they “wanted to get a license and hang on to it because inevitably John 
Morgan is going to win.” The lingering questions were “who gets a license, the number of 
licenses, and restrictions.” 
A few respondents reasoned that legislators specifically “didn’t want marijuana 
companies from outside of the state to come in and totally make the system out of their control.” 
One respondent stated, “Basically, that was when the growers realized that they could have the 
upper hand here. That’s why you saw the nursery association get engaged.” “All these other little 
interests started becoming involved. They started seeing that it can be successful for Florida’s 
businessmen.”  
As a result, in the last couple of days of the session, an amendment was made to SB 1030 
that almost all respondents felt “came out of nowhere.” A respondent explained that as a proxy 
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for being a Florida business, “the Nurserymen’s association added language that said in order to 
be eligible for the license.” Requirements were an existing valid Florida certificate of registration 
issued for the cultivation of more than 400,000 plants, operation by a nursery grower as defined 
in statute, and operation as a registered nursery for at least 30 consecutive years. Only five 
dispensing organizations were permitted: one each in central, northwest, northeast, southeast, 
and southwest Florida. These five organizations were required to be vertically integrated and, 
therefore, could only sell products they grew themselves. Vertical integration required the five 
permitted dispensing organizations to be accountable for all supply chain processes from raw 
material (cultivation) to finished product (retail) without the option of outsourcing portions of the 
process and to sell only what they grow. According to several respondents, professional lobbyists 
“were able to limit the amount of people that could actually get the business,” to “keep it being 
vertically integrated,” and to “create the cartel-style system that we have today.” 
Most respondents commented that the vertical integration amendment remained a 
“mystery” almost five years later and could not surmise the source behind the “last-minute 
amendment.” However, a couple of respondents believed that vertical integration “was put in by 
the nursery association at the behest of the Speaker.”  
Horse-Trading 
 
While respondents thought the general policy of medical marijuana was good, several 
shared a sentiment that “the way that Florida chose to implement it was the absolute worst way 
we could have done it in the country.” The legislation “restricted access.” It created a “cartel” 
and “divided up the market into the north region, the middle region, and the south region.” With 
the vertical integration requirement, one licensee could not sell product to another, and “if you 
don’t get one of the first five licenses, you never get a license.” 
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As one respondent explained, “Nobody really thought that it was a good piece of 
legislation … but it was better to have something on the books.” The Florida Senate was faced 
with a decision: 
You have a question on day 58 … or day 59 of a 60-day session. Do you take a deal 
that’s on the table with a crappy provision that only restricts it to five, or do you wait 
another year and send it back without that? And so, the decision was made to just take it. 
As one respondent remarked, “Even if you came up with a bill that wasn’t very good, you 
at least had some pathway for medical cannabis, and that was the kind of first step of the 
legislation. And while it is by no means perfect, at least it’s not prohibition.” A few respondents 
noted that they are “often willing to support bills that make some positive improvement even if 
they don’t go as far as [they] think they should in a given policy just to get an incremental 
change happening.”  
Post-Passage 
The immediate aftermath of SB 1030’s passage provides additional insights. The passage 
of SB 1030 was viewed by almost all respondents as the Florida Legislature being “out there 
saying marijuana is medicine.” Bill passage was viewed as “an excellent first step” even though 
“it wasn’t perfect.”  
One respondent commented, “Our thesis was correct … we needed to put forth legislation 
that supported [medical cannabis]. But frankly, as the public was telling us, we didn’t go far 
enough.” Another respondent noted, “We’ve seen since, with the constitutional amendment, 
where 72% of the voters came out and supported increased access to medical cannabis.”  
Lobbyists and parent advocates saw business opportunities following the bill’s passage. 
One respondent commented on a parent advocate turned businessperson, “at the end of the day 
[they] thought they could get in this business too and it would translate into them being 
recognized a leader in the industry, which to some extent, they were.” Respondents described the 
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lengthy rule promulgation process for SB 1030, which included discussions about smokables, 
edibles, patches, compliance cameras, and the use of organic versus inorganic fertilizer with 
information provided in person by the Stanley Brothers and the mother of Charlotte Figi. One 
respondent described the situation: 
There were only 72 growers that had been in business for 30 years, that had over 400,000 
plants—that qualified. And so they were being bombarded by people who were licensed 
in other states, that understood the process from seed to sale, because that was part of the 
rules—it was from seed to sale—and a vertical integration system where only one 
company—or one entity—is involved in the growing, in the processing—the compliance, 
the processing, the extraction of the oils, the production of the products, the distribution, 
through the retail and through delivery. It was a very long arduous process. … 
Qualifying nursery growers were inundated with offers to buy. Many respondents 
commented that the vertical integration system was not working, “It was a mess … the 
Department of Health is still trying to implement that thing.” As SB 1030 and subsequent bill 
iterations moved through the regulatory and legislative processes, more business-type 
organizations were formed that leveraged funders, growers, and 30-year nursery licensees. One 
respondent commented, “When you see license holders selling their license for millions and 
millions of dollars but have never grown a plant of marijuana, they simply own the licensee, you 
see how corrupt the system is.” Most respondents knew of people who were “really in it to help 
people, not to make money.” However, that was not the case for all new investors. One 
respondent cut business ties after receiving feedback that: 
This is not about helping people … This is about getting a license and 10 years later, or 5 
years later, or whenever, the Feds remove this Schedule 1 status, the pharmaceuticals are 
going to come in here and pay the half a billion—half a billion dollars for this license. So 
that’s what this is about—this is about money. [If] you think this is about anything else 
but money, you’re fooling yourself. 
Another respondent commented, “At this point, medical marijuana is not about public policy, it’s 
about profitability and feasibility of the drug product.” 
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Brief Summary of Respondent-Generated Key Factors 
In the medical marijuana case study, based on respondent statements, the most important 
factors influencing the outcome of the bill (passage) appeared to be: compelling stories of 
children suffering, threat of a constitutional amendment, consistent and impassioned advocacy of 
affected families, member-to-member relationships, strong sponsors, the support of legislative 
leadership, and the likelihood of financial profit. 
Needle and Syringe Exchange 
The Infectious Disease Elimination Act of 2014 (“IDEA”) (SB 408) was more frequently 
referred to as the “Needle Exchange Bill for Miami-Dade County” or simply the “Needle 
Exchange Bill” among legislators. This legislation sought to create a five-year pilot program in 
Miami-Dade to exchange dirty needles for clean needles and to decriminalize the possession of 
syringes. The bill passed out of committees in both the House and Senate and passed off the 
floors of both the House and Senate, only to die in return messages to the Senate. (See Chapter 1 
for a more complete description.) 
In the needle exchange case study, I first discuss what factors led to the opening of a 
window of opportunity for the bill. Then, I explore which persuasive arguments were useful, and 
how grassroots and constituent advocacy efforts impacted the bill. Next, I review the impact of 
legislative perceptions and relationships on the bill. In addition, I discuss respondents’ 
perspectives of how the state health agency influenced legislative perception. Finally, I recount 
what respondents believed were the hidden reasons why the bill ultimately failed to pass in 2014.  
Window of Opportunity 
While respondent reports varied greatly as to when a needle exchange bill was first 
considered by the state legislature, most key informants spoke of persistence in advocacy efforts 
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and newly publicized research as positively impacting IDEA’s progress through the legislative 
process in 2014.  
Most respondents referred to the needle and syringe exchange bill as being in its first year 
of consideration. Two respondents spoke of 2013 rather than 2014 as the first year the needle 
exchange bill appeared, sponsored by Gwen Margolis in the Senate, and Mark Pafford in the 
House. However, one respondent who had witnessed many years of legislative sessions 
explained that variously worded needle and syringe exchange bills had been brought 
unsuccessfully before previous legislatures from seven to 10 times during the 1990s and 2000s, 
coming close to passage on more than one occasion. Among the state reasons that prior bill 
attempts failed: opposition by Governor Jeb Bush’s drug “czar,” Colonel Jim McDonough, 
concern by law enforcement that officers would be stuck with needles as they frisked people, and 
concern that the exchange would lead to increased heroin use. In addition, lessons from prior bill 
attempts, including “buzz words and the do’s and don’ts,” counterarguments to concerns, and 
extensive literature, were shared with University of Miami medical students who led grassroots 
IDEA advocacy efforts during the 2014 legislative session.  
By 2012, Hansel Tookes, then a University of Miami medical student, had conducted 
research comparing the number of discarded syringes on the streets of Miami in comparison to 
San Francisco and interviewing persons who inject drugs. The Miami Herald featured his 
research on the front page. With the support of the University of Miami and the medical student 
section of the Florida Medical Association (FMA), the exchange concept was brought before the 
FMA Board of Governors and then brought as a resolution to the House of Delegates. While 
there was concern and opposition, the resolution passed, and FMA actively supported bringing a 
bill in the 2013 legislation session and thereafter. FMA Chief Executive Officer Tim Stapleton 
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was noted as helping Tookes reach out to the legislature and narrowing the focus of the bill to 
Miami-Dade initially.208 In 2013, the Florida Sheriffs Association opposed the bill. Miami’s state 
attorney209 who facilitated an introduction between the medical students and the Florida Police 
Chiefs Association, was willing not to prosecute people for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
The combination of state attorney support and limiting the bill to Miami-Dade encouraged 
Miami law enforcement and the Sheriffs Association to support the bill in 2014.  
Persuasive Arguments: Health Benefits, Economic Benefits, and Bipartisan Support 
Many respondents explained that the bill was viewed as being good for health in that it 
could reduce or prevent HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and other infections. IDEA allowed dirty needles 
and syringes to be returned in exchange for clean needles and syringes. Respondents reported 
that clean exchange could not only safeguard drug users from infections, but it could reduce the 
number of dirty needles “just laying around.” Children and families were perceived at risk for 
encountering dirty needles in public locations such as beaches and parks. A few respondents 
viewed the bill as an opportunity to clean up public areas and create a healthier environment. 
In addition, a few respondents noted that advocates and bill sponsors argued that many in 
the drug-using population could not afford health care, leaving the cost of providing medical care 
for conditions such as HIV/AIDS to the state. By preventing HIV infections alone, it would 
reduce the health costs to the state and the taxpayer by more than $120 million. A couple of 
respondents viewed the bill as a chance to reduce health disparities across ethnicity and/or 
income in Miami-Dade, where the population is greater than 18% black/African American 
population and greater than 65% Hispanic/Latino. One respondent commented that legislative 
support was influenced by a “strong desire to sponsor legislation that had a known track record 
for improving public health.”  
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However, one respondent commented that it was a mistake for advocates to push 
needle/syringe access without concretely tying the issue to substance abuse treatment. As a 
standalone issue, it could more easily fail: “There’s a saying in Tallahassee, ‘if you stand up by 
yourself, you get shot.’” Other respondents provided a slightly different perspective. They noted 
that “perception was everything.” The needle/syringe exchange program in fact provided a 
breadth of additional services addressing treatment concerns. “There were just true 
misunderstandings about what a needle exchange really is about.” These respondents cited data-
driven arguments backed by studies showing that locations (e.g., San Francisco) with existing 
needle or syringe exchange programs had a notable reduction in new cases of infectious disease 
such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis among the injection drug-using population. They also noted that 
the exchange presented opportunities to connect injection drug users with services otherwise 
challenging to access, including basic health care, counseling, and drug treatment referrals. 
Various health facilities such as hospitals, health clinics, and substance abuse programs would 
operate the exchange program. 
As the legislative session progressed, several respondents recalled, needle and syringe 
exchange came to be viewed as a universal, nonpartisan issue. Some respondents attributed this 
viewpoint to the information provided by Tookes (a fourth-year medical student in 2014), while 
other respondents attributed it to Senate sponsor Oscar Braynon’s ability to gain support across 
party lines. One respondent noted, “When someone is infected or impacted by HIV or AIDS, it 
doesn’t see party registration, it doesn’t see zip code.” Another respondent noted that the needle 
and syringe exchange was important and timely as the opioid epidemic was escalating, and 
people were moving from pills to needles.  
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However, a few respondents recalled that the bill was an easier sell to legislators 
representing constituencies that did not have similar drug-related concerns (e.g., rural counties) 
because it was viewed as a Miami-Dade bill and limited to a pilot, “Miami was the only way to 
get it done … A lot of [legislators] viewed [it] as a foreign country.” In effect, it was considered 
by many to be a local bill with a universally appealing objective that allowed members to support 
both the Miami-Dade delegation and realize health benefits for a specific population. In addition, 
respondents noted that limiting the bill to a pilot allowed hesitant legislators to proceed more 
confidently. If the pilot failed, little harm was done, and if the pilot succeeded, the legislature 
would be credited for passing a good bill that could be replicated across the state.  
A couple of other respondents suggested that the strategic decisions to limit the scope of 
the bill, including focusing on one county, designing the model as a five-year ‘pilot,’ ensuring no 
state dollars were used, and including an evaluation aided in appeasing concerns and helping the 
bill progress toward final passage, despite its ultimate failure to pass. “You couldn’t get the 
whole piece. You got as much as you can. And guess what you do? You come back in 
subsequent years and try to make your bill better.” 
Grassroots and Constituent Advocacy Work Drives Bill 
All respondents viewed Tookes as the main non-legislator, non-lobbyist advocate for 
IDEA. Tookes traveled regularly to Tallahassee during the session to meet with legislators and 
executive branch members to educate them and provide testimony on the benefits of IDEA. He 
presented patient stories and pictures of impacted individuals and drug paraphernalia in public 
places such as neighborhood playgrounds.  
Several respondents noted that Tookes was “relentless,” “polished,” and “persistent,” 
building a network of contacts, texting and calling legislators, and stopping by legislative offices 
to explain “all the science” and answer questions. Once Tookes had a legislator’s buy-in, he 
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would ask the legislator to introduce him to yet another legislator or even ask the legislator to 
speak to other legislators and explain the bill’s importance. “He used the network that he had 
built but then got that network to go and talk to other people and other legislators that might not 
know anything about the bill.” A couple of respondents commented that Tookes’s youthful 
appearance and student status were suggestive of younger voter/constituent support to legislators. 
This allowed his message to be better received than if a more experienced medical doctor had 
delivered it. The bill was referred to by some as “the medical student’s bill” or “Hansel’s bill,” a 
couple of respondents noted. 
While Tookes led the effort, University of Miami medical students as group were “the 
true proponents of this legislation” and “stewards of public health,” and they provided a 
“constant stream of boots on the ground advocacy,” a few respondents explained. Medical 
students would meet with members from legislative committees of reference throughout the 
process, explaining both the health benefits and potential cost savings of needle exchange from 
reduced infectious disease transmission.  
Advocacy, But Not Necessarily Professional Lobbying 
Nearly all respondents commented on the lack of professional lobbyists who worked on 
the IDEA bill. Many deemed this to be unusual. At minimum, they would have expected that 
lobbyists would show support for a bill progressing as well as IDEA did.  
While professional lobbying efforts fell below the radar of most respondents, health care 
advocacy groups with common interests encouraged each other to, at minimum, advocate by 
appearing at committee hearings and waiving in support (i.e., going on record as supporting the 
bill without using allotted time to provide substantive testimony). Interest groups that waived in 
support at committee meetings included the AIDS Institute, the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, the 
Florida Medical Association (FMA), and the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association (FOMA). 
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A few advocates, instead of waiving their time in favor of the bill, spoke of the bill’s benefits to 
people. 
Other organizations mentioned by respondents as supporting the bill included the Florida 
Hospital Association, the Florida Association of Nurse Practitioners, and the Florida Sheriffs 
Association. A couple of respondents noted that it was important to ensure that the Sheriffs 
Association and the Dade County Police (the chief, in particular) were not actively opposed to 
the bill.  
One respondent noted that legislative members do not like it if there are any (large 
organizational) opponents, “The members don’t like that. They want … no opposition.” Most 
respondents did not recall any open opposition in 2014 or negative publicity, and they did not 
believe that public opinion impacted the bill’s outcome.  
Instead of a lobbyist push, several respondents viewed the bill drive as a grassroots 
advocacy endeavor. A few respondents commented that it was a bit unusual for grassroots 
advocacy to lead the charge on the bill. However, the “story and intentions” of the legislation 
were not unusual. The bill was “truly a public health measure for the greater good.” 
Legislative Perceptions 
A few respondents noted that certain legislators had difficulty with the concept of 
distributing syringes and needles to “drug addicts” or “drug users,” and that state government 
funding should not aid in drug-related illegal activities. A couple of respondents suggested that 
the choice of wording made the bill less appealing than it could have been because “needle 
exchange” evokes a different mental picture and emotional response than “syringe access” or 
“access to sterile syringes.” Respondents conveyed some legislators’ beliefs that “having a bill 
passed like this would promote drug use, and almost send a statement that it’s okay … to use 
drugs. We’re going to give you the needles.” This argument was countered by the opportunity to 
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provide drug-cessation education to users and the increased economic costs of taxpayer-funded 
indigent care at hospitals for individuals contracting illness, particularly HIV/AIDS, from dirty 
syringes and needles. One respondent noted that particular arguments, either the health argument 
or fiscal argument, “played a greater role depend[ing] on the political affiliation of the 
legislator.” Fiscal arguments carried slightly more weight among more conservative legislators.  
“Concern by other legislators of the optic of handing out syringes” thwarted the original 
bill objective to implement IDEA statewide. One respondent explained that “public policy moves 
incrementally” and “you try to get what you can, and you move incrementally as long as it 
doesn’t violate your core [political] values.” 
Many respondents noted their belief that the House speaker and Senate president might 
have more actively supported the legislation if it appeared that the governor’s office, Department 
of Health (DOH), and/or FMA supported IDEA. A few respondents mentioned that a House 
speaker’s receptivity to health issues such as these depended largely on the particular speaker’s 
level of conservativism. Further, if the speaker “doesn’t want a bill to pass, it’s not going to get a 
hearing in a committee,” because directives were given in a “top down” fashion in the Florida 
House. IDEA passed all committees and initial floor votes in both chambers but was not 
prioritized in the final hours of the legislative session. A couple of respondents stated that 
leadership had “mixed feelings” about the bill. 
Legislative Relationships and Power 
Senate sponsor Oscar Braynon210 was the minority (Democratic) whip and was in 
succession to become the minority leader pro tempore and then minority leader, and House 
sponsor Mark Pafford211 was Democratic policy chair and slated to become the next minority 
leader. By all respondent reports, Senator Braynon212 acted as a legislative champion who was 
able to reach across the aisle to gain Republican support and ensure the bill’s objective was 
 
83 
viewed from a more universally beneficial, nonpartisan perspective. Senator Braynon spoke with 
his colleagues about constituents in his community who had been impacted. The stories 
resonated on a personal or social level for legislators from across the state despite the bill 
focusing the pilot on Miami-Dade. As one respondent noted, “It comes back down to 
relationships in this process. You can have the greatest public policy, but if you … have an A in 
public policy, but you have an F in member-to-member relationships, you will not succeed in 
moving your public policy forward.” Senator Braynon also facilitated Hansel Tookes’ meeting 
with legislators and members of the executive branch.  
Senator Anitere Flores,213 a Miami Republican, chair of the Senate Committee on 
Communications, Energy, and Public Utilities, and vice chair of the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, was cited by respondents as be a “very active 
proponent” as was Representative Eduardo “Eddy” Gonzalez,214 who was in his final year in 
office and the chair of the Dade delegation. One respondent commented that Gonzalez “whipped 
the vote,” inspiring members to vote for the bill with comments like “Come on. You see these 
people with abscesses—can’t we help them out, throw them some clean syringes?” Gonzalez is 
also credited with convincing the chair of Government Operations Subcommittee in the House, 
Frank Artiles,215 to hear the bill in committee after it was delayed for reading. House sponsor 
Mark Pafford was noted by a couple of respondents as successfully promoting IDEA among state 
representatives. Other significant proponents216 of the bill noted by respondents included 
legislators who were health care professionals, members of the Florida Legislative Black Caucus, 
members of the Miami-Dade delegation, and key state senators including the chair of Senate 
Committee on Health Policy, which was the first committee stop for SB 408. 
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In 2014, Miami-Dade was represented by six of the state’s 40 senators and 18 of the 
state’s 120 representatives.217 The only opponent among the Miami-Dade delegation was 
Representative Mike Bileca.218 Senator John Thrasher,219 chair of Senate Committee on Rules, 
was the only nay vote for SB 408 in committee.  
Although it was generally noted by a few respondents that staff directors have “a lot of 
influence with the Chairman,” most respondents did not feel that legislative staff had a 
significant impact on this bill’s outcome. However, one respondent explained that there were 
meetings behind the scenes with legislative staff, who “did a lot of work” conducting research 
and locating current, quality information to increase legislator(s)’ comfort with, and support of, 
the bill. Involvement transcended the legislative aide level and went up to chief of staff level. 
Another respondent noted that House of Representatives Health and Human Services (HHS) 
Committee staff director and former Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) Secretary 
Christa Calamus had some influence in the bill advancing. Legislative analysis was deemed fair 
by most respondents, and one respondent recalled that the projected fiscal savings was more than 
$120 million if even 10% of injection drug users avoided HIV infection and corresponding 
treatment costs, which “helped boost this initiative, particularly in the more conservative 
legislative minds.” 
State Health Agency Influences Legislative Perception 
The Florida Medical Association (FMA) is a major political contributor to campaigns. 
Respondents offered mixed responses when asked about FMA’s support of this legislation, with 
some noting FMA’s support (“waiving in” support for the bill) and others arguing that it quietly 
opposed the bill. But others suggested that FMA’s speculated opposition was without foundation 
or confirmation and that the source of the rumor was believed to be the State Surgeon General 
John Armstrong, who was thought to have a close relationship with FMA. A couple of 
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respondents stated that the state surgeon general had refused to meet with medical students at the 
time because of their student status and had requested instead that bill proponents meet with the 
Statewide Drug Policy Advisory Council. The request was viewed as a tactic to potentially derail 
or delay bill progress as the council took the time to review the bill’s policy implications. A few 
respondents heard—but could not verify—that the state surgeon general “singlehandedly was 
airing concerns with legislators.” Nearly all respondents cite lack of support from the state 
surgeon general and DOH as key in the bill’s failure to pass. “In the Department of Health … 
there’s basically three positions—neutral, opposed, and support.” While a couple of respondents 
labeled DOH’s position to be neutral, more respondents believed DOH to be actively opposed. 
According to a few respondents, the opposition of the state surgeon general was not 
discovered by key parties until late in the session, which made it difficult to resolve. It was also 
believed that the state surgeon general ordered negative changes to DOH bill analyses in addition 
to engaging in direct and indirect advocacy against the bill. Heads of medical schools across the 
state and proponent organizations worked to undo any damage. Respondents explained that 
Armstrong did not reach out to the bill sponsors to express concerns or opposition, which was 
perceived as disrespectful by many legislators. Armstrong, who had been serving as the 
Governor’s appointee, was also slated for formal Senate confirmation during the 2014 session. 
Respondents stated that his handling of the bill was a major factor in his inability to get 
confirmed.  
Final Hours: Gubernatorial Casualty of War and “Kill Bill” Theories 
In the 2014 election year, Governor Rick Scott ran for reelection against former Governor 
Charlie Crist. According to a few respondents, the bill’s House Sponsor, Mark Pafford, went 
public with unfavorable statements concerning Governor Scott. In addition, Governor Scott had 
tried repeatedly to have his state surgeon general nominee (Armstrong) confirmed without 
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success, and confirmation would be an accomplishment if 2014 were to be Scott’s last year as 
governor. Many respondents stated that the bill’s Senate sponsor, Oscar Braynon, actively 
opposed the state surgeon general nominee’s confirmation. With both the House and Senate 
sponsors causing Rick Scott angst, concerns emerged that the governor would veto IDEA if it 
passed. Many respondents believe that this is the core reason that IDEA did not ultimately pass. 
The Senate, understanding that there would be a veto, opted to expend political capital elsewhere 
that year and take the bill up again when there could be a new surgeon general, a new sponsor, 
and possibly a new governor. A few respondents stated that the governor’s office had no 
substantive objections to IDEA regardless of Dr. Armstrong’s position, and that IDEA’s demise 
was merely a political “casualty of war.”  
A couple of respondents believed that time simply ran out for the bill during the busy 
2014 legislative session, and that more education should have been done in the interim session to 
educate people before the regular session. “When push comes to shove in those last days—even 
in the last hours of session, there’s just a limited number of things that they can get done by 
midnight on that Friday—because everyone wants to go home.” One respondent explained that 
many bills successfully pass out of committee such as IDEA did but “never quite make it across 
the finish line for one reason or another.” A mix of factors intervened, including a sense of 
urgency, prioritization, and where the bill is placed on the agenda.  
According to a couple of respondents, a deal was cut on the last day of the legislative 
session that the House would vote on the bill only if the University of Miami was designated the 
administrative burden of running the exchange program instead of the Department of Health or 
its designee, as the Senate’s version stated. The House passed the bill amended with that caveat, 
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but it died in return messages to the Senate without the Senate taking up the amended bill for 
final reading.  
Brief Summary of Respondent-Generated Key Factors 
In the needle exchange case study, based on respondent statements, the most important 
factors influencing the outcome of the bill (near passage, but ultimately failure to pass) appeared 
to be: a constituent champion, strategic leveraging of legislative contacts to build access, a strong 
legislative sponsor, member-to-member relationships, legislator education on topic by credible 
medical students, and repositioning the bill as only a pilot project limited to one county. The 
state health agency’s opposition and intergovernmental tensions appeared to have negatively 
impact the bill. For a summary of medical cannabis and needle/syringe exchange legislation 
following the 2014 Florida legislative session, see Appendix H. 
Study Limitations 
This research has several limitations. Foremost, the results and conclusions cannot be 
generalized because this study examined only two cases of legislation during one legislative 
session in a single state. While the case studies provided deeper insights into the passage and 
failure in two specific instances of legislation, they could not capture a complete picture of every 
interpersonal and political transaction that transpired to yield the final outcome. Any number of 
other factors, which are not addressed in this study, may have influenced the successful passage 
of state health legislation. It is not feasible to fully estimate or describe the impact of each 
variable because no variable exists in a vacuum independent of other factors. Also, while data 
analysis suggested that some factors were more influential than others, the study did not explore 
whether, how, or in what combination the factors worked together to be effective. 
In addition, the process of gubernatorial review and approval was beyond the scope of 
this research study. The original independent variables selected for this study were a subjective 
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synthesis of several unconnected research studies that may or may not be directly relevant to 
how Florida health legislation is passed. To that end, this study tests the boundaries and 
applicability of prior case studies while adding a component of original research variables 
through the open-ended portions of the online survey and the interviews. In addition, the study 
involved the participation of 20 purposively selected stakeholders across bills and stakeholder 
categories for the key informant interviews. It is possible that stakeholders choosing to 
participate have stronger opinions that may not be representative of others within their 
stakeholder grouping.  
Furthermore, the study cannot predict with any certainty what would happen if the state 
of Florida significantly changes lobbying restrictions, legislator access, Republican Party 
dominance, elections laws, or government leaders. Finally, external validity/generalizability 
remains problematic, as any one of a multitude of factors (e.g., politics, ideology, economy, 
population demographics) may change the prioritization of health-related issues in other states. 
Standard basic interview protocol, uniform definitions, a Coding Guide, MAXQDA 
coding software, and a second coder were used to increase validity and reliability. (See Chapter 
3, Methods.) Various data sources were also triangulated, including legislative records, media 
sources, survey results, interview results, and organizational notes. As the measurements of the 
variables and the instrument proposed appear reasonable, face validity is arguably moderate. 
Construct validity is also presumed to be relatively solid given the studies identified in the 
literature review. The sources of variable data were fairly reliable for gauging the comparative 
level of influence of legislative factors, and the additional factors provided by participants 
captured novel items for testing in later studies. Internal validity of this qualitative study is 
expected to be high as perceptions were measured and gauged in comparison to the responses of 
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other citizen stakeholders, legislators, agency officials, and lobbyist participants. Because the 
questions in the online survey are an extension of current theories found in literature review 
results and cross-referenced with the key informant interviews, content validity should be 
relatively high. External validity was challenging, but results may be applicable to future 
research in similar legislative endeavors within the Republican-controlled Florida Legislature. A 
replication of this study with similar results in other Republican-controlled states with bicameral 
legislatures may suggest a much broader range of applicability. However, to achieve a higher 
external validity in subsequent studies, a review of other states with Democratic-controlled 
legislative action or mixed party control would be necessary. 
Selection bias will necessarily alter study results. Multiple points of selection bias have 
been considered, including critical bias by the researcher in bill selection and representative 
stakeholder selection. The researcher concedes personal preferences and biases that may impact 
direct responses and stakeholder selection, such as perceived personal knowledge of Florida’s 
legislative process. As study participation is voluntary, stakeholders who interviewed may be 
different in some substantive ways than stakeholders who declined participating in the key 
informant interviews. In addition, recall bias must be considered given the time elapsed both 
from the 2014 legislative session to the online survey and in between the survey and key 
informant interview components. Furthermore, stakeholder responses may have been affected by 
intervening changes in public perception (e.g., increased acceptability of medical marijuana use) 
or the implementation of bills passed after 2014 (the needle/syringe exchange program 
eventually passed in 2016). Stakeholders may have given “socially acceptable” responses, rather 
than raise questions regarding legislative choices that appear “political” or “tainted.” Identified 
stakeholders who are personally known to the researcher may be more likely, or less likely, to 
 
90 
participate or to answer forthrightly because of individual sentiment toward the researcher or 
research. Participants may be passionate about the topic or may want to use research outcomes to 
their monetary advantage (e.g., lobbyists).  
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY/INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter will summarize how specific factors influenced the fates of the two bills and 
how these examples may guide policy advocates in future efforts to develop and influence public 
health policy. In the two case studies, as in prior studies discussed in the literature review, 
several well-researched policy guiding factors were present, including:  
1. a window of opportunity,  
2. persuasive health and/or economic arguments with quantifiable return on investment,  
3. grassroots mobilization with in-person constituent advocacy and policy entrepreneurship, and 
4. legislative power and legislative perception.  
Factors less discussed in the literature, such as the importance of legislative relationships, were 
found to be influential in the two bills’ outcomes. Unexpectedly, professional lobbying, support 
of the governor’s office, and support of the state health agency did not play as important roles in 
the 2014 consideration of both the medical cannabis and needle exchange bills.  
Window of Opportunity 
Among general factors influencing legislation, a “window of opportunity”220 has been 
cited as highly influential. This window may vary depending on factors such as media 
attention221 and the number of times the issue has been brought before the legislature.222 
Windows of opportunity existed in both SB 1030 (medical cannabis) and SB 408 (needle 




In 2014, Florida’s election year politics were in play. Discussions of elections, re-
elections, constitutional amendments, confirmation of appointees, fundraising, media attention, 
and political posturing pervaded the Florida legislative scene. Both medical cannabis and needle 
and syringe exchange had been previously considered. However, persistent efforts had not 
resulted in bill passage for either topic.  
A large window of opportunity had opened for the medical cannabis bill (SB 1030) that 
allowed the entrance of a “perfect storm,” or unique confluence, of complex conditions for 
successful passage. The national media spotlighting of Charlotte’s Web through Dr. Sanjay 
Gupta’s CNN documentary,223 viewed by a Florida legislator ascending in power and an 
advocate family that later helped with the bill, led to a renewed interest and different direction 
for medical cannabis bill language that had floundered in previous attempts. In addition, the 
threat of a medical cannabis constitutional amendment on the general election ballot that would 
limit the legislature’s ability to set parameters for medical cannabis occurred in this election year 
that pitted a Republican-turned-Democrat former governor against a Republican incumbent. 
Further, public polling suggested that more than 60% of Floridians supported the “concept” of 
medical cannabis.224 The combination of circumstances led to a Republican majority-party 
interest in a successful medical cannabis bill before the election, which could have drawn more 
liberal and youthful voters were medical cannabis to remain unaddressed.  
In the Infectious Disease Elimination Act (IDEA), a new window of opportunity opened 
following research on discarded needles and syringes in Miami by Hansel Tookes that was 
featured on the front page of The Miami Herald. In addition, new data showed reductions in 
infectious disease in locations with existing exchange programs. This led to a renewed focus on 
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the issue of needle and syringe exchange that had been raised unsuccessfully in the 1990s and 
2000s.  
The strength of the window of opportunity in the medical cannabis bill far eclipsed that 
of the IDEA bill. While IDEA was considered in the same legislative session and election year, it 
did not have the medical cannabis bill’s added political leverage of being the subject of a 
constitutional amendment that could usurp legislative preference or change gubernatorial race 
outcomes, nor the added political assurance of a poll that a majority of Floridians supported 
needle exchange. That it was an election year may have worked against the needle exchange bill 
because of political intrigue surrounding the governor’s selection of state surgeon general. In 
addition, unlike the medical cannabis bill, the needle and syringe exchange bill did not have a 
national health expert and thought leader such as Dr. Sanjay Gupta bringing stories of need and 
efficacy directly into the homes of millions of viewers. While Gupta is a health-related celebrity, 
his documentary coverage did not rise to the level of endorsement for Florida’s medical cannabis 
bill. However, celebrity endorsement has been found to influence bill outcomes.225 
Persuasive Arguments and Economic Considerations  
Educating legislators on medical cannabis and needle and syringe exchange needs and 
benefits was critical in advancing the bills toward final legislative consideration. Research,226 the 
actions of other states, health benefits,227 and the potential cost of action or inaction as state 
financial gain or loss228 all weighed in to strengthen or weaken the case for bill passage. In 
addition to overt costs and benefits for each bill, policymakers also considered whether passage 
would promote drug use and whether the impacted individuals could have acted to prevent or 
mitigate their situations (e.g., individual responsibility for injectable drug use). Legislators 
further considered individual costs and benefits of supporting legislation (e.g., constituent 
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approval in an election year, financial benefits from a last-minute vertical integration amendment 
to the medical cannabis bill). 
Despite anecdotal evidence, legislators found a lack of expert reviews or peer-reviewed, 
evidence-based research to support claims that medical cannabis was effective for various health 
conditions as claimed. The lack of research was offset by the in-person and video testimonies of 
families suggesting that inaction could lead to continued or worsening health conditions, extreme 
treatments, death, or the movement of impacted families out of state because of lack of access. In 
addition, some states that had adopted medical cannabis legislation were viewed as being 
influenced by “bleeding-heart” liberals by Florida’s conservative legislature. Limiting the bill to 
pain-relieving/symptom-reducing properties of medical cannabis (i.e., found in the CBD 
component) rather than euphoria properties (i.e., found in the THC component) permitted a shift 
in discussion from cannabis as an illegal, gateway drug to cannabis as compassionate medicine. 
Legislative analysis further suggested that medical cannabis could result in a multibillion-dollar 
industry in the state of Florida. The combination of these critical factors set the stage for passage 
of medical cannabis.  
In contrast to medical cannabis, the research in IDEA was more robust. In cities such as 
San Francisco with existing needle and syringe exchange programs, new cases of infectious 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis were reduced among the injection drug-using 
population, and health care and drug treatment referrals were increased. Hansel Tookes’s study 
also demonstrated the need for an exchange program to reduce the dirty needles/syringes left in 
public areas in Miami-Dade to reduce transmission of infectious disease to the general 
population. In addition, the bill was limited to Miami-Dade, where the highest rates of related 
infectious diseases were found. The health benefits to users, protection for the general public, 
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and cost-savings generated from avoiding costly infectious disease treatments were strong 
arguments that offset many concerns. Nonetheless, the perception that self-manifested drug users 
were being given paraphernalia to continue a dangerously destructive and illegal habit was 
challenging to overcome. 
Both bills involved the potential to initiate, encourage, or continue illegal drug use. Both 
bills were universally appealing to the extent they would help people address pain, health, or 
both. However, in the case of medical cannabis, patients were viewed as both in need and 
without blame. Legislators were more likely to view children with epilepsy and cancer patients 
as innocent victims of their diseases or health conditions. The frames of “protection” and 
“worthiness” or “deservingness,” or even unconscious racial/ethnic attributions (medical 
cannabis use associated with Caucasians) may have influenced perceptions of medical 
cannabis.229 For these reasons, it was easier for legislators to support medical cannabis for 
treatment of pain relief that traditional medications could not provide. In contrast, the drug-using 
population was not viewed as blameless, regardless of need. The frames of “illicit drug use” and 
“unworthiness” or “lack of deservingness,” or even unconscious racial/ethnic attributions 
(injectable drug use associated more with people of color) may have influenced perceptions of 
needle and syringe exchange.230 It was arguably within the control of drug users to start using 
illegal drugs. Addiction was not easily divorced from choice and not readily viewed as a disease 
state or faultless medical condition. This distinction between the bills and the accompanying 




Grassroots Mobilization, Persistent Constituent Advocacy, and the Children  
Constituents coalescing into interest groups were the lead advocates for both the medical 
cannabis and needle exchange bills. The impact of legislative testimony and in-person 
discussions contributed to the advancement of both bills, albeit to different degrees.231 
The Moseleys and other families, backed by long-time, pro-cannabis special interest 
groups such as the Florida Cannabis Action Network, served as key advocates for the medical 
cannabis bill. Parents and children were in the Capitol building daily during the legislative 
session, meeting with legislators and testifying, serving as a visual reminder that the need for 
medical cannabis was real and could not be ignored. They shared heartbreaking, relatable stories 
of children and family members suffering from painful conditions through photos, videos, and 
in-person testimony. Parents testified at the agony of watching their children suffer to the point 
of despair. Similar to other studies, grassroots mobilization in this study extended to public 
education and mass emails to constituents, support of the constitutional amendment, letters to 
legislators, affected individuals and families going to the Capitol, media buzz and, on occasion, 
the hiring of consultants for media or lobbying.232 
In the case of IDEA, constituents such as Hansel Tookes became policy entrepreneurs, 
creating windows of opportunity and calling attention to health-related policy issues. Medical 
student and researcher Tookes served as key advocate for the needle exchange bill, speaking as 
both a professional and a concerned Miami-Dade resident/constituent. With the backing of the 
University of Miami, he and a handful of other medical students visited legislator offices and 
spoke in committee meetings. Tookes used initial legislative and organizational contacts to build 
additional contacts, forming an eventual network of contacts for education and advocacy. Tookes 
and supporters spent time before the start of the 2014 legislative session to develop “conceptual 
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buy-in” or reduce oppositional concerns from major special interest stakeholders such as the 
Florida Medical Association and the Florida Sheriffs Association. Every day during the 
legislative session, Tookes and supporters were seen and heard throughout the Capitol building 
advocating for the needle exchange bill.  
As noted by many interviewed on medical cannabis, it was difficult to ignore the families 
and the children. Seeing sick children and hearing stories of sick children every day of the 
legislative session in committee meetings, in legislator offices, and in the Capitol’s halls left a 
deep impression of need and urgency. While Tookes and colleagues presented patient stories and 
pictures both of impacted individuals and of potentially harmful situations such as drug needles 
in local playgrounds, the impression of need and urgency was not as strong as in medical 
cannabis. As conveyed by the advocates, a vote for medical cannabis could help a child cope 
with life-threatening seizures and could help a parent not to pray for God to take their child to 
ease their suffering. A vote for needle exchange did not appear to resonate at that level, and some 
believed it would have little to no impact on injectable drug use itself. 
Professional Lobbying 
Literature suggests that professional lobbying is one of the most important factors in the 
ascension and passage of health-related legislation.233 Interview results across both medical 
cannabis and needle exchange bills suggest that in these specific bills, professional lobbying 
played a surprisingly diminished role in bill progression and consideration.  
While a small handful of lobbyists worked on the medical cannabis bill from the 
beginning, many in a pro bono capacity based on personal interest and impact, it was suggested 
that most paid lobbyists did not take interest in the bill until passage was a near certainty, and in 
the immediate post-passage period. The historical failure of cannabis-related bills suggested that 
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time spent lobbying would not result in a win for clients. As the session neared an end and 
passage was increasingly likely, professional lobbyists recognized that medical cannabis—from 
growing and selling to regulatory issues—presented a lucrative opportunity in which an 
increasing number of clients would want to partake. The nursery growers were noted as having 
an early interest and benefiting from the last-minute addition of language creating requirements 
for a vertically integrated growing, production, and distribution system.  
Interview results suggest that professional lobbyists were not actively or visibly engaged 
in the needle exchange bill that year. Interest groups expressed support by “waiving in support” 
during committee stops without actual testimony, but almost all respondents found the absence 
of lobbyists to be unusual for a bill progressing as well as IDEA did.  
The lack of professional lobbyist involvement in both bills was noticeable and unusual to 
those interviewed. With constituent advocacy working well, legislative champions, lack of vocal 
big organization opposition, and little-known financial incentives during the committee process, 
these bills may have been periodically monitored but not actively advocated by lobbyists. In 
addition, with both bills related to drugs, lobbyists may have preferred a “wait-and-see” 
approach. Because lobbying was not prevalent in these bills, the impact of time spent 
lobbying,234 money paid to lobbyist,235 and legislative funding credited to a lobbyist236 could not 
be assessed. However, for the medical cannabis bill, the prospect of future money for lobbyists 
was a last-minute factor of influence. 
Legislative Relationships 
Whether legislative member-to-member, family and friends, or non-legislator 
connections in the legislative process, almost all interviews suggested that legislative 
relationships drove the consideration of both the medical cannabis and needle exchange bills.  
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In the medical cannabis bill, member-to-member relationships allowed for bill 
sponsorship across party lines. Member-to-member relationships also included family 
relationships. The House bill sponsor was related to the Senate president, and two of the Senate 
sponsors were related by marriage. It was a strategic objective of the family advocates to have 
legislators relate to the stories of the children and family members. Family testimony led many 
legislators to speak openly of their own family members and friends who had suffered without 
the benefits of medical cannabis. Family advocates were said to develop enduring relationships 
with legislative sponsors. Connections between legislators and those in the legislative process are 
believed to have led to the vertical integration amendment added at the final hour before passage. 
In IDEA, member-to-member relationships were noted as particularly important in 
gaining momentum and bipartisan support. This included individual member-to-member 
relationships in addition to regional delegation (Miami-Dade) and Democratic caucus support. A 
handful of legislators were known to have family members or friends impacted by drug 
addiction. Legislators representing districts with similar demographics to Miami-Dade and 
legislators representing geographic areas close to Miami-Dade were noted as being additionally 
supportive. The constituent advocates were noted as developing working relationships and 
gaining the admiration of legislators as the session progressed.  
Across both bills, legislative relationships allowed for bill negotiations and horse-
trading.237 The medical cannabis bill was viewed as imperfect and language compromises were 
made, but it was considered a foothold that could not be lost in subsequent statutory iterations. 
For the needle exchange bill, final bill negotiations resulted in the saving of political capital for 
another year and possibly another gubernatorial administration and state surgeon general.  
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Legislative Power and Perception 
Legislative power, influence, and perception were common themes across the medical 
cannabis and needle exchange bills. The political power of a sponsoring legislator who acts as a 
policy entrepreneur can impact a bill’s outcome.238 
The rising political power and charisma of Republican Representative Matt Gaetz (now 
US representative), bolstered by support of Democratic cosponsorship of Representative Katie 
Edwards, and the perception of backing by his Senate president father, made Matt Gaetz a 
formidable legislative champion of the medical cannabis bill. In the Senate, the “Three Bs” 
(Senators Bean, Bradley, and Brandes) were perceived as a political medical cannabis 
powerhouse backed by the Senate president. These legislators influenced organizations and 
fellow legislators to support the medical cannabis bill, which was perceived as both alleviating 
the suffering of blameless children and families and a solid “win” for supportive legislators in an 
election year.  
The rising political power and influence of Democratic Senator Oscar Braynon, minority 
whip and designated future minority leader, bolstered by the support of Republican senators such 
as Committee Chair Anitere Flores, the Miami-Dade delegation, and the Democratic caucus, 
made Braynon a powerful legislative champion of the needle exchange bill. He rallied bipartisan 
support both in the Senate and House. In the House, sponsor Mark Pafford garnered support as 
Democratic policy chair and designated next minority leader. But, legislative perception of 
individual addiction/drug use responsibility remained a factor of consideration. After limiting the 
bill to Miami-Dade, more legislators were willing to support IDEA because it was perceived to 
have less of a negative impact on voter approval outside of Miami-Dade, particularly among 
Republican legislators. Legislative (mis)perception that the Florida Medical Association was 
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against the bill, in addition to concerns regarding a gubernatorial veto, may have made needle 
exchange an unnecessary political risk in an election year. 
For each bill, legislators perceived a benefit to their constituents that influenced their 
support.239 Medical cannabis was viewed as benefiting constituents throughout the state of 
Florida, while needle exchange was limited to potentially helping constituents in Miami-Dade. 
Medical cannabis, as a result of grassroots efforts and polling, was perceived as having 
significant constituent support, which impacted legislative support.240 In addition, majority party 
sponsorship of the medical cannabis bill was noted as contributing to its success, consistent with 
findings in other studies.241 Furthermore, legislative leadership impacted the bills’ outcomes, 
particularly in the case of medical cannabis, which the Senate president supported.242  
Studies have found that legislative staff members, including committee staff,243 staff 
directors, and legislative aides,244 to be influential in the progress and outcome of health-related 
legislation. However, respondents in this study did not find legislative staff to have a strong 
impact on either the medical cannabis or needle exchange bills. 
Governor’s Office Impact and State Health Agency Influence 
Support by the governor’s office has been cited as critical to the passage of health-related 
legislation.245 In addition, studies have found the support of the state health agency as 
influential.246 Despite a known anti-drug stance by the governor, neither the medical cannabis 
bill nor the needle exchange bill received active support or opposition from the governor’s office 
to the extent known. However, the state surgeon general and the Florida Department of Health 
overtly and/or covertly opposed both bills. This impacted one bill but not the other. As a result of 
the anti-drug positioning of the Department of Health, agencies discussions were limited and 
non-impactful, differing from other studies.247 
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State Surgeon General Armstrong testified against medical cannabis during committee 
meetings. Regardless, the compelling testimonies of the families in combination with election-
year political objectives were enough to garner powerful legislative support. Helping sick 
children in pain, a repeated theme across interviewees, was a political win in an election year. 
Although there were short-lived rumors of a gubernatorial veto, they did not impede the bill’s 
progress and were found unsubstantiated as the governor signed the enrolled bill into law.  
In contrast, the needle exchange bill was the subject of behind-the-scenes intrigue, with 
possible direct lobbying of legislators, rumors of Florida Medical Association opposition (despite 
FMA’s favorable support in committee), and rumors of a veto. The state surgeon general was 
believed to have acted against the bill in the last days of the legislative session. The bill may 
have also been a “casualty of war,” caught in the crosshairs of negative comments made by the 
bill sponsor against the governor in an election year and unsuccessful attempts at Senate 
confirmation of the governor’s selected state surgeon general, John Armstrong. The political 
gamesmanship surrounding the needle exchange bill may not have made it a safe or attractive 
allocation of political capital for legislators in the final hours of that legislative session. 
Conclusion 
Several factors common in other studies were present in these two legislative campaigns, 
including policy entrepreneurs, windows of opportunity, and the role of citizen/constituent 
lobbying. However, certain factors were less important in the 2014 legislative session, including 
the role of the governor, executive agencies, and professional lobbyists. Notably, while these 
three factors were less important for key informant interview participants, they were rated as 
more influential for bill outcome by the smaller number of Qualtrics survey participants. A major 
distinction between the two bills, which helps explain the success of the medical cannabis bill 
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and the failure of the needle exchange bill, seems to rest on the extent of the window of 
opportunity and the sympathy toward the intended beneficiaries of the legislation. Children with 
intractable epilepsy and cancer were perceived as blameless, but drug users were not. Thus, it 
was easier to support medical cannabis for children, while opposing clean needle legislation for 
drug users. Similarly, the prospect of a constitutional amendment, viewed as motivating to 
Democrat voters during an election year, was a sufficient threat to drive some conservative 
legislators to support the medical cannabis bill who would otherwise oppose it. Table 6 
summarizes and compares the key factors for both bills. 
 
Table 6. Comparison of key factors across the medical cannabis  
and needle exchange bills 
 
 Cannabis Needle Exchange 
Factor Comment Comment 
Window of 
Opportunity 
• History of broader legislative attempts  
• Proposed constitutional amendment 
encouraged legislature to act first 
• National media (Gupta) 
• High favorable polling numbers 
• Election year—partisan positioning 
• Gubernatorial race 
• History of similar legislative attempts 
• Newly published research  
• Support of the Florida Medical Association, 








• Weak empirical evidence 
• Limited approved conditions—not 
recreational 
• Strong sympathy for affected 
individuals (innocent children) 
• Educating legislators important and 
effective because individuals viewed as 
victims 
• Recognition that medical cannabis could 
be a lucrative industry 
• Bill made legislators appear to support 
medicinal rather than illicit drug use 
• Original opposition based on cannabis as a 
“gateway drug” 
• Large economic benefit 
• Strong empirical evidence 
• Low sympathy for affected individuals 
(drug users)—however, bill could protect 
innocent people 
• Educating legislators important but did not 
have the impact of cannabis legislative 
effort because individuals viewed as drug 
users by choice 
• Limited to Miami-Dade and only a pilot  
• Bill made legislators appear to support 
illicit drug use 
• Original opposition based on perception of 
condoning or enabling drug use 













• Strong, consistent, and large constituent 
representation 
• In-person advocacy with multiple 
advocates involved daily 
• Emotional/compelling testimony that 
resonated with legislators 
• Strong, consistent, but smaller constituent 
representation 






• Majority party support and sponsorship 
(bipartisan sponsorship in House) 
• Member-to-member relationships 
(especially when related) 
• Strong support by legislative leadership 
(Senate president) 
• Legislators related to personal stories 
 
• Certain legislators had difficulty with the 
concept of distributing clean supplies to 
drug users 
• Concern over how bill support would 
affect voting in election year 
• Member-to-member relationships important 
in earning bipartisan support 





• Overt state health agency opposition did 
not thwart bill efforts 
• Governor did not support bill, but signed 
bill into law upon passage 
• Covert state health agency opposition 
cast doubt on bill at the end of the session 
 
Other Factors • Professional lobbyists only involved at end 
of the session 
• Big business interest at end of the session 
(leading to vertical integration language) 
• Professional lobbyist involvement not 
recalled by respondents 
• House sponsor’s remarks against the 
governor may have impacted bill 
• Senate’s refusal to confirm governor’s pick 
for state surgeon general may have 
impacted bill 
 
(See also Appendix F: Factors of Influence, Description, Sources of Concept,  
General Interview Findings) 
 




CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND PLAN FOR CHANGE 
Recommendations 
The following eight recommendations are drawn from the combined lessons of the 
medical cannabis and needle exchange case studies. They are intended to help groups 
successfully advocate for health-related legislation. While these bills were considered under very 
specific circumstances as previously described in the Results section (e.g., during an election 
year with a Republican legislature and Republican governor), some lessons may be applicable 
across health-related bill topics and locations.  
These recommendations are targeted to grassroots health-related efforts, community-
based organizations, family advocates, and student-based groups without significant financial 
and/or lobbying influence. Nonetheless, they may still provide useful information for lobbyists, 
advocates, and even government agencies seeking to promote or defeat health-related legislation.  
1. Thoroughly Assess the Sociopolitical Environment 
Key informants in both case studies underscored the importance of understanding the 
sociopolitical environment. This involves searching for both the “window of opportunity” and 
gathering additional insights to predict a “perfect storm.” To the extent possible, a 360-degree 
assessment of the environment should be conducted to include current sociopolitical views (e.g., 
limited-use medical cannabis gaining support), political events (e.g., upcoming election, 
constitutional amendment), national and local media attention (e.g., Dr. Sanjay Gupta/CNN 
special), the number of times similar bill language has been proposed, legislative leanings, 
special interest group efforts, and executive branch positioning. Knowing the landscape before 
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proposing bill language will inform a strategic approach on how to create a more favorable 
environment. For example, community groups may consider creating a window of opportunity 
by garnering positive media attention, petitioning for a constitutional amendment, or laying the 
groundwork for bill passage through legislator education and discussion in consecutive years. 
2. Thoroughly Assess the Target Audience 
Learning the state’s legislative players and process was critical in both case studies. 
Research and assessment of the target audience should also be done from all angles, inclusive of 
legislators, executive branch stakeholders, lobbyists, special interest groups, likely proponents 
and opponents, and unlikely or remote stakeholders (e.g., industries that would not immediately 
or directly feel the impact of legislation and, therefore, are not obvious targets, such as the 
gambling industry for medical cannabis). Each stakeholder group may have unique interests in 
the bill, as the medical cannabis case study suggests.  
It is not enough to research a legislator’s voting record. Thorough research should include 
knowledge of a legislator’s professional, business, and personal interests to better understand 
motivation for support or opposition, with similar research conducted for key executive branch 
members, such as the governor and the heads of health-related state agencies. Key legislators, 
especially leadership, may have strong positive or negative sentiments regarding personal or 
political experiences with the bill sponsors. Member-to-member relationships can impact 
bipartisan support or acceptance, bill prioritization, and bill progression. Legislative spouses 
should be viewed as influential and considered for bill education and advocacy purposes. The 
proposed bill may go against personal beliefs, constituent leanings, a previous public campaign 
platform, or the majority party view. Legislator connections to key bill proponents and 
opponents, including personal, business, and campaign contribution interactions provide 
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additional insight into the likelihood of legislative support. Considerations may change during an 
election year, lending added factors of whether a legislator’s bill support will be viewed 
favorably by a constituency and further chances of reelection. Less public motivations should be 
assessed to the extent possible (e.g., horse-trading support of one bill for another).  
Similarly, it is not enough to know whether a lobbyist or other non-legislative stakeholder 
supports or opposes a bill. Stakeholder assessment should include length of involvement and 
prior actions regarding the bill topic, the publicly stated grounds for support or opposition, 
relationships and financial dealings with legislators and lobbyists, whether the stakeholder 
publicly espouses majority viewpoints, and any hidden motivations (e.g., expected profit or loss 
depending on bill disposition). The strength of a lobbyist’s relationship with a legislator can 
influence a bill’s prioritization and progress. 
Researching publicly available legislative history (e.g., legislator biographies, voting 
records, prior legislative attempts for the bill topic, leadership and slated successors), legislative 
and executive branch state lobbyist registrations, campaign donations, public polling, and media 
sources provide a solid start to understanding the legislative process environment. Opposition 
research across actors (e.g., special interest groups, negative lobbying efforts) is equally 
important. Adding a professional lobbyist to the team may be helpful in learning deeper-level 
and historical insider knowledge. When selecting a lobbyist, consider past and present 
relationships (and therefore access) with legislators, particularly those in leadership. Consider 
also the lobbyist’s personal interest in the bill topic. Higher personal investment for a lobbyist, 
whether through personal interest, time spent, or expected monetary compensation, makes it 
more likely that the lobbyist will vigorously advocate the issue and prevent the bill language 
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from being lost to amendments, horse-trading, or last-minute “trains” (i.e., being used as a “shell 
bill” or omnibus bill to pass a group of desired issues).  
Assessment of the target audience can also help to identify advocacy allies. Working with 
other groups that have similar interests and objectives and building a supportive coalition can 
strengthen the impact of advocacy efforts. A coalition of groups working together through 
coordinated advocacy on an issue gives the appearance of broad support, which may increase 
legislator interest in supporting the bill. 
3. Strategically Select the Health Issue to Bring Forward as Legislation 
To the extent possible, the bill topic should involve a universally appealing issue that has 
the potential to transcend political party lines. The health-related issue addressed should be hard 
to ignore, personally relatable, “for the greater good,” and likely to resonate with constituents. 
However, controversial bills do not generally meet these criteria, and even the concept of 
medical cannabis for sick children was not viewed as universally appealing to some conservative 
legislators because it dealt with marijuana. 
If universal appeal is not immediately evident in the public health issue put forward, the 
issue should be dissected and analyzed until there is a major aspect of the issue upon which 
substantial bipartisan agreement can be reached, a common denominator (e.g., children are 
suffering).248 Ideally, the topic should be prominent and foregrounded in the national and/or state 
arenas. If it is not, consider ways to increase positive media attention around the chosen issue. 
The topic should be uniquely relevant to state residents and, when possible, should impact 
districts or regions that are well-represented by policymakers in a position of power (e.g., 
legislative leadership) or where there is a strong legislative representation (e.g., Florida’s Miami-
Dade delegation).  
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Health issues that have extensive evidence-based research that demonstrate both a health 
benefit and an economic benefit are more easily supported by legislators and justifiable to their 
constituents. However, research typically is not enough. The issue must be foregrounded as 
urgent and timely, with a compelling narrative to accompany the bill language. Short-term 
impacts, long-term impacts, and unintended consequences of the bill should be considered as 
part of an initial assessment before proposal. 
Health-related issues that are controversial because of diverse political and social 
viewpoints, such as illegal drug use in these case studies, require additional consideration and 
strategy before bill proposal. This includes topics perceived as morally or ethically challenging, 
in which the health actor’s choices play a significant role in whether they are impacted (e.g., 
smokers may be perceived as socially or morally responsible for contracting lung cancer). For 
controversial issues, research of the sociopolitical environment and of legislative process 
audiences should be conducted earlier to better anticipate objections and provide effective 
counterarguments. 
4. Carefully Craft the Message and Select the Messenger  
Health-related issues put forward as legislation should be carefully framed and 
delivered.249 In both case studies, legislative champions and crafted messaging played key roles 
in obtaining broader legislative support.  
A health-related idea that “helps people” or “prevents disease” does not always rise to 
legislative interest. A succinct story demonstrating the topic’s urgency, timeliness, health 
benefits, and significant state cost savings or profit, blended with a common denominator (e.g., 
children are suffering; increased costs and new cases of HIV/AIDS) create a strong, sellable 
message. The message should be reinforced with emotive personal stories, research, and 
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examples from other states, especially states with similar population and political demographics. 
The message should also anticipate and address opposing arguments. Comparative state 
information should include whether similar bill language has been adopted or a similar bill topic 
has been considered. Supportive peer-reviewed, evidence-based research should be readily 
available to legislators and legislative staff. The message, when carefully crafted and supported, 
should make it easy and worthwhile for a legislator to support the bill. At minimum, the message 
should make it difficult for a legislator to justify opposing the bill. Strategic research on 
legislators should indicate with whom the message will most strongly resonate, and which 
concerns and barriers need to be addressed in advance of presenting the issue to a legislator 
resistant or opposed to the message.  
Selecting the right messenger or champion to serve as a spokesperson for the cause at the 
grassroots/constituent level can significantly impact the bill outcome. Grassroots or constituent 
champions, as demonstrated in the medical cannabis and needle exchange case studies, may 
advocate more effectively with legislators when they have a background or expertise in health 
care (e.g., fourth-year medical student advocating for needle exchange), have a powerful 
personal story (e.g., parents of children with intractable epilepsy), and are perceived as credible 
and reasonable (e.g., able to work well with a conservative legislature). If there is no measurable 
movement over the course of three legislative attempts (e.g., a key informant interviewee’s 
comment of “your bill three times to get through”), selection of different messengers may change 
the outcome. Practically, annual post-session debriefings should include a review of the 
effectiveness of both the message and the messenger with adjustments as needed.  
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5. Locate a Legislative Champion or Legislative Champions  
Ideally, locate a legislative champion in both the House and Senate, with a least one 
prominent or rising in the majority party. In the medical cannabis case study, even though the 
topic had been put forward for many years by special interest groups and legislators, it did not 
move as desired until a majority party legislative champion picked it up and families that had not 
actively advocated in past legislative sessions delivered it as a compelling story. The right 
legislative champion should be in a position of influence or rising in leadership, with the ability 
to garner bipartisan support. Also, they should have the ability to access current legislative 
leadership and influence bill prioritization throughout the legislative session, preferably 
introducing the bill as a committee bill as permitted by legislative guidelines. The legislative 
champion should be well-educated on the issue and supplied with all research. When possible, 
the champion should have demonstrated personal or professional interest in the bill topic as 
shown by previous sponsorship, voting record, or public statement. Legislators who function as 
policy entrepreneurs may be more willing to take on controversial health-related topics as 
demonstrated in the medical cannabis and needle exchange bills. 
6. Focus on Visibility, Influence, and Persistence in Advocacy Efforts 
A consistent theme across both case studies was the need for persistent, visible, and vocal 
in-person advocacy. While respondents were aware of grassroots campaigns (e.g., email your 
legislator in support of the bill), it was the in-person presence of grassroots champions and allies 
that left a deep, lasting impression. Whether the Moseleys or other families for the medical 
cannabis bill, or Hansel Tookes or other medical students for the needle exchange bill, legislators 
were continuously reminded of the respective bill’s objectives by seeing dedicated supporters 
and constituent champions in the halls of the Florida Capitol building. By repeatedly meeting 
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one-on-one with legislators and legislative staff, providing compelling testimony with visual aids 
(e.g., photos, videos), having impacted individuals (including children) attend committee 
meetings, and generally being “seen” daily in the legislative process, grassroots advocates 
created a memorable sense of urgency and importance around their bills. Seeing suffering 
families and children and directly hearing from rising medical doctors made the bill issues 
difficult to ignore or deprioritize. 
Strategically mapping out and leveraging key member-to-member and member-to-non-
legislator relationships can help to maximize an advocate’s circle of influence. For example, 
respondents noted that for the needle exchange bill, the most prominent constituent advocate not 
only met with legislators to provide education on the bill topic but also reportedly requested that 
those legislators introduce them to additional legislators and/or assist them in scheduling 
meetings with members of legislative leadership. Understanding and leveraging legislator 
relationships may provide a path to accessing legislator leaders that are more challenging to 
access. In addition, leveraging relationships of allies or coalition members may lead to greater 
access.  
Persistence and resilience in legislative attempts may eventually result in success. It may 
take several bill attempts to gain momentum toward passage. Educating legislators, legislative 
staff, executive branch members, lobbyists, and special interest groups takes time. Open-minded, 
open-ended dialogue with legislators is necessary to build rapport, understand their philosophical 
beliefs, and understand personal relationships with a bill topic (e.g., family member died of drug 
overdose). Finding areas of compromise involves carefully listening to legislator concerns. 
Expecting a bill to pass on its first attempt may not be realistic. If the bill is too detailed, 
legislators may disagree. Bill proponents should decide what parts of the bill language are 
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necessary to their cause and what parts are desired. They should have a basic, stripped-down 
version of the bill ready in case a strike-all amendment (an amendment that removes all current 
bill language) is filed or additional concessions are needed to reduce disagreement that would 
kill the bill. This “foot-in-the-door” bill, like the 2014 medical cannabis bill, may not be 
considered ideal, but it allows for future fine-tuning of an existing statute rather than the heavier 
lift of initial legislation. Even if most of the desired bill language is adopted, there will likely be 
a need for annual “tweaking” to address unforeseen concerns. Proponents should plan for a 
longer marathon of proposals and refinements, rather than a shorter sprint to the proverbial finish 
line.  
7. Remain Vigilant in the Final Hours of the Legislative Session 
As the results of both medical cannabis and needle exchange demonstrate, positions and 
bill language can change rapidly, particularly in the last days of the legislative session when 
deals are cut, and the state budget is finalized. Therefore, if the proposed bill is still being 
considered in the final days and hours, advocates should monitor not only their bill, but all major 
bills, political trade- offs, and inter-chamber or intergovernmental branch posturing. That 
vigilance may save bill language from being eliminated or changed in a way that defeats the 
original purpose. However, it should be anticipated that the language may be amended, and 
additional compromises may need to be made. In this case, having the skeleton bill (i.e. 
simplified bill of only required components and language) that meets its intended purpose 
provides a basis for negotiation. Any possible gubernatorial veto or state agency opposition 
should have been researched and addressed well before final legislative days, leaving no room 
for last-minute speculation or intentionally created misperceptions by opponents.  
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8. Evaluate and Plan for Continuous Strategic Advocacy Improvement 
Following the legislative session, it is critical to perform an “After-Action Review” or 
evaluation of advocacy efforts. Careful consideration of areas of success and challenge provides 
valuable insights into what strategic improvements are needed. Reviewing the efficacy of the 
messenger and the message in communications with legislators, unexpected barriers 
encountered, and opportunities to garner support allows the advocate to plan for the financial and 
human capital needed to increase the chances of success.  
Striving for continuous strategic advocacy improvement will entail revising the strategic 
approach as needed. Advocacy efforts should “move the needle” on the selected health policy 
issue. Lessons learned from the After-Action Review should guide any needed revisions to the 
strategic approach. Small adjustments can have a large impact. Adjustments may include hiring 
another lobbyist, researching committee members more thoroughly, proposing different bill 
language, collaborating with new partners, or having more advocates/supporters physically 
present in the Capitol building during the legislative session. Advocacy should occur throughout 
the calendar year, allowing for new opportunities to garner support.  
Plan for Change  
The following Plan for Change is based on aspects of the Diffusion of Innovations 
Theory by Everett M. Rogers. The Plan focuses on dissemination of information through 
presentations and webinars to two select stakeholder categories that would likely be innovators 
or early adopters of the recommendations. In addition, the Plan provides a practical tool for use 
by adopters in the form of an advocacy checklist/workbook with resources. The checklist details 
the recommendations and can be adapted for use in different states or adjusted to meet the needs 
of the adopter. 
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Diffusion of Innovations Theory 
From 1962 to 2003, Everett Rogers published five editions of his Diffusion of Innovations 
book, which presented a model of diffusion of innovations. Rogers (2003)250 defines diffusion as 
the “process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among 
the members of a social system … a special type of communication in which the messages are 
about a new idea … a kind of social change.”251 Dearing and Cox (2018)252 further define 
diffusion as a “social process that occurs among people in response to learning about an 
innovation such as a new evidence-based approach for extending or improving health care.”  
The model uses a normal frequency (S-shaped) distribution to categorize adopters into 
five categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, later majority, and 
laggards.253 
 
Figure 3: Modified Diffusion of Innovations Model: Distribution  





While full diffusion is “an atypical outcome” because most innovations do not diffuse or 
follow the S-shaped curve,255 the model is useful to show best practices and a need for long-term 
strategic dissemination of innovations beyond training and toward use in funded practice 
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collaboratives. This Plan for Change will focus on initial strategic dissemination of 
recommendations and findings to innovators and early adopters. An innovation’s attributes, 
adopters’ characteristics and perceptions, and the larger sociopolitical environment (including 
timing, framing, and salience) impact the progress of diffusion.256 Communication channels and 
methods also impact the rate of innovation adoption.257 Within perceived innovation attributes, 
relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability are concepts 
considered by potential adopters.258  
The recommendations may be perceived as providing a relative advantage, or “degree to 
which an innovation is perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes,” for adopters in that 
they combine many existing theories into practical advocacy advice supported by statements 
from key informants with experience in the legislative process.259 The recommendations may 
also result in time and money saved through focus on more effective actions. Compatibility, or 
the “degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values, past 
experiences, and needs of potential adopters,” will depend on whether the potential adopter has 
previously been involved in the legislative process and currently desires to advocate for 
legislation.260 Where there is a need for cost-conscious, time-conscious advocacy, compatibility 
may be high. Complexity, or the “degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively 
difficult to understand and use,” will be moderate to high in that the recommendations involve 
in-depth social and political research.261 However, it is not anticipated to be a significant barrier 
to adoption among those individuals and organizations that are highly motivated to advocate 
effectively for health-related legislation. Trialability, or how an “innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis,” will depend on whether the adopter is pushing a 
legislative bill and the importance of the topic.262 Higher priority bills that have previously failed 
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to pass may be strategic choices for trying the recommendations. Finally, observability, or the 
“degree to which the results of an innovation are observable to others,” will be greatest following 
use in a legislative session.263 However, partial results may be seen during a legislative session in 
terms of being able to observe legislator receptiveness, legislative processes, and access to 
legislative leadership. 
Dissemination of Recommendations 
Dissemination of case study findings will be made through the offering of webinars and 
presentations to two targeted groups of potential adopters: health care profession students, and 
select health-related, small-to-medium organizations. These groups are likely to lack formal paid 
lobbyists and may be more in need of this type of information. 
Health Care Profession Students 
In the needle exchange case study, University of Miami medical students were influential 
in advancing the bill. Students attending schools for their respective health care professions are 
poised for learning how to shape health-related ideas into successful legislation. Such students 
are more likely to view the study’s recommendations as novel and to consider adoption as 
innovators or early adopters. In addition, health care profession students have the added benefit 
of some health-related and medical knowledge, which lends credibility in advocacy and 
resonates with policymakers as suggested by the case studies.  
Initial dissemination would target students in accredited Florida schools of public health, 
nursing, physician assistance, and medicine. Professional associations are not initial targets as 
the study results may not be particularly unknown to those organizations, especially if they have 
previously hired professional lobbyists. The Council on Education for Public Health (CEPH) 
lists 10 accredited Florida universities that offer baccalaureate and higher degree programs. 
According to the Florida Department of Health, there are 66 accredited associate degree in 
 
118 
nursing (ADN) programs leading to Registered Nurse (RN) status and 52 accredited bachelor’s 
degree in nursing (BSN) programs. Because of the large number of nursing programs, 
dissemination would be targeted at accredited nursing schools that offer both ADN and BSN 
programs (e.g., Keiser University) and those offering either accredited program in major 
metropolitan hubs such as Miami or Tampa. The Physician Assistant Education Association 
(PAEA) lists eight actively accredited (i.e., not on probation or provisional status) physician 
assistant schools in the state of Florida. The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) 
and American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) report seven schools of allopathic medicine 
and two schools of osteopathic medicine.  
Other avenues of dissemination to Florida health profession students could include 
related professional organizations such as the student membership/chapters of the American 
Public Health Association, American Nurses Association, National Student Nurses’ Association, 
American College of Physicians, the American Academy of Physician Assistants, and American 
Clinical Social Work Association.  
Health-Related, Small-to-Medium Organizations 
Case study findings may benefit small-to-medium organizations or grassroots movements 
that either do not have professional lobbyists on board, were recently formed or reorganized, or 
would like suggestions on maximizing the use of time and funding for advocating health-related 
legislation and policy.  
Interested organizations may include those based in health-related professions in which 
recommendations may be disseminated as professional development (e.g., public health 
professionals in the Florida Public Health Association (FPHA), and the Florida Institute for 
Health Innovation (FIHI), formerly known as the Florida Public Health Institute (FPHI); nurses 
in the Florida Action Coalition), those based on a specific health condition (e.g., local autism 
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advocacy groups), and those recently seeking health-related solutions (e.g., cannabis groups). In 
addition, health care coalitions in the state of Florida may benefit from the case study 
recommendations. A sample list of potential target organizations is attached as Appendix I.  
Moving Toward Diffusion of Innovations: The Advocacy Checklist 
A draft of a practical tool that encompasses this study’s recommendations, an Advocacy 
Checklist, has been developed. I will work with stakeholder groups to get feedback before 
finalizing it following completion of the dissertation. It will be field-tested among target 
populations for usability and refined as needed. This Advocacy Checklist was tailored to 
adopters in the state of Florida for use in developing health-related advocacy efforts. This 
multipage checklist acts as a strategic roadmap by breaking down the eight recommendations 
into actionable components, lending greater insight into the strategic thought processes within 
each recommendation, and providing weblinks to resources under each subsection to assist 
adopters in implementing the recommendations. The Advocacy Checklist will be offered to all 
potential adopters in conjunction with presentations/webinars. In addition, the tool can be 
tailored to adopters in other states by updating relevant resource links and accounting for 
legislative variances (e.g., unicameral legislature). The Advocacy Checklist can also be adjusted 
by the adopter to meet its unique needs for a bill issue or advocacy year, and such adaptation 
lends itself to sustainable use.264 A draft Advocacy Checklist is attached as Appendix J. 
Through the dissemination of this study’s results and recommendations to health care 
profession students and to smaller health-related organizations that are likely to be innovators or 
early adopters, this research may help public health advocates to strategically maximize their 
chances of getting health-related legislation passed. The Advocacy Checklist provides an 
additional practical tool for implementing the recommendations with resources that can be 
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customized to various states. The Plan for Change provides a tactical roadmap that allows newer 
health advocates to quickly gain insights customarily obtained only over time through trial and 
error. For more seasoned health advocates, the Recommendations and Plan for Change provide 
suggestions to ensure that no major opportunities are missed, and that a robust advocacy strategy 
is in place.  
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APPENDIX A: QUANTITATIVE SURVEY AND CONSENTS 
FLORIDA LEGISLATION INFLUENCE STUDY—ONLINE SURVEY 
Research Participant Information and Consent Form 
 
Explanation of the Research 
You are being asked to participate in a research study of factors that influence the final outcomes (passage 
or failure) of health-related legislation in the State of Florida. 
 
This research is in support of a doctoral-level dissertation at the Gillings School of Global Public Health, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The entire survey is estimated to take up to 10 minutes to 
complete. 
 
You will be asked to respond to a series of questions about a particular health bill that was passed into 
law. Specifically, you will be asked whether you believe that the topic listed was influential in helping the 
bill to pass and, if you think it was influential, rank how influential it seemed to be. 
 
Your Rights to Participate, Say No, or Withdraw 
Participation in this research project is completely voluntary. You have the right to say no. You may 
change your mind at any time and withdraw. You may choose not to answer specific questions or to stop 




Your participation will be kept confidential. You have been given a unique identifier, and your name will 
not be collected. Your identifier will not be made public, although your general position and branch of 
government (e.g., legislative branch, executive branch, lobbyist, individual stakeholder) will be noted as 
part of survey results. 
 
Contact Information 
If you have questions following participation, you may contact the researcher, Tamara Demko, JD, MPH, 
at (850) 631-0386; Pam Silberman, JD, DrPH, Faculty Advisor at (919) 966-4525; or the UNC 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), at (919) 966-3113, referencing IRB # 17-2311. 
 
Consent  
You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this research and be legally able to consent.  
 
I authorize the researcher to share any analysis from this online survey in any publishable form, barring 












By clicking on the button below, you indicate your review of the Research Participation & 
Consent Form and your voluntary agreement to participate in this online survey. 









Why Did That Bill Pass or Fail? 
Online Qualtrics Survey 
 
The purpose of this brief survey is to better understand what factors are more influential in the 
final outcome (passage or failure) of health legislation in Florida. You have been identified as 
having an interest in the passage of (INSERT BILL NUMBER, INSERT SHORT TITLE 
DESCRIPTION), which was successfully passed by the state legislature in 2014. The entire 
survey is estimated to take up to 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Please respond to all parts honestly based on your personal perception. All answers are 
confidential, and no personally identifying information will be reported.  
 
RATE—SCALE OF INFLUENCE: For each statement, please check one box corresponding 
to how influential the listed factor was in this particular bill’s outcome on a scale from 1 (less 
influential) to 5 (more influential). 
 
If needed, hover your cursor over a factor for additional descriptions. (For example, “scientific or 
research backing,” refers to when “researchers or research organizations have published 
materials in support of what this bill addresses and it impacted the outcome.”) 
 
# Rate the Listed Factors 
 
In the passage or failure of the bill, the 
listed factor [below] was … [Check one 






2 3 4 5 
More 
Influential 
A. A new window of opportunity opening 
up. 
      
B. A previous attempt to pass similar 
legislation. 
      
C. The amount of media attention.       
D. Scientific or research backing.       
E. A public education or grassroots 
mobilization campaign. 
      
F. A special interest group’s legislative 
testimony or direct discussions with 
legislators. 
      
G. The political power of a sponsoring 
legislator. 
      
H. The amount of constituent support as 
perceived by a supporting legislator. 
      
I. Overall benefit to the state as perceived 
by a supporting legislator. 
      
J. Professional lobbyists’ work.       
K. The amount of time spent by lobbyists on 
the issue. 
      
L. The amount of money paid to lobbyist.       
M. Financial support to legislators by any 
source credited to a particular lobbyist or 
lobbying firm. 
      
N. Sponsorship of the bill by the political 
party in power (legislative majority).  
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O. Support of a particular legislative staff 
member. 
      
P. Support of legislative leadership.       
Q. Support of a particular legislative 
committee. 
      
R. Support of a particular state agency.       
S. Support of the governor’s office.       
T. “Horse Trading.”       
U. Persuasive economic benefit arguments.       
V. Persuasive health benefit arguments.       
Z1. Unlisted factor (Type your 
factor_______) (Optional) 
      
Z2. Unlisted factor (Type your 
factor_______) (Optional) 
      
Z3. Unlisted factor (Type your 
factor_______) (Optional) 
      
 
 
# Stakeholder Group Influence 
 
Rate the influence of the following 
stakeholder groups on the outcome of 
health legislation from less influential 
to more influential. Mark only one 






2 3 4 5 
More 
Influential 
1. General public/individual stakeholders       
2. Organizational stakeholder       
3. In-house lobbyist (only one client)       
4. Professional lobbyist (more than one 
client) 
      
5. State agency       
6. Governor’s office       
7. State senator–bill sponsor       
8. State senator–committee Chair       
9. State representative–bill sponsor       
10. State representative–committee chair       
11. Legislative leadership       
12. Legislative staff       
13. Media/press       
14. Other unlisted stakeholder (Type)       
15. Other unlisted stakeholder (Type)       




WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE? Please check the box that most closely describes your role in the 
passage of this bill at the time the bill was passed. Check one box only. 
 
 
 General Public/Individual Stakeholder 
 Organizational Stakeholder 
 In-House Lobbyist (only one client) 
 Professional Lobbyist (more than one client) 
 State Agency Employee 
 Governor’s Office 
 State Senator 
 State Representative 
 Legislative Leadership 
 Legislative Staff 
 Media/Press 






VOTER AFFILIATION? Please check the box that most closely describes your political party 




 Republican Party 
 Democratic Party 
 No Party Affiliation (NPA) 
 Other 
 Not Registered 




ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS OR FACTORS? (optional): Please type below any additional 
thoughts on factors listed above or on anything you feel influences the outcome of Florida 







Thank you for your time 
Your participation will help to improve processes  




APPENDIX B: QUALITATIVE KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW AND CONSENTS 
FLORIDA LEGISLATION INFLUENCE STUDY—KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW  
Research Participant Information and Consent Form for In-Person Interviews 
 
Explanation of the Research 
You are being asked to participate in a research study of factors that influence the final outcomes 
(passage or failure) of health legislation in the State of Florida. 
 
You will be asked to respond to a series of questions about a particular health bill that was 
passed into law. Specifically, you will be asked whether you believe that the topic was influential 
in helping the bill to pass and, if you think it was influential, how influential it seemed to be. 
 
Your Rights to Participate, Say No, or Withdraw 
Participation in this research project is completely voluntary. You have the right to say no. You 
may change your mind at any time and withdraw. You may choose not to answer specific 
questions or to stop participating at any time in the process. Whether you choose to participate or 
not will not be reported to your employer. 
 
Confidentiality 
Your participation will be kept confidential. No personally identifying information will be 
collected or made public, nor will anything be quoted without permission, although your general 
position and branch of government may be noted (such as “state representative”). 
 
Contact Information 
If you have questions following participation, you may contact the researcher, Tamara Demko, 
JD, MPH, at (850) 631-0386; Pam Silberman, JD, DrPH, Faculty Advisor at (919) 966-4525; or 
the UNC Institutional Review Board (IRB), at (919) 966-3113, referencing IRB # 17-2311. 
 
Consent  
You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this research and be legally able to consent.  
 
I understand that I may ask questions of the interviewer at any time, stop the interview entirely, 
or withdraw from participation whenever I so choose. I understand that my personally 
identifying information or participation status will not be shared with my employer or otherwise 
disclosed without my express permission in separately signed document. I am volunteering for 
this research of my own free will, have had the opportunity to ask questions, and desire to 
participate. I authorize the researcher to record this interview in audio and written format, and to 
share any observations from this interview in any publishable form, barring my personally 





Recording (Please check one and initial next to your choice.) 
  I give the researcher permission to use audio equipment to record this interview.  









Your signature below means that you voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
study. 
 
             
Signature       Date 
 




FLORIDA LEGISLATION INFLUENCE STUDY—KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW  
Additional Research Participant Information and Consent Script for Remote Interviews 
 
Contact Information 
If you have questions following participation, you may contact the researcher, Tamara Demko, 
JD, MPH, at (850) 631-0386; Pam Silberman, JD, DrPH, Faculty Advisor at (919) 966-4525; or 
the UNC Institutional Review Board (IRB), at (919) 966-3113, referencing IRB # 17-2311. 
 
Consent  
You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this research and be legally able to consent.  
 
No personally identifying information or participation status will be shared with your employer 
or otherwise disclosed without your express permission in separately signed document.  
 
Do you understand the conditions and consent to participate in this research study?  
 
Recording 
To assist the researcher in remembering your responses, do you authorize the researcher to 
record this interview in audio and written format, and to share any observations from this 
interview in any publishable form? 
 
(If Yes to Both) 
Thank you. I will repeat those two questions after I turn the voice recorder on to document your 





Why Did That Bill Pass or Fail?—Select Key Informant Interviews  
 
Introductory Script for All Key Informant Interviews 
• Introduction—Hello, I am Tamara Demko, a DrPH student at the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, and am conducting dissertation research to better understand what 
factors are more influential in the final outcome (passage or failure) of health-related bills 
in Florida. 
• You will be asked to respond to a series of questions about a particular health bill that 
was passed into law. Specifically, you will be asked whether you believe that the topic 
was influential in helping the bill to pass and, if you think it was influential, how 
influential it seemed to be. 
• Participation in this research project is completely voluntary. You have the right to say 
no. You may change your mind at any time and withdraw. You may choose not to answer 
specific questions or to stop participating at any time in the process.  
• Your participation will be kept confidential. No personally identifying information will 
be collected or made public, nor will anything be quoted without permission, although 
your general position and branch of government may be noted (such as “state 
representative”). 
• Thank you for taking time to talk with me today. The interview will be up to 30 minutes 
or so. There are no right or wrong answers. I’d like to know more about things that help 
health bills to pass in the legislature and what stakeholders think is important.  
• For this interview, we’ll only be discussing one bill, the successful265 passage of 
(House/Senate) Bill #____ (short title of bill) in the 2014 legislative session. 
 
1. What was your position and title at the time this bill was considered?      
 
2. Please describe your role or interest in the consideration and outcome of (House/Senate) Bill 
#____ (short title of bill) in the 2014 legislative session?     
      [PROMPT: If legislator, were you a primary sponsor? If 
lobbyist, about what percentage of your workweek did you spend on this legislation? Was it a 
major concern or one of multiple pieces of legislation you were following? What client were 
you representing?] 
 
3. What factors influenced the outcome of the bill in your opinion? 
[PROMPT: Did certain stakeholders, legislators, or events impact the outcome of this bill 
more than others? What do you think made this bill ultimately pass or not pass?] 
 
4. Was political timing a factor in getting the bill passed?       
(If so, please explain) [PROMPT: Do you believe there was a window of opportunity that 
was created by some external event? If so, please describe. Was that event influential in the 
passage/defeat of the legislation? Had there been previous efforts made to pass the bill?  If 
so, why was this bill enacted when others were not (if applicable).] 
 
5. Did public opinion impact the bill’s outcome? If so, how? How did the public learn about the 
issue?   
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[PROMPT: Was there a media or public education campaign? Grassroots mobilizing efforts? 
If yes (to either), please describe]   
 
6. What actions, if any, did special interest groups take that effectively supported or opposed 
the bill?   [PROMPT: Did a group’s public testimony have an effect? What about 
groups that opposed this legislation? What arguments do you think were the most successful 
in the passage/defeat of this legislation?] 
 
7. Do you have any ideas of what influenced the sponsoring legislator to sponsor the bill?  
     
[PROMPT: Did the bill fit party goals? Did the bill represent the legislator’s area of 
concern/passion?  Any other factors that might explain why the legislator sponsored the 
legislation?]  
 
8. What influenced legislators who voted in support of the bill?     
  [PROMPT: Was there constituent support? Pressure from leadership? Other factors that 
influenced legislators?] What about those who opposed the bill? 
 
9. What impact, if any, did legislative staff members (names or titles) have on the outcome of 
the bill? [PROMPT: Did staff directors, committee staffers, or aides have influence?] 
 
10. What impact, if any, did members of the executive branch (names or titles) have on the 
outcome of the bill?    
[PROMPT: Did agency heads or the governor weigh in?] 
 
11. What impact, if any, did professional lobbyists have on the outcome of the bill? What made a 
lobbyist successful? 
              
[PROMPT: Would the bill have passed without professional lobbying? Did more money or 
subject-matter knowledge mean better results? Did lobbyists use other key strategies to help 
support or oppose the legislation?] 
 
12. What arguments were more persuasive in achieving the outcome (passage/defeat) of this bill? 
[PROMPT: What were the best arguments for and against this bill? How did these points 
resonate with voting legislators?] 
 
13. Do you have any other thoughts or observations about the outcome of the bill that you would 
like to share?           
             
      
 
14. (For cannabis:) Why do you think this bill was successful in 2014, when other bills like the 
clean needle exchange program, were not? (For needle exchange:) Why do you this health-




15. Finally, what was your political party affiliation in 2014 (what was listed on your voter 
registration card?) 




APPENDIX C: KEY TERMS DEFINED 
“Committees of Reference” include all committees in the Florida Senate and the Florida House of 
Representatives to which a particular bill was referenced for consideration and voting in order to 
progress on the pathway to being enacted into law. 
 
“Companion Bill,” as used by the Florida Legislature, refers to “a bill introduced in one house 
that is substantially the same and identical as to specific intent and purpose as a bill introduced in 
the other house. The use of companion bills allows bills in each body to move through the 
committee process at the same time,”266 which increases the chances of a timely review toward 
possible passage. 
 
“General Public/Individual Stakeholders” include all identified stakeholders who are not 
affiliated with any one particular interest group, nor employed by the legislative branch, the 
executive branch, state agency, or as a lobbyist.  
 
“Governor’s Office” and “Governor’s Office Employees” includes all individuals whose 
employment is considered to be under the Executive Office of the Governor rather than a state 
agency. “Governor’s Office” includes the Office of Policy and Budget (OPB). 
 
“In Messages” or “In Return Messages,” as used by the Florida Legislature, refers to when a bill 
passed by one chamber is en route to, or is held in, the other chamber for consideration.267 
 
“In-House Lobbyists” include all individuals paid and registered as lobbyists who serve only one 
exclusive client. They are distinguished here from “Professional Lobbyists” because they only 
represent the interests of one entity and have different leverage capabilities than lobbyists 
representing multiple interests. 
 
“Key Stakeholders” is a broad, encompassing catchphrase that references actively involved 
stakeholders known via public record or media sources and includes the bill sponsors, committee 
members of committees of references in which the bill passed (includes chairmen), any 
individuals and groups that provided written or oral testimony to the state legislature on record, 
lobbyists of record, an authoritative representative of any state health agency or the Executive  
Office of the Governor reviewing the bill, and the legislative staff directors (health policy or 
budget as applicable).  
 
“Legislative Leadership” includes all senators and representatives designated and recognized as 
leaders within their respective chamber, including the titles of Senate president, Senate president 
pro tempore, Senate majority leader, Senate minority leader, Senate minority leader pro tempore, 
Senate president designate; House Speaker, House Speaker pro tempore, House majority leader, 
House minority leader, House minority leader pro tempore, and House Speaker designate. 
 
“Legislative Staff” includes all individuals employed by the legislature or a legislator, including, 
but not limited to legislative aides, committee staff, staff directors, and the Office of Program 




“Media/Press” include all recognized members of the media/press who either bear credentials or 
self-report as members of the media/press. 
 
“Organizational Stakeholder” includes all identified stakeholders who identify as affiliates of 
special interest and political groups and who are not registered to lobby for any client. 
 
“Professional Lobbyist” includes all individuals representing more than one client who are 
separately paid to advocate a position before the executive or legislative branches and whose 
names are included as registered in the State of Florida’s lobbying directory.  
 
“State Agency” and “State Agency Employees” include all individuals employed by a Florida 
state agency, whether a governor’s agency or a cabinet agency, who do not otherwise fall under 
the definition of employment by the executive office of the governor. This includes individuals 
working on any task force, council, or committee created by statute or executive order in any 
capacity. 
 
“Successful” legislation is limited in definition, for the purposes of this study, to passage into law 
(ordered enrolled) by both legislative Florida bodies, and does not seek to account for the 
approval or vetoing of a bill by the governor’s office, or factors of influence therein. However, to 
avoid any confusion, all passing legislation used in this study will also have been approved by 
the governor’s office. There are significant intervening factors that impact the quality of 
implementation and rulemaking for any given piece of legislation, and the objective of this study 
is limited to achieving an often-necessary first step in public health policy. 
 
 
For additional and formal Florida legislative process definitions, please see the Florida Senate’s 




APPENDIX D: QUALTRICS SURVEY QUESTION CODING AND HOVER FUNCTION 
DESCRIPTIONS 
Influential Factors/Survey Question Coding & Hover Function Descriptions. Coding 
“numbers” and category “ZZ” are assigned for tallying purposes. 
 
Letter Coding & Hover Function Descriptions for Surveys (22 Primary Codes) 
Code # Code Name Research Team—Internal Explanation [Survey-
Taker Explanatory Note for Survey Hover Function] 
A Window of Opportunity A new window of opportunity opening up. [Recent current events 
made the topic of this bill a publicly supported, priority issue, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
B Persistence A previous failed attempt(s) to pass the bill. [A bill covering this 
issue has been heard by the legislature in past years but did not 
pass, and it impacted this bill's outcome.] 
C Media Attention The amount of media attention. [This issue was deemed 
newsworthy and was covered by well-known newspapers, radio, or 
TV, and it impacted the outcome.] 
D Research Scientific or research backing. [Researchers or research 
organizations have published materials in support of what this bill 
addresses, and it impacted the outcome.] 
E Public Education and 
Grassroots Mobilization 
A public education and grassroots campaign. [Organizations have 
attempted to educate the public on this issue though social media, 
print, TV campaigns, or “contact your legislator” appeals, and it 




A special interest group’s legislative testimony or direct discussions 
with legislators. [Public testimony in legislative committees or 
private, scheduled meetings with legislators by special interest 
groups impacted the outcome.] 
G Sponsoring Legislator’s 
Power 
The political power of a sponsoring legislator. (May suggest policy 
entrepreneur.) [The sponsoring legislator had significant political 
clout that impacted the outcome.] 
H Legislator’s Perception 
of Constituent Backing  
The amount of constituent support as perceived by a supporting 
legislator. [A supporting legislator perceived significant constituent 
support on the subject of the bill in the form of letters, calls, or 
contributions, and it impacted the outcome.] 
I Legislator’s Perception 
of State Benefit 
Overall benefit to the state as perceived by a supporting legislator. 
[A supporting legislator made statements or had known positions 
suggesting that the state of Florida as a whole would benefit from 
the bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 
J Professional Lobbyist 
work 
Professional lobbyists’ work. [Paid, registered lobbyists were a 
driving force behind this bill.] 
K Time Spent by Lobbyist The amount of time spent by lobbyists on the issue. [Lobbyists 
spent significant time on this issue, and that impacted the outcome.] 
L Money Paid to Lobbyist The amount of money paid to lobbyist. [Lobbyists were paid 
significant amounts of money (from any source) for this issue, and 
that impacted the outcome.] 
M Legislative Funding 
Credited to Lobbyist 
Financial support to legislators provided directly via a lobbyist or 
lobbying firm or provided indirectly but credited to a particular 
lobbyist. [Lobbyists or lobbying firms known to support this bill 
provided financial contributions directly or indirectly to legislators, 
and it impacted the outcome.] 
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N Majority Party 
Sponsorship 
Sponsorship of the bill by the political party in power (legislative 
majority). [Introduction of this bill by the majority party impacted 
the outcome.] 
O Legislative Staff Support Support of a legislative staff member. [A legislative staff member 
(legislative aide, committee staff, staff director) supported the bill, 
and it impacted the outcome.] 
P Legislative Leadership 
Support 
Support of legislative leadership. [Legislative leadership supported 
the bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 
Q Legislative Committee 
Support 
Support of a particular legislative committee. [A particular 
legislative committee supported the bill, and it impacted the 
outcome.]  
R State Agency Support Support of a particular state agency. [A particular state agency 
supported the bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 
S Governor’s Office 
Support 
Support of the governor’s office. [The governor’s office supported 
the bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 
T “Horse Trading” Trading bill support or opposition to achieve desired ends. 
[Working with other legislators or lobbyists to achieve their desired 
results on another bill in exchange for desired results on this bill.] 
U Economic Argument Persuasive economic or business argument. [A strong economic 
benefit, return-on-investment (ROI), or cost-effectiveness argument 
was made that impacted the outcome.] 
V Health Argument Persuasive health benefit argument. [A strong public health benefit, 
improved patient outcome, or improved health care (noneconomic) 
argument was made that impacted the outcome.] 
ZZ Other (Previously Un-
coded)  
Other previously uncoded, contributing factor to successful passage 
of state legislation. This includes actions or circumstances that do 
not logically correspond to a clear actor encompassed by another 
category, and relate to time, generalized foregrounding of issue, or 
























2014 member of the Senate on record as a 
Committee Chair for a committee of reference 







2014 member of the House of Representatives on 
record as the bill’s sponsor. In this case, the 







2014 member of the House of Representatives on 
record as a Committee Chair for a committee of 
reference assigned to the bill. In this case, the 
companion bill’s sponsor. 
AZ-1c Legislative 
Branch 
Legislative Leadership Includes all senators and representatives designated 
and recognized as leaders within their respective 
chamber, including the titles of Senate president, 
Senate president pro tempore, Senate majority 
leader, Senate minority leader, Senate minority 
leader pro tempore, Senate president designate; 
House Speaker, House Speaker pro tempore, House 
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majority leader, House minority leader, House 




Legislative Staff  Individuals or teams previously or currently 
employed by the Legislature in any capacity. 
Includes staff directors, legislative aides, committee 
staff, the Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability (OPPAGA), etc. 
AZ-2a Executive 
Branch 
Governor’s Office Individuals working on behalf of the Executive 
Office of the Governor in any capacity. Includes the 
Office of the General Counsel and the Office of 
Planning and Budget (OPB). 
AZ-2b Executive 
Branch 
State Agency  Individuals or teams previously or currently 
employed by, or within the oversight of, a state 
agency, whether a governor’s agency or cabinet 
agency. Also includes individuals working on any 
task force, council, committee, or organization 
created by statute or executive order in any capacity, 
within the oversight of a state agency. 
AZ-3a Lobbyist Professional Lobbyist Individual representing more than one client who is 
specifically paid to influence legislative outcome at 
the time of bill consideration and is registered in the 
state to lobby. 
AZ-3b Lobbyist In-House Lobbyist Individual representing only one client who is 
specifically paid to influence legislative outcome at 
the time of bill consideration and is registered in the 
state to lobby. 
AZ-4a Constituencies Organizational 
Stakeholder 
Individual belonging to an organized special interest 
group/organization that seeks to influence legislative 
outcome at the time of bill consideration. Includes 
government relations staff representing a single 
entity who are NOT registered to lobby with the 
state. 
AZ-4b Constituencies General 
Public/Individual 
Stakeholder 
Individual who does not belong to an organized 
special interest group/organization, and is NOT 
registered to lobby with the state, but who 
independently seeks to influence legislative outcome 
at the time of bill consideration. 
AZ-5 Other  Category not listed Media/Press stakeholder category from survey and 






APPENDIX E: SELECT RESULTS FROM QUALTRICS SURVEY 
Medical Cannabis  
Factor of Influence (11 Participants) More Influential  
(4 and 5 
combined)  
or Less Influential  








V. Persuasive health benefit arguments. More 9 
C. The amount of media attention. More 8 
N. Sponsorship of the bill by the political party in 
power (legislative majority). 
More 8 
F. A special interest group’s legislative testimony or 
direct discussions with legislators. 
More 7 
G. The political power of a sponsoring legislator. More 7 
H. The amount of constituent support as perceived by 
a supporting legislator. 
More 7 
P. Support of legislative leadership. More 7 




B. A previous attempt to pass similar legislation. Less 8 
L. The amount of money paid to a lobbyist on the 
issue. 
Less 8 
U. Persuasive economic benefit arguments. Less 7 
O. Support of a particular legislative staff member. Less 6 
R. Support of a particular state agency. Less 6 
S. Support of the Governor’s Office. Less 6 
 
Stakeholder Influence (11 Participants) More Influential  
(4 and 5 
combined)  
or Less Influential  








1. General Public/Individual Stakeholder More 8 
11. Legislative Leadership More 8 
7. State Senator–Bill Sponsor More 7 
9. State Representative–Bill Sponsor More 7 
13. Media/Press More 6 
 
5. State Agency Less 6 
6. Governor’s Office Less 6 
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12. Legislative Staff Less 6 
 
The three largest participant groups were legislative staff members, professional lobbyists, and 
general public/individual stakeholders. More Democrats participated in answering the voter 




Factor of Influence (7 Participants) More Influential  
(4 and 5 
combined)  
or Less Influential  








E. A public education or grassroots mobilization 
campaign. 
More 4 
G. The political power of a sponsoring legislator. More 4 
P. Support of legislative leadership. More 4 
J. Professional lobbyists’ work. More 3 
R. Support of a particular state agency. More 3 
S. Support of the Governor’s Office. More 3 
V. Persuasive health benefit arguments. More 3 
 
F. A special interest group’s legislative testimony or 
direct discussions with legislators. 
Less 4 
L. The amount of money paid to a lobbyist on the 
issue. 
Less 4 
M. Financial support to legislators by any source 
credited to a particular lobbyist or lobbying firm 
Less 4 
H. The amount of constituent support as perceived by 
a supporting legislator. 
Less 3 




Stakeholder Influence (6 Participants) More Influential  
(4 and 5 
combined)  
or Less Influential  








10. State Representative–Committee Chair More 5 
5. State Agency More 4 
1. General Public/Individual Stakeholder More 3 
2. Organizational Stakeholder More 3 
6. Governor’s Office More 3 
7. State Senator–Bill Sponsor More 3 
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8. State Senator–Committee Chair More  3 
9. State Representative–Bill Sponsor More 3 
11. Legislative Leadership More 3 
 
13. Media/Press Less 4 
12. Legislative Staff Less 3 
 
The three largest participant groups were state legislators, general public/individual stakeholders, 
and legislative staff members. An equal number of Democrats, Republicans, and those with no 





0 2 4 6 8 10
V. ~ Persuasive health benefit arguments.
U. ~ Persuasive economic benefit arguments.
T. ~ "Horse trading."
S. ~ Support of the Governor's Office.
R. ~ Support of a particular state agency.
Q. ~ Support of a particular legislative committee.
P. ~ Support of legislative leadership.
O. ~ Support of a particular legislative staff member.
N. ~ Sponsorship of the bill by the political party in power
(legislative majority).
M. ~ Financial support to legislators by any source credited
to a particular lobbyist or lobbying firm.
L. ~ The amount of money paid to a lobbyist on the issue.
K. ~ The amount of time spent by lobbyists on the issue.
J. ~ Professional lobbyists' work.
I. ~ Overall benefit to the State of Florida as perceived by a
supporting legislator.
H. ~ The amount of constituent support as perceived by a
supporting legislator.
G. ~ The political power of a sponsoring legislator.
F. ~ A special interest group's legislative testimony or
direct discussions with legislators.
E. ~ A public education or grassroots mobilization
campaign.
D. ~ Scientific or research backing.
C. ~ The amount of media attention.
B. ~ A previous attempt to pass similar legislation.
A. ~ A new window of opportunity opening up.
Number of Survey Participants Voting Factor as More Influential to Bill Passage by 
Type
Ranks of 4, 5, and 4 and 5 Combined
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E. ~ A public education or grassroots mobilization…
D. ~ Scientific or research backing.
C. ~ The amount of media attention.
B. ~ A previous attempt to pass similar legislation.
A. ~ A new window of opportunity opening up.
Number of Survey Participants Voting Factor as More Influential to Bill Passage by 
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Ranks of 4, 5, and 4 and 5 Combined
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APPENDIX F: FACTORS OF INFLUENCE, DESCRIPTIONS, SOURCES OF 
CONCEPT, AND GENERAL INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
Factor of Influence Description Source of Concept Cannabis Bill 
Needle/ 
Syringe Bill 




amendment. [Threat of a 
looming constitutional 
amendment was 
influential in the outcome 
of the bill.] 




[Strategy to drive political 
outcomes in an election 
year influenced the 
outcome of the bill.] 
Survey YES YES 
Media Attention—
National  
The amount of national 
media attention. [This 
issue was deemed 
newsworthy and was 
covered by well-known 
national newspapers, 
radio, or TV, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
• Meier, et al. (2009) 
• Paul-Shaheen (1998) 
• Shelov (1995) 




The amount of state or 
local media attention. 
[This issue was deemed 
newsworthy and was 
covered by well-known 
state or local newspapers, 
radio, or TV, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
• Survey 




A previous failed 
attempt(s) to pass the bill. 
[A bill covering this issue 
has been heard by the 
legislature in past years 
but did not pass, and it 
impacted this bill’s 
outcome.] 
• Meier, et al. (2009) 
• Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) 










A new window of 
opportunity opening up. 
[Recent current events 
made the topic of this bill 
a publicly supported, 
priority issue, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
Paul-Shaheen (1998) 
YES 










Persuasive economic or 
business argument. [A 




was made that impacted 
the outcome.] 
• Bourdeaux and 
Fernandes (2007) 
• Hadorn (1991) 
• Harkreader (1999) (as 
fiscally 
legitimate/consistent) 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 
LATENT LATENT 
Educating Legislators 
on Bill Topic  
Educating legislators on 
bill topic. [Educating 
legislators on the bill 
topic was an important 
factor that impacted the 
outcome.] 
Survey YES YES 
Health Argument  
Persuasive health benefit 
argument. [A strong 
public health benefit, 
improved patient 
outcome, or improved 
health care 
(noneconomic) argument 
was made that impacted 
the outcome.] 
• Brownson, et al. (2011) 
• Dodson, et al. (2013) 
• Flynn, et al. (1998) 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 









Scientific or research 
backing. [Researchers or 
research organizations 
have published materials 
in support of what this bill 
addresses, and it impacted 
the outcome.] 
• Brownson, et al. (2011) 
• Dodson, et al. (2013) 
• Heller, et al.  (2014) (via 
universities) 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 










issue. [Bill issue was 
universally appealing and 
transcended political 























A special interest group’s 
legislative testimony or 
direct discussions with 
legislators. [Public 
testimony in legislative 
committees or private, 
scheduled meetings with 
legislators by special 
interest groups impacted 
the outcome.] 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 
• Madler, et al. (2014) 
• Meier, et al.  (2009) 






Personal stories. [Stories 
shared by constituents 
with legislators, either in 
committee meetings or 
during office visits, 
influenced the outcome.] 
Survey SOME YES 
Personal Stories—






children by constituents 
with legislators, either in 
committee meetings or 
during office visits, 
influenced the outcome.] 
Survey YES NO 







additions or alterations to 
bill language suggested 
by lobbyists while under 
final chamber 
consideration that 
















work. [Paid, registered 
lobbyists were a driving 
force behind this bill.] 
• Ahrens, et al. (2011) 
• Bullock and Padgett 
(2007) 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 
• Madler, et al. (2014) 
• McKay (2012) (as 
negative lobbying) 
• Seymour and Seymour 
(2013) 
• Zakocs et al. (2001) 
LITTLE NO 






The amount of constituent 
support as perceived by a 
supporting legislator. [A 
supporting legislator 
perceived significant 
constituent support on the 
subject of the bill in the 
form of letters, calls, or 
contributions, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
• Dodson, et al. (2013) 








Legislators as respected 
health experts. 
[Legislators who are also 
respected as licensed 
health professionals 
influenced the outcome of 
the bill.] 




“Horse trading.” / Trading 
bill support or opposition 
to achieve desired ends. 
[Working with other 
legislators or lobbyists to 
achieve their desired 
results on another bill in 
exchange for desired 
results on this bill.] 
• Ainsworth (1997) 
• Bullock and Padgett 
(2007) 







Perception of individual 
responsibility for health 
issue. [Perception or 
belief by the Legislature 
that a person or group of 
persons should or should 
not bear the responsibility 
for the health issue 
addressed in the bill 
influenced the outcome.] 
Survey; Observational; 
Ryan (1976) (as “blaming 
the victim”) 
NO 






Support of a particular 
legislative committee. [A 
particular legislative 
committee supported the 
bill, and it impacted the 
outcome.] 
• Eyler, et al. (2012) 
YES 
but not as 
standalone 
SOME 




Support of legislative 
leadership. [Legislative 
leadership supported the 
bill, and it impacted the 
outcome.] 
• Flynn, et al. (1998) 
• Harkreader and 
Imershein (1999) 
• Paul-Shaheen (1998) 




Support of a particular 
legislative staff 
director/legislative aide. / 
Support of a legislative 
staff member. [A 
legislative staff member 
(legislative aide, 
committee staff, staff 
director) supported the 
bill, and it impacted the 
outcome.] 
• Brownson (2011) (as 
committee staff) 
• Weissert & Weissert 





Sponsorship of the bill by 
the political party in 
power (legislative 
majority). [Introduction of 
this bill by the majority 
party impacted the 
outcome.] 
• Ellickson (1992) 
• Lindley (2014) 
• Lukens (2014) 










family and friends. 
[External non-legislative 
relationships of legislators 
influenced the outcome. 
For example, a legislator 
has a family member 
Survey; Observational YES SOME 
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impacted by the topic of 









legislators influenced the 
outcome.] 









relationships of legislators 
with others in the political 
process (lobbyists, other 
government branches) 
influenced the outcome.]  
Observational YES SOME 
Sponsoring 
Legislator’s Power  
The political power of a 
sponsoring legislator. 
(May suggest policy 
entrepreneur.) [The 
sponsoring legislator had 
significant political clout 
that impacted the 
outcome.] 
• Ainsworth (1997) (as 
selective associations) 
• Bourdeaux and 
Fernandes (2007) 
• Bullock and Padgett 
(2007) 
• Ellickson (1992) 
• Gray and Lowery (2000) 
• Meier, et al. (2009) 





Overall benefit to the 
state or constituency as 
perceived by a supporting 
legislator. [A supporting 
legislator made 
statements or had known 
positions suggesting that 
the state of Florida as a 
whole or a specific 
constituency would 
benefit from the bill, and 
it impacted the outcome.] 
• Bourdeaux and 
Fernandes (2007) 
• Flynn, et al. (1998) 
• Hadorn (1991) 
• Heinrich, et al. (2013) (as 
important topic) 









Support of the governor’s 
office. / Support of the 
governor’s office. 
[Working with other 
legislators or lobbyists to 
achieve their desired 
results on another bill in 
exchange for desired 
results on this bill.] 
• Flynn, et al. (1998) 
• Harkreader and 
Imershein (1999) 
• Lindley, et al. (2014) 
• Meier ,et al. (2009) 











Governor’s veto. [Threat 
of gubernatorial veto 








State Agency Support 
Support of a particular 
state agency. / Support of 
a particular state agency. 
[A particular state agency 
supported the bill and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
• Bourdeaux and 
Fernandes (2007) 
• Brownson, et al. (2011) 
• Burris, et al. (2012) 
• Harkreader and 
Imershein (1999) 




State surgeon general. 
[Actions directly by the 
state surgeon general, not 
known to be attributable 
to the governor’s office, 
influenced the outcome.] 
Survey; Observational NO NO 
Literature Review 
but Not Asked 
Specifically in 
Interview (7) 
Description Source of Concept Cannabis Bill 
Needle/ 
Syringe Bill 
Celebrity Backing Celebrity endorsement. 
• Demaine (2009) 
• Marsh, et al. (2010) 





Public Education and 
Grassroots 
Mobilization 
A public education or 
grassroots mobilization 
campaign. 
• Ann Christopher (2015) 
(using patient case studies) 
• Dodson, et al. (2013) 
• Gray and Lowery (2007) 
• Harkreader and 
Imershein (1999) (as 
unified health care elite) 
• Holm and Shaheen 
(1995) 
• Lukens (2014) 
• Madler, et al. (2014) 
• Meier, et al. (2009) 
• Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) 
• Paul-Shaheen (1998) 
• Quadrango (2011) 
• Zakocs, et al. (2001) 
YES SOME 
Agency Discussion 
A special interest group’s 
direct discussion with 
government agency 
officials. 
• Madler (2014) 
• Meier, et al.  (2009) 





The willingness of a 
particular legislator to 
champion the bill. 
• Bourdeaux and 
Fernandes (2007) 
• Bullock and Padgett 
(2007) 
• Ellickson (1992) 
• Meier, et al. (2009) 
• Paul-Shaheen (1998) 







Time Spent by 
Lobbyist 
The amount of time spent 
by lobbyists on the issue. 
·Ahrens, et al. (2011) NO NO 
Money Paid to 
Lobbyist 
The amount of money 
paid to lobbyist. 
• Ahrens, et al. (2011) 







Financial support to 
legislators provided via a 
particular lobbyist or 
lobbying firm. 
• Bullock (2007) 
• Jewell and Bero (2008) 
• Seymour and Seymour 
(2013) 
NO 



















factor to successful 
passage of state 
legislation able to be 
categorized as a “general 
factor.” This includes 
actions or circumstances 
that do not logically 
correspond to a clear 
actor encompassed by 
another category, and 
relate to time, generalized 
foregrounding of issue, or 
unique circumstance such 
as sole backing by 
nongovernmental public 
figure. 
      
Constituent 
Champion 




















APPENDIX G: CODING GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
Coding Group Categories for Data Analysis of Qualitative Components 
7 Major Groupings—39 Total Codes (32 unique + 7 miscellaneous) 
 
General Factors (6) 
• Constitutional Amendment 
• Election-Year Politics 
• Media Attention—National  
• Media Attention—State/Local 
• Persistence 
• Window of Opportunity 
Argument and Persuasion (5) 
• Economic Argument 
• Educating Legislators on Bill Topic  
• Health Argument  
• Research 
• Universally Appealing Issue 
Constituencies (3) 
• Legislative Testimony/In-Person Discussion 
• Personal Stories—Adults 
• Personal Stories—Children and Parents Discussing Their Children 
Lobbyists (2) 
• Last-Minute Push/Influence  
• Professional Lobbyist Work 
Legislature (13) 
• Constituent Backing (Legislative Perception of) 
• Health Experts (Legislators as Respected Health Experts) 
• Horse-Trading 
• Individual Responsibility for Health Issue (Legislative Perception of) 
• Legislative Committee Support 
• Legislative Leadership Support 
• Legislative Staff Support 
• Majority Party Sponsorship 
• Special Relationships: Family and Friends 
• Special Relationships: Member-to-Member 
• Special Relationships: Non-Legislator Government Process 
• Sponsoring Legislator’s Power  
• State/Constituency Benefit (Legislative Perception of) 
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Executive Branch (4) 
• Governor’s Office Support 
• Governor’s Veto (Threat of) 
• State Agency Support 
• State Surgeon General 
 
Miscellaneous (7) 
• Miscellaneous—General Factors 




• Miscellaneous—Executive Branch 






Code Name Research Team—Internal Explanation  




Constitutional amendment. [Threat of a looming constitutional 
amendment was influential in the outcome of the bill.] 
General Election-Year 
Politics 
Election-year politics. [Strategy to drive political outcomes in an 




The amount of media attention. [This issue was deemed newsworthy 
and was covered by well-known newspapers, radio, or TV, and it 




The amount of media attention. [This issue was deemed newsworthy 
and was covered by well-known newspapers, radio, or TV, and it 
impacted the outcome.] 
General Persistence A previous failed attempt(s) to pass the bill. [A bill covering this issue 
has been heard by the Legislature in past years but did not pass, and it 
impacted this bill’s outcome.] 
General Window of 
Opportunity 
A new window of opportunity opening up. [Recent current events made 
the topic of this bill a publicly supported, priority issue, and it impacted 
the outcome.] 





Persuasive economic or business argument. [A strong economic 
benefit, return-on-investment (ROI), or cost-effectiveness argument 




Legislators on Bill 
Topic 
Educating Legislators on bill topic. [Educating legislators on the bill 
topic was an important factor that impacted the outcome.] 
Argument and 
Persuasion 
Health Argument Persuasive health benefit argument. [A strong public health benefit, 
improved patient outcome, or improved health care (noneconomic) 





Universally appealing issue. [Bill issue was universally appealing and 





Research Scientific or research backing. [Researchers or research organizations 
have published materials in support of what this bill addresses and it 
impacted the outcome.] 




A special interest group’s legislative testimony or direct discussions 
with legislators. [Public testimony in legislative committees or private, 




Personal stories. [Stories shared by constituents with legislators, either 
in committee meetings or during office visits, influenced the outcome.] 





Personal stories—Children. [Stories shared specifically about children 
by constituents with legislators, either in committee meetings or during 
office visits, influenced the outcome.] 
   
Lobbyists Last-Minute 
Influence 
Last-minute Influence. [Specific last-minute additions or alterations to 
bill language suggested by lobbyists while under final chamber 
consideration that influenced the outcome.] 
Lobbyists Professional 
Lobbyist work 
Professional lobbyists’ work. [Paid, registered lobbyists were a driving 
force behind this bill.] 





The amount of constituent support as perceived by a supporting 
legislator. [A supporting legislator perceived significant constituent 
support on the subject of the bill in the form of letters, calls, or 
contributions, and it impacted the outcome.] 




Legislators as respected health experts. [Legislators who are also 
respected as licensed health professionals influenced the outcome of 
the bill.] 
Legislature “Horse Trading” Trading bill support or opposition to achieve desired ends. [Working 
with other legislators or lobbyists to achieve their desired results on 






Perception of individual responsibility for health issue. [Perception or 
belief by the Legislature that a person or group of persons should or 
should not bear the responsibility for the health issue addressed in the 




Support of a particular legislative committee. [A particular legislative 




Support of legislative leadership. [Legislative leadership supported the 
bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 
Legislature Legislative Staff 
Support 
Support of a legislative staff member. [A legislative staff member 
(legislative aide, committee staff, staff director) supported the bill, and 
it impacted the outcome.] 
Legislature Majority Party 
Sponsorship 
Sponsorship of the bill by the political party in power (legislative 






Special Relationships: Family and Friends. [External non-legislative 
relationships of legislators influenced the outcome. For example, a 







Special relationships: member-to-member. [Internal legislative 






Special relationships—non-legislator. Government process. [External 
non-legislative relationships of legislators with others in the political 





The political power of a sponsoring legislator. (May suggest policy 
entrepreneur.) [The sponsoring legislator had significant political clout 





Overall benefit to the state or constituency as perceived by a supporting 
legislator. [A supporting legislator made statements or had known 
positions suggesting that the state of Florida as a whole or a specific 
constituency would benefit from the bill, and it impacted the outcome.] 





Support of the governor’s office. [Working with other legislators or 
lobbyists to achieve their desired results on another bill in exchange for 











Support of a particular state agency. [A particular state agency 





State surgeon general. [Actions directly by the state surgeon general, 
not known to be attributable to the governor’s office, influenced the 
outcome.] 





Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation able to be categorized as a “general factor.” This 
includes actions or circumstances that do not logically correspond to a 
clear actor encompassed by another category, and relate to time, 
generalized foregrounding of issue, or unique circumstance such as 






Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation able to be categorized as “argument and 
persuasion.” This includes rationale, logic, thought and policy 





Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation able to be categorized as “Influence of Professional 






Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation able to be categorized as “Influence of 
Constituencies.” This includes direct action by an individual citizen or 





Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation able to be categorized as “Influence of the 
Legislature.” This includes direct actions, beliefs, and incentives 
specific to all individuals (including employees and elected officials) 
within the House of Representatives or Senate. 
Miscellaneous MISC-Executive 
Branch: Other 
Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 






Branch.” This includes supportive actions by the governor’s office 
(general counsel or chief of staff level, Office of Policy and Budget), or 




Other, previously uncoded, contributing factors to successful passage 
of state legislation previously uncategorized. This includes all other 
responses in the fill-in section of the Quantitative Phase survey, and 
Qualitative Phase interviews that are not encompassed in any of the 





APPENDIX H: POSTSCRIPT TO THE 2014 FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE SESSION: 
MEDICAL CANNABIS AND NEEDLE EXCHANGE EFFORTS 
Medical Cannabis 
By the end of 2014, 24 states (including California and New York) and Washington, DC, 
had comprehensive medical marijuana laws in place while Florida had passed only a low-dose 
version. In the years that followed the initial bill passage, several cannabis-related bills268 were 
filed in the Florida House and Senate that sought to clarify and expand the work done in 2014. In 
2015, none of these bills269 passed.  
Five additional states, including Florida, had enacted broader medical marijuana laws by 
the end of 2016.270 One of Florida’s many cannabis-related bills271 passed in 2016. The Medical 
Use of Cannabis bill272 (HB 307) was signed into law. The legislation included extensive 
changes to 2014 provisions, including revisions to medical cannabis definitions and physician 
requirements. In November 2016, a constitutional amendment allowing the use of medical 
marijuana for debilitating conditions and setting the Florida Department of Health as the 
regulatory agency, passed on the general election ballot.273 The ballot initiative was sponsored by 
People United for Medical Marijuana, whose listed chairperson was John Morgan.274 The 
amendment clearly removed criminal liability, civil liability, and sanctions under Florida law for 
qualifying patients, their caregivers, physicians, and registered Medical Marijuana Treatment 
Centers. In addition, the list of debilitating conditions275 was expanded to include “debilitating 
medical conditions of the same kind or class as or comparable to those enumerated, and for 
which a physician believes that the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the potential 
health risks for a patient,” giving significant discretion to physicians.  
Of the 2017 cannabis-related bills,276 only the Industrial Hemp Pilot Projects bill277 (SB 
1726) was passed into law. The legislation directed the Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
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Services to authorize and oversee industrial hemp pilot project development for universities. In 
June 2017, a special session of the legislature was convened to address the implementation of the 
constitutional amendment. Senate Bill 8-A, the Medical Use of Marijuana Act278 was passed into 
law along with more than $15 million in appropriations. The bill converted existing dispensing 
organizations to Medical Marijuana Treatment Centers, expanded the number of organizations to 
17, and allowed for additional licenses and storefronts depending on qualifying patients in the 
registry.279 In addition, the legislature passed the Public Records/Medical Marijuana Use 
Registry/Physician Certification for Marijuana and Dispensing/Department of Health bill280 (SB 
6-A), which exempted personally identifying information of patients, caregivers, and physicians 
from public records requirements.  
In 2018, among the cannabis-related bills,281 the Medical Marijuana Growers bill282 (HB 
6049) passed into law, amending a requirement for medical marijuana treatment centers. House 
Bill 4393, Moffitt Cancer Center–Coalition for Medical Cannabis Research and Education,283 
was an appropriations project that passed as part of the general appropriations bill. More 
cannabis-related bills284 followed in 2019, and two bills were passed into law: the Medical Use 
of Marijuana bill285 (SB 182), which expanded the definition of medical cannabis to include the 
smoking of marijuana except in certain locations; and the State Hemp Program bill286 (SB 1020), 
which created the state hemp program within the Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services.  
In July 2019, the Florida First District Court of Appeals upheld part of an injunction 
issued by a Leon County Circuit Court that included finding the vertical integration requirement 
continued in the 2017 law to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida will hear the 
case, although dates for oral arguments have not been determined.287 For the upcoming 2020288 
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legislative session, cannabis-related bills relating to medical marijuana retail facilities, cannabis 
offenses, and medical cannabis use in schools have been filed.  
Needle and Syringe Exchange 
By 2015, 16 states, including California and New York, had passed laws that authorized 
needle exchanges, and other states were working to decrease barriers and remove syringes from 
statutory criminal drug paraphernalia definitions.289 In 2015, Senator Oscar Braynon sponsored 
the Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program bill (SB 1040), which would have that created 
the Miami-Dade Infectious Disease Elimination Act (IDEA). It died on second reading calendar. 
Representative Katie Edwards sponsored identical HB 475, which died in committee.  
By March 2016, syringe possession laws varied, often written into controlled substance 
and drug paraphernalia laws. Five states, including California, required a prescription for syringe 
possession, while 10 states (including Massachusetts and Colorado) and Washington, D.C. 
expressly removed syringes from drug paraphernalia definitions.290 In 2016, Senator Oscar 
Braynon sponsored the Infectious Disease Elimination Pilot Program bill291 (SB 242), which 
created the Miami-Dade Infectious Disease Elimination Act (IDEA). It was passed on March 2, 
2016, signed into law, and became effective on July 1, 2016. The University of Miami was 
authorized to establish a sterile needle and syringe exchange pilot program in Miami-Dade 
County. In addition, the “possession, distribution, or exchange of needles and syringes under the 
pilot program” was found not to be a violation of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act or other laws.  
In 2018,292 Senator Braynon and other legislators sought to extend the IDEA pilot from 
Miami-Dade to Broward and Palm Beach counties or, alternatively to Palm Beach County only. 
No related bill succeeded.  
 
156 
In 2019, the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Health Policy Committee, and 
Senator Oscar Braynon sponsored the Infectious Disease Elimination Programs bill (SB 366), 
which293 provided that any county commission could authorize a sterile needle and syringe 
exchange program. It passed on May 2, 2019, was signed into law by the governor, and became 
effective July 1, 2019. This effectively expanded IDEA across the state of Florida to any county 
desiring the option. No related bills have been filed for the upcoming 2020 legislative session.   
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APPENDIX I: SAMPLE OF SMALL TO MEDIUM HEALTH-RELATED 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Florida Public Health Association 
14646 NW 151st Blvd. 




Florida Institute for Health Innovation (FIHI), formerly known as the Florida Public 
Health Institute (FPHI) 
2701 N. Australian Avenue, Suite 204 





Florida Health Care Coalitions 
Sources:  












General Area Coalition Name Website 
1 Florida Panhandle 
(Far Northwest 
Florida) 
















• Northeast Florida Healthcare 
Coalition (NEFLHCC) 
 
• North Central Florida HealthCare 
Coalition 
 












4 West Central 
Florida 
(includes Tampa) 
Tampa Bay Health and Medical 
Preparedness Coalition website 
http://www.tampabayhmpc.org/ 
5 Central Florida 
(includes Orlando) 
Central Florida Disaster Medical 
Coalition 
http://www.centralfladisaster.org/ 
6 Southwest Florida 
(includes Sarasota, 
Naples) 












• Lee County Healthcare Coalition 
 
 

























7 Southeast Florida 
and the Keys 
(includes West 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, Miami) 
• Palm Beach County Healthcare 
Emergency Response Coalition 
(HERC) 
 
• Broward County Healthcare 
Coalition 
 
• Miami-Dade County Healthcare 
Preparedness Coalition 
 


















APPENDIX J: DRAFT ADVOCACY CHECKLIST 
The Advocacy Checklist 
 
This Advocacy Checklist is designed for individuals and organizations preparing to advocate for 
public health and health-related legislation. The suggested strategies may help to ensure that 
time, money, and manpower are used efficiently. Please see Appendix K, Florida-Specific 
Resources for Advocacy, for a robust list of informational links to assist in carrying out each of 
the recommendations. Advocates should know the schedule and dates for the legislative session 
and pre-session committee meetings to maximize and appropriately time use of the Advocacy 
Checklist. 
 
Recommendation 1: Thoroughly assess the sociopolitical environment. 
✓ Identify or Create a Window of Opportunity. Assess whether there is a social or political 
opening for your topic. For example, are there recent news reports discussing your topic as 
something that needs to be addressed urgently, or has political sentiment recently shifted on 
your topic? Look for opportunities to create a fertile climate for change, to create an opening 
if one is not readily apparent. For example, consider using polling to determine constituent 
support, bringing the issue as a constitutional amendment by citizen initiative if you think 
there will be lots of support for the issue, or generating press coverage to create the 
appearance of urgency or crisis. (Note that some states may allow citizen initiatives for 
statutory changes.) 
✓ Assess Current Leadership. Examine the political makeup and positional leanings of the 
legislative and executive branches, including leadership positions and key staff members. For 
example, check for gubernatorial executive orders or state health agencies publications on the 
bill topic.  
✓ Use the Media. Determine the level of national, state, and local media attention for topic. 
For example, review recent attention and social media stories on the topic; set Google alerts 
for similar news articles.  
✓ Think About Current Political Events. Assess surrounding current and upcoming political 
events to determine the potential impact on the legislation. For example, are you pushing a 
controversial issue that would be difficult to pass in a gubernatorial election year? Has a 
constitutional amendment been proposed for the topic? 
✓ Research Prior Related Bill History. Determine whether this topic has been discussed in 
the legislature previously, how many times, disposition, subtle changes in proposed 
language, and key sponsors and opponents.  
✓ Identify Special Interest Groups. Determine which groups/organizations are likely to be 
interested in the topic and prior legislative efforts, such as health-related groups and groups 
that may be impacted by bill passage positively or negatively (can be a remote connection). 





Recommendation 2: Thoroughly assess the target audience.  
✓ Research Legislators’ Backgrounds. Research the background and positions of key 
legislators. This includes party leadership and other committee members in applicable 
committees where the bill is likely to be sent. Research the backgrounds of people you are 
considering for sponsorship. Learn everything you can about the legislators’ backgrounds, 
such as their education, family, faith, and membership in civic groups. Know their committee 
memberships, political membership (majority vs. minority party), voting records, and any 
campaign promises they may have made related to your topic. 
✓ Identify People Who Can Influence Key Legislators. Find out who might influence a 
legislator’s policy positions. Research who contributed to the legislator’s campaign, the 
legislator’s spouse, information about other close connections (family, lobbyists, business 
partners), and historical and current positions of constituents. Some of this information may 
be found through monitoring social media, local newspapers, election results for local 
referenda, or a sampling of emails to legislators obtained through a public records request. 
✓ Research Executive Branch Members’ Backgrounds. Know the background and positions 
of key executive branch members including the governor, state agency heads, legislative 
affairs, and key staff members of the Governor’s Office of Policy and Budget (e.g., Health 
and Human Services policy coordinator and budget chief, overall director). 
✓ Research Special Interest Groups. Find out which groups are likely to have an interest in 
this issue. Identify proponents, opponents, and others who might later become active in your 
issue. Some may be obvious (such as a medical society for issues affecting physicians). 
However, others may take more work to identify special interest groups. One way to do this 
is by talking to others who already have legislative experience—to see which groups usually 
work on similar types of issues. Once you identify likely proponents and opponents, look at 
their legislative involvement and resources. You can find out whether the group has paid 
lobbyists or whether the group has made campaign contributions. Search their websites to see 
if they have publicly stated grounds for support or opposition. 
✓ Examine Lobbyists’ Backgrounds. After you identify key stakeholders, research their 
lobbyists. Identify lobbyists who are likely to work on this issue. Research current and 
historical information for each registered lobbyist known to represent a client with a position 
on the bill or known to have a strong personal position on the bill. Your research should 
include a review of lobbying registrations (legislative and executive branches), campaign 
contributions, relationships (personal or business), and financial dealings with legislators. 
Consider hiring a lobbyist for deeper-level and historical insider knowledge in addition to 
increased legislative access. 
✓ Build a Supportive Coalition. Identify and work with other groups that have similar 
interests and objectives that can support your advocacy efforts by working together. A 
coalition of groups working together through coordinated advocacy on an issue gives the 





Recommendation 3: Strategically select the health issue to bring forward as legislation.  
✓ Critically Analyze the General Appeal of the Issue. Look critically at your bill topic to 
assess the general appeal of your topic. Ask others who are not as directly involved in your 
topic to give you feedback on the issue. Does the issue have the potential to transcend 
political party lines? If not, reframe or reconsider the issue.  
✓ Reframe Your Issue, When Needed. There are many ways to reframe an issue. For 
example, you can try to identify a sympathetic group that the bill will help, for example, by 
focusing on the benefits of the bill on children, people with developmental disabilities, or 
those with cancer. Most legislative issues are statewide, so you will need to show how the 
issue impacts people across the state. However, if the issue has more of an impact in a 
particular legislative district, you might want to focus your message on that district. Reframe 
your issue to make it difficult for a legislator to argue against. For example, the issue should 
come across as hard to ignore, personally relatable, for the greater good, and attractive for 
positive media attention. Issues become more attractive if they are directly relevant to state 
residents and impactful to districts or regions that are either well-represented by 
policymakers in a position of power (e.g., legislative leadership) or geographically positioned 
where there is a strong legislative representation (e.g., Florida’s Miami-Dade delegation).  
✓ Think about Long- and Short-Term Impacts of the Bill. Consider foreseeable short-term 
and long-term impacts across stakeholders. However, you also want to anticipate that your 
bill will have unintended consequences for some groups or actors. Strategically consider any 
hypothetical ripple effects of your proposed legislation. Those who may be impacted 
indirectly should also be considered as stakeholders. If they can foresee an impact that you 
have not considered or addressed, these indirect stakeholders may advocate against your bill 
behind the scenes. 
 
Recommendation 4: Carefully craft the message and select the messenger.  
✓ Carefully Develop and Frame the Message. Craft a succinct message that explains why 
your issue is both urgent and timely. Know who this issue affects and how many people the 
bill will help. When possible, use a compelling, emotive narrative to accompany bill 
language and convey a nonpartisan, “common denominator” message (e.g., children are 
suffering; increased costs and new cases of HIV/AIDS). 
✓ Research to Support Your Issue. If possible, find evidence-based research to back your 
issue and demonstrate urgency. Show both a health-based and economic-based benefit for the 
bill. Find out if similar legislation has been introduced in other states, and if so, what 
happened. Highlight success stories from other states—particularly from states 
demographically and/or political similar to yours.   
✓ Anticipate Your Opponents’ Arguments. For controversial issues, conduct research early 
to better anticipate objections and provide effective counterarguments.  
✓ Carefully Select the Right Messengers or Champions. Consider initial messaging by 
someone in the majority party or someone with demonstrated bipartisan communication 
skills. In addition, it is always helpful to have a well-known spokesperson who can speak in 
support of the bill. Individuals with a background or expertise in health care, and those who 
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have powerful personal stories can also be helpful messengers. When you are trying to 
identify the “right” messengers, think about the person’s past relationships with key policy 
makers, their prior advocacy efforts, and their reputation and ability to access legislators and 
legislative leadership. Be flexible in messenger choice and consider changing messengers if 
there is no movement over the course of three legislative sessions.  
✓ Evaluate Your Messaging and Advocacy Efforts. Hold annual post-session debriefings to 
review of the effectiveness of both the message and the messenger and adjust both as needed.  
Recommendation 5: Locate a legislative champion or legislative champions. 
✓ Select Legislative Champions. Locate a champion in both the House and Senate. It is 
generally helpful to have your primary bill sponsor be prominent or a rising star in the 
majority party. However, when possible, you may also want to identify a key champion in 
the minority party to make the bill bipartisan.   
✓ Seek a Legislative Champion Who Will Actively Support Your Legislation. Ideally, find 
a legislative sponsor who is well-educated or interested in the issue, and someone who has 
the ability and commitment to push the bill as a priority throughout the legislative session. 
Depending on the complexity of the issue, you may need to identify a policy “entrepreneur” 
who can carry a new idea or lead a controversial health-related topic.   
✓ Educate Your Key Sponsors. Once you have identified your key legislative sponsors, 
supply them with all the key research, talking points in support of your bill, and data to 
counter your opponent’s arguments. Your sponsor will also want to know who the key 
stakeholders are, and their likely positions in support of or opposition to the legislation. 
Recommendation 6: Focus on visibility, influence, and persistence in advocacy efforts.  
✓ Increase Your Visibility. You want your issue to be visible every day of legislative session. 
Your group of allies should schedule meetings with legislators, legislative leadership, and 
relevant legislative staff directors. Testify in committees where the bill is being heard. When 
possible, augment your testimony with visual aids such as photos and videos. Have impacted 
individuals present in the committee room (e.g., sick children) to demonstrate need, show 
support, and provide testimony when possible. You should plan to attend pre-session 
committee work meetings. When the bill is not being heard or you are not meeting with 
legislators, members of your coalition should sit in related committee meetings to be seen. It 
helps to create a sense of urgency and importance by being seen in the halls of the Capitol 
building. 
✓ Build Relationships. Relationships are key to success in the legislature. Always appear to be 
reasonable, approachable, receptive, polite, trustworthy, responsive and knowledgeable about 
your issue, and be considerate of legislative concerns/needs. Work with both sides of the 
political “aisle” to avoid partisan politics. Who are the main legislative contacts, colleagues, 
and friends of the legislator you are meeting? Can the legislator help with an introduction to a 
specific legislator or legislative leadership or directly advocate your cause? Build rapport 
with a legislator and, when possible, enlist their help in reaching harder-to-access legislators. 
Grow support and create trust with legislators and other stakeholders through open-minded, 
open-ended conversation.  
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✓ Leverage Your Influence. Ensure that legislators hear from constituents who are directly 
impacted by the issue. It is particularly effective if the constituents are from the legislator’s 
district. Present testimony by individuals with evidence-based knowledge or training on the 
topic (e.g., health professionals and related students near graduation). Strategically map out 
and leverage key member-to-member and member-to-non-legislator relationships to 
determine circles of influence. Also map out and leverage your coalition members’ 
connections. Continue mapping out relationships until you have found a way to access all 
key legislators. 
✓ Develop a One-Page Issue Brief and Key Talking Points. Never miss an opportunity to 
succinctly educate legislators. Have a one-page advocacy document, research, and elevator 
speech ready to go. A one-page document should concisely list the problem issue, the 
solution including relevant bill impacted/language, financial and health returns-on-
investment, and brief research highlights that includes similar actions by other states. Bring 
the one-pager to every legislative meeting and leave it with the legislator and/or legislative 
aide. Have copies of the most supportive research to leave with the legislator and/or 
legislative aide. Have a concise “elevator speech” ready to go to pique interest in the event 
you pass a legislator in the hallway or elevator.  
✓ Exercise Persistence. You should not expect your bill to pass on the first attempt. 
Regardless, you should work as if it will. Think marathon, not sprint. Build momentum. If 
your bill does not pass, it does not mean failure if you have successfully laid the groundwork 
and support for the issue in the next legislative session. Give best efforts for each attempt. 
Take the time needed to educate legislators, legislative staff (committee staff directors, 
legislative aides, leadership staff), executive branch members, lobbyists, and special interest 
groups. Build support and momentum over time while watching for larger windows of 
opportunity or a perfect storm of favorable social and political conditions. Be prepared for 
multiple legislative attempts and flexible in adjusting bill language or champions. 
 
Recommendation 7: Remain vigilant in the final hours of legislative session. 
✓ Track Your Legislation. - Use a legislative tracking service throughout the legislative 
session to notify you regarding any bill actions. Such services are available free via 
legislative links or through paid subscription services. 
✓ Anticipate Sudden Bill Actions. Know the likelihood of your bill being used as a “train” or 
omnibus, catch-all bill for any issue that falls under the umbrella of “health.” Conversely, if 
the session is ending and your bill has not passed, consider finding a “catch-all” bill that is 
likely to pass and attach your bill language. Understand the likelihood of last-minute 
amendments and have a basic skeleton bill ready as a back-up or compromise, when 
appropriate.  
✓ Monitor Leadership Changes. Look out for any last-minute changes of support, position, or 
prioritization of the bill across the legislative and executive branches.   
✓ Watch for Horse-Trading. Determine if the bill is being used to horse-trade support on 
another bill. If so, monitor both bills closely. You should also monitor all “finish line” bills 
(bills likely to pass) generally. In addition, monitor whether your bill is being held as 
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leverage for political issues (e.g., Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointments) or 
being held until bill language is tweaked to provide economic or other benefits to special 
interest groups. Monitor and quickly counter any lobbying against your bill. If your bill is 
passed, continue to monitor for the possibility of veto and any challenges to regulatory 
implementation. 
 
Recommendation 8: Evaluate and Plan for Continuous Strategic Advocacy Improvement. 
✓ After-Action Review. Evaluate the success of your advocacy efforts: what worked well and 
what could have gone better. Some items would include reviewing an individual advocate’s 
performance and legislative access, whether certain messages resonated with legislators, and 
what unexpected barriers were encountered. 
✓ Revise Strategic Approach as Needed. Strive for continuous strategic/advocacy 
improvement. Consider whether your advocacy efforts are actually “moving the needle” on 
your health policy issue. Use the lessons from the After-Action Review to guide any needed 
revisions to the strategic approach. For example, legislators may be more receptive to 
different bill language or to a particular advocate or lobbyist. Perhaps additional knowledge 
of legislative relationships or more in-person advocacy was needed. Consider also 
collaborating with new partners across business sectors and engaging in year-round advocacy 





APPENDIX K: FLORIDA-SPECIFIC RESOURCES FOR ADVOCACY 
This is a non-exhaustive list of helpful Florida-specific resources for use in conjunction with 
The Advocacy Checklist in Appendix I.  
 
House of Representatives 
• General site—https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/ 
• House Bill Tracker sign-up— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/MyHouse/accountcreation.aspx 
• House Bill search by session/number— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/bills.aspx 
• House Leadership page and descriptions— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/LeadershipOffices/LeadershipOffices.aspx?Ca
tegory=PublicGuide&File=Leadership.html 
• House Majority Office— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/FileStores/Web/HouseContent/Approved/ClerksOffice/
HouseDirectory.pdf 
• House Minority Office— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/LeadershipOffices/HouseMinority/HouseMino
rity.aspx 
• House member pages by Speaker— 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Representatives/representatives.aspx 








• General site—https://www.flsenate.gov/ 
• Senate Bill Tracker sign-up—https://www.flsenate.gov/Tracker/Signup 
• Senate Bill search by session/number/term—https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bills/2020 
• Office of the Senate President—  
https://www.flsenate.gov/Offices/President 
• Senate Majority Office—https://www.flsenate.gov/Offices/Majority/ 
• Senate Minority Office—https://www.flsenate.gov/Offices/Minority 
• Senate member pages by Senate President—https://www.flsenate.gov/Senators 
• Senate directory showing committees and staff—  
https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/SDI
R.pdf 
• District maps—http://www.flsenate.gov/senators/districts 
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• Executive Office of the Governor—https://www.flgov.com/ 
o EOG Organizational Chart (updated periodically)—https://www.flgov.com/meet-
staff/ 
o EOG Legislative Affairs—https://www.flgov.com/legislative_affairs/ 
o EOG Office of Policy and Budget (OPB)—https://www.flgov.com/opb/ 
o Current executive orders—https://www.flgov.com/2019-executive-orders/ 
o Prior executive orders—https://www.flgov.com/all-executive-orders/ 
• Health-Related State Agencies (some may fall as Cabinet, rather than gubernatorial agencies) 
o Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA)—https://ahca.myflorida.com/ 
o Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD)—http://apd.myflorida.com/ 
o Department of Children and Families (DCF)—https://www.myflfamilies.com/ 
o Department of Education (DOE)—http://www.fldoe.org/ 
o Florida Department of Elder Affairs (DOEA)—http://elderaffairs.state.fl.us/ 
o Department of Health (DOH)—http://www.floridahealth.gov/ 
o Department of Revenue (DOR)—https://floridarevenue.com/pages/default.aspx 
o Florida Department of Veterans Affairs (FDVA)—http://floridavets.org/ 
o Division of Blind Services—http://dbs.myflorida.com/Information/index.html 
o Division of Vocational Rehabilitation—http://www.rehabworks.org/ 
 
Election Year 
•  Contributions-Campaign Finance Database—https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/campaign-
finance/contributions/ 












• General lobbying information with lobbying firms, lists, compensation reports—
https://www.floridalobbyist.gov/ 
• Registered Legislative Lobbyists— 
https://www.floridalobbyist.gov/LobbyistInformation/RegisteredLegislativeLobbyists 
• Registered Executive Branch Lobbyists— 
https://www.floridalobbyist.gov/LobbyistInformation/RegisteredExecutiveLobbyists 
• Legislative intelligence, bill tracking, and news service (paid subscription)—
https://www.lobbytools.com/ 
 
News and Historical 
• List of various Capital coverage news sources—https://thecapitolist.com/mediaguide/ 
• The Florida Channel—https://thefloridachannel.org/ 




• Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR)—
http://www.edr.state.fl.us/Content/ 
• Florida Legislature’s Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 
(OPPAGA)—http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/ 
• Florida State University College of Law Florida Research Center-Legislative History 
Sources—https://guides.law.fsu.edu/c.php?g=84905&p=547304 
 
Political Parties  
• Republican Party of Florida (RPOF/Florida GOP)—https://florida.gop/ 
• Florida Democratic Party—https://www.floridadems.org/ 
 
Select Major Organizational Influencers (not limited to health) 
• Florida Medical Association (FMA)—https://www.flmedical.org/florida/ 
• Florida Osteopathic Medical Association (FOMA)—https://www.foma.org/ 
• Florida Hospital Association (FHA)—http://www.fha.org/ 
• Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) of Florida—http://www.abcflorida.com/ 
• Associated Industries of Florida (AIF)—http://aif.com/index.html 
• Florida Chamber of Commerce—https://www.flchamber.com/ 
• Florida United Businesses Association (FUBA)—https://fuba.org/ 
• Florida Fraternal Order of Police—http://www.floridastatefop.org/Home.asp 
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• Florida Hospitality Industry Association—https://floridahia.com/ 
• Florida Justice Association (formerly Trial Lawyers Association)—
https://www.floridajusticeassociation.org/ 
• Florida Realtors—https://floridarealtors.org 
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